Decoding Jammu and Kashmir Poll Results: Exploring National Conference’s Victory, End of Emotional Politics and Emerging Political Trends of Hegemony and Democracy | Adfer Rashid Shah

Abstract

Keywords: Jammu and Kashmir, Assembly Elections, Union Territory, Statehood Demand

Introduction

Omar Abdullah, leader of the National Conference, was sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir on October 16, 2024. He took oath of the office alongside five other lawmakers from his party, including Surinder Choudhary from the Jammu Division, who was appointed as Deputy Chief Minister. This decision of having a deputy CM and two other Cabinet ministers from Jammu aims to balance the power and governance representation, addressing the significant concern regarding representation of Jammu, particularly after the BJP’s overwhelming success in the region. Among the only two women MLAs with JKNC, one, Sakina Itoo was inducted in the cabinet to ensure women’s representation. While the congress chose to stay away from the government and pledged its support from outside, this is seen a strategic step by congress to avoid uncomfortable questions on Article 370 restoration, statehood, etc,.

Analyzing the Voting Patterns in Jammu and Kashmir

The national conference won 42 seats and got the support of 7 independents/other has a total tally of 49 MLAs including a CPI (M) seat. While the congress won just six seats taking the total tally of the pre poll alliance to 55.With this tally JKNC led alliance can win three out of the total four Rajya Sabha seats while the one seat will go to BJP for winning 29 seats with highest vote share in the Jammu division and no seat in Kashmir division. Engineer Rashid’s AIP won just one seat like that of Sajad Lone’s Peoples conference who also won only his own seat in Handwara.CPI (M) won a seat in Kulgam while Aam Admi Party (AAP) opened its account in the Jammu division with one seat from Doda while PDP was completely decimated and reduced to just three seats in whole of the Jammu and Kashmir winning no seat in Jammu division. Also six independents won throughout the union territory.Post-delimitation, J&K has total 90 seats, 47 in Kashmir division and 43 in Jammu Division.

The verdict of the assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir reflects a profound transformation in voting behaviour, illustrating a shift from traditional party loyalty and sentimental politics to a more rational decision-making by voters. The decisive mandate to the BJP in Jammu plains (29 seats), paired with the overwhelming support for the National Conference (JKNC) in Kashmir and Jammu Mountains (42), requires a careful analysis rather than being viewed merely as a reflection of broader trends in Indian democracy. As per analysts, the divergent electoral patterns suggest the emergence of distinct political identities for Hindus and Muslims, with Muslims in Kashmir—alongside the Pir Panjal and Chenab regions—forming a separate voting bloc from Hindus in Jammu plains (Pan-Hindu vs Pan-Muslim Vote consolidation) that they simply call the fragmentation of the vote along the communal lines. However, this perspective oversimplifies a complex reality and a diverse geography of the union territory that needs consistent efforts from Jammu and Kashmir leadership across political parties to sustain the shared identity and the collective sense of belonging to Jammu and Kashmir. Leadership across party lines needs to safeguard the linkages that join both the regions and there is a need to develop more robust and sustainable linkages to build unbreakable bonds so that the two divisions are not seen as distinct and different just on the basis of peoples voting preferences. One such linkage that can prevent such an undesirable social fabric fragmentation besides no Jammu versus Kashmir polarization politics, is the immediate restoration of the ‘Darbar Move’ practice that was more than an administrative ritual but a financial blessing for the Jammu region as well as a strong platform for the ‘people to people contact’ between the two divisions. Also there needs to be more affiliation of leaders from Jammu in Kashmir based parties and vice versa too, to create a balance of power in governance and prevent any instability and security issues in the both the Jammu and Kashmir divisions. Moreover, academia especially universities in the union territory can start joint study programmes, faculty and student exchanges, sign MoUs, joint sports and other activities to bridge the gap and foster harmony between the two divisions.

Of Regional Difference and Political Preferences (Jammu vs Kashmir Division)
Though, the electoral results in Jammu do not represent a complete consolidation of the Hindu vote for many reasons, like it was not a clean sweep as parties other than BJP also won seats from the Jammu division. However the JKNC and Congress alliance still managed to secure a significant portion of the vote share (30.67 %) that couldn’t translate to seats though. Additionally, the JKNC and congress alliance achieved victories on some seats across Jammu, Pir Panjal, and Chenab valley too (8 seats). Therefore, the electoral results in Jammu cannot be solely attributed to a Hindu vote for the BJP solely as 14 other seats in Jammu division went to other parties. This pattern of voting can better be understood in the context of hegemony and democracy in Indian Politics.

Thus, it is misleading to claim that the Jammu’s leadership will lack any representation in the government given the fact that the independents and AAP candidate (4+1) from Jammu are ready to join hands with the National Conference and congress alliance. These alliances will certainly workout the political representation of the people of Jammu in government as Omar Abdullah believes, though it seems more difficult since in the Union territory system, Legislative council is not there to nominate members or appoint them as ministers to give a better representation to Jammu. Some political analysts also assert that the two regions share nothing but a troubled history, implying a lack of commonality. However, despite geographical divisions, there are substantial linguistic, cultural, and economic ties that the divisive politics of Jammu versus Kashmir frequently overlooks.

About the regional patterns of voting that shows a clear divide between the Jammu division and the Kashmir division and the larger question of the balance of power that is taken as something unique to Jammu and Kashmir only by analysts. One needs to understand that it is not just peculiar in Jammu and Kashmir only but deep seated regional differences in political preference should not be seen through the lens of religion or faith only but ethnicity and culture, geography and perceptions, regional identities and political inclinations and aspirations. We have such examples in Telangana movement which led to the formation of the new state. North eastern states and their distinct cultural and political identities, divergent political preferences in Maharashtra, Kargil and Leh, etc,.Omar Abdullah played a master stroke to address the power and governance balance between the two regions by inducting Surinder Choudhary from Jammu (the NC man who defeated UT BJP chief Ravender Raina in Nowshera) as Deputy Chief Minister.

NC and Congress alliance is much robust in Kashmir compared to Jammu as the alliance won 40 seats out of the total 47 seats and 8 seats from Jammu out of 43 seats. Whereas BJP just got 2.17% vote share in Kashmir winning no seats at all but 45.23% in Jammu Winning 29 seats out of the total 43 seats. The vote share of the JKNC +Congress alliance was 41.08% in Kashmir but 30.67 % in Jammu, reflecting that a significant vote share is there in Jammu too that couldn’t translate to seats but proves that it is not a total divide that establishes Jammu belongs to BJP solely and Kashmir belongs to National Conference. Therefore such a voting preference should be treated as beauty of democracy and freedom for people’s political differences and preferences rather than a matter of concern. Already independents from Jammu region, AAP candidate, and the eight candidates of the alliance from the Jammu division already represent the region.

Reasons for Congress Drubbing in J&K

The Congress party suffered a major debacle in whole Jammu and Kashmir wining just 5 seats from Kashmir and only one seat from the Jammu division getting just a 12% of vote share (6% lesser than the previous elections). Given Congress’s huge debacle in Jammu, People started believing it as a ‘Congress Mukt Jammu’ purely because the congress party hardly strengthened its cadre at the ground level and campaigned seriously. A near-total rejection of the Congress party was evident, with the party securing only one seat out of the thirty nine (39) contested. This outcome reflects a lack of strong regional leadership, coordination, and the central leadership’s disinterest in campaigning vigorously in Jammu, despite Rahul Gandhi’s considerable goodwill in Jammu and Kashmir. Why congress avoided rigorous campaigning in Jammu and why did its leadership preferred campaigning on safe seats in Kashmir, remains an interesting question.

Should National Conference take all the Credit for its Electoral Success?

The electoral success of the National Conference cannot be solely attributed to its own credibility or familiarity for being the oldest established party throughout Jammu and Kashmir. Also some analysts wrongly attribute peoples support to NC for being the sole custodian of Kashmiri nationalism, which it is not. Instead, its rise and success beyond its own expectations can be understood within the context of a shifting political landscape, particularly the challenges faced by its main rival, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) over the years. The PDP’s struggles with significantly declining credibility graph and the desertion of the popular leaders from the party rendered it nearly invisible throughout the union territory. The exit of key political figures from PDP over the years further diminished its standing, allowing the JKNC to emerge as the primary viable option and only alternative for the majority of voters, especially youth, in the Valley who wanted the immediate restoration of peoples chosen government. Besides this, other factors also contributed like the people’s confidence in Omar Abdullah’s leadership, the influence and increasing familiarity of the member of parliament Syed Agha Rahullah Mehdi among youth especially, and the socio-psychological and economic impact of a decade-long gap in democratic governance in the UT, all played a significant role in the kind of mandate that the National Conference received. Other factors like the Lieutenant Governor rule, the transition from statehood to Union Territory status that people term as demotion of the state, and the dramatic rise of the new parties largely perceived as the BJP proxies in the valley also shaped this pro JKNC political climate. Additionally, leaders like Er Rashid being tagged as B-teams of BJP and being sent to decimate the established parties vote bank also garnered much support for National conference. Also Peoples Conference and Apni Party, whose electoral performances have been declining due to peoples negative, tagging on them as BJP proxies, left none other than the National Conference in the valley as the only alternative for masses. Besides the presence of numerous independent candidates aimed at fracturing the vote to cast a dent on the electoral gains of the JKNC and PDP bolstered JKNC’s rapport among masses for independents too were purely seen as proxies (vote katwa). Further the Congress party’s limited presence in the Valley, coupled with Ghulam Nabi Azad’s declining credibility post his exit from the Congress (leading to the complete drubbing of his newly launched party DPAP both in parliamentary and assembly elections) also favoured Omar Abdullah to gain more support. People punished all the turncoats badly and all the leaders with negative tags in the valley got thrashed electorally. (Apni party,PC,AIP,JKUM,PDF,etc). The electoral challenges faced by the PDP were further compounded by candidates from the Jamaat-e-Islami, a still banned religio-political organization that was contesting in several key constituencies, resulting in a division of votes that ultimately favoured the JKNC and its allies, such as Congress and the CPI(M).

The Sociology of Jamaat-e-Islami and AIP’s Electoral Setback

Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat) in Kashmir is in search of a political and constitutional legitimacy and people also believe that Jamaat was already in contact with the Centre to lift the ban on them before elections so that they can participate in the democratic process. The Delhi High Court has further upheld the ban on Jamaat despite the organization’s indirect involvement in the recently conducted Jammu and Kashmir assembly elections. Their contesting on 10 seats marked their return to electoral politics after 37 years since 1987. Jamaat’s sudden entry into the electoral arena and at the last moment surprised many and was perceived as the organization’s shift from separatism to mainstream. What people believe that Jamaat contested these elections not to win but to get rid of the separatism label on it and to ensure that it was ready to merge into the mainstream? However, sociologically speaking, one can trace their motivation to Er Rashid’s thumping victory in the Parliamentary elections that he contested while being in Tihar Jail, which garnered significant sympathy vote for him and he could even defeat OmarAbdullah and Sajad Lone like heavyweights. Having faced a prolonged ban that stifled Jamaat’s social, religious, and political activism, Jamaat believed it prudent to re-engage with the mainstream through electoral participation, hoping that this strategy would secure their future by acting in the present and get some immediate respite in their public and personal lives that the ban has casted. Although Jamaat made considerable efforts to garner support during their campaign, the primary reasons for the complete drubbing of their backed candidates—losing badly as 8 out of their 10 candidates even failed to secure their deposits. Should Jamaat be understood as a spoiler (vote katwa) that dented the winnability of PDP on significant seats, remain a curious question.

Engineer Rashid’s AIP faced a similar fate, with only one of its total 36 candidates winning only one seat that too in his home turf while nine candidates securing less than 1000 votes and 31 candidates losing their deposits. Both Jamaat and AIP were further hindered by the prevailing perception, propagated by established parties during their campaigns, that Jamaat and Engineer Rashid were mere proxies of the BJP, which ultimately confused and demotivated the electorate. The voters however demonstrated a clear shift away from emotional politics, as evidenced by the lack of sympathy wave for any particular candidate even for the man who won the parliamentary seat purely on the sympathy card (Er Rashid). About AIP’s downfall people also believe that AIP founder tried to exploit the earlier sympathy wave for his family like giving mandate to his own brother and involving his sons which has not gone down well with a significant AIP supporters.

Why Jamaat Can’t Evolve In Kashmir as a Strong Political Force

If we talk of south Asia especially Bangladesh and Pakistan including India, religious parties or religion based outfits though have a strong street force and participation but this kind of strength hardly translates to votes or to the electoral success in the end be that Jamaat in Bangladesh or in Pakistan. (The decline of Egypt’s brotherhood). Same happened to Jamaat in Kashmir despite a good public street response and an active cadre. Such a response stemmed from a public backlash, sectarian divisions in the larger Kashmiri society, issues related to the readiness of the Jamaat’s ground-level cadre, lack of a proper pre poll alliance with the likeminded parties like PDP, youth as conscious voters’ and their rational calculations thereby rejecting Jamaat, the consolidation of votes among dominant candidates, traditional party loyalties (NC Wave) and national conference and congress alliance or the pre-eminence of established parties, and to the worst horror of Jamaat, a significant vote split among Independent candidates, the PDP, and Jamaat’s own nominees, which inadvertently facilitated the success of National Conference candidates leading to a complete rout of the Jamaat backed candidates. Jamaat is however trying everything it can to get the ban lifted and there are indications that it may again participate actively in the upcoming Panchayat elections in the union territory to prove their integration within the mainstream politics.

This goes without saying that Jamaat cadres being the harsh opponents of national conference politics have predominantly supported the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) since its very inception. However this time, Jamaat’s sudden entry into the electoral fray left little time for the PDP to forge any pre-poll alliances, resulting in disappointing outcomes for both the parties that benefitted the National Conference. It appears likely that Jamaat will garner more support in future to counter the rising influence of the National Conference in Kashmir, particularly as the PDP may take time to recover from its current crisis. But can Jamaat make it without PDP remains a significant question? The fact remains that the PDP previously emerged stronger due to Jamaat’s robust cadre based support be that in 2002 or 2014, Jamaat’s backing significantly contributed to the PDP rise and securing a considerable number of seats (28 in 2014) and forming the government twice. Jamaat has already conducted its initial electoral experiment in recent elections but did not achieve any significant success, suggesting that, beyond securing a few seats, it may struggle to emerge as a significant political entity in future too. Its future may be parallel to that of Er Rashid’s Awami Ittihad Party (AIP), People’s Conference, or Apni Party. Therefore for Jamaat to strengthen its political position and have a say, it has to re-align itself with the PDP, which has always benefited from Jamaat’s strong ground presence—something Jamaat couldn’t leverage independently. While Jamaat has the potential to facilitate the PDP’s re-emergence, it cannot accomplish this for itself and emerge as a strong force to counter National conference in future. Needless to argue that Jamaat can never vote for or join hands with National conference because of their contrast in ideologies and past bitterness, therefore PDP is the lone option for Jamaat since Engineer Rashid cannot emerge as faster as the PDP can. Sociologically speaking, Jamaat given its ideology can be a successful ideologue or mentor to the PDP but not a direct and influential political outfit.

Kashmir’s Conscious Voter Rejected Voting on Sympathy and Emotions

While emotional campaigning and polarization have historically served as effective mobilization tools for politicians in Kashmir, the absence of a legitimate government for a decade has fostered a more discerning electorate. This shift suggests that voters are increasingly prioritizing substantive issues over emotional appeals. A closer examination of the electoral verdict reveals a striking rejection of newly emerged single-leader parties, which suffered due to image and credibility issues exacerbated by established parties’ negative portrayals. The electorate explicitly rejected parties and candidates that relied solely on nostalgia or sympathy, such as smaller parties and independents, including the DPAP and Jamaat-backed candidates despite of the ban imposed on the organization. Even the independent candidate Sarjan Barkati (Sarjan Wagay) lost both in Budgam and Ganderbal even when incarcerated and his daughter ran an emotional campaign for her father’s release and asked for votes on sympathy ground. Voters scrutinized candidates based on their track records, political manoeuvring, ideologies, and past affiliations. The Valley witnessed a total rejection of political turncoats—those who shifted allegiances for convenience over the past decade—since young voters increasingly demanded integrity and authenticity from their leaders. This shift marks the onset of a more rational and challenging political climate in Kashmir. Voters in Kashmir, especially, have moved beyond superficial campaign promises; they now demand transparency and accountability after decades of suffering. The youth played a pivotal role in delivering a decisive mandate to address pressing issues such as statehood status, free speech, unemployment, the drug menace, and basic services like clean drinking water, education, and healthcare infrastructure. For the first time, there was notable youth engagement driven by a desire for outcomes aligned with their aspirations, career concerns, and regional identity—what they refer to as "Tashakhus."

End of the Small Party Politics in Jammu and Kashmir

The overwhelming support for the two established parties, the BJP and the JKNC, rather than fragmented votes, underscores a collective expectation for urgent and effective governance in Jammu and Kashmir. If emotive rhetoric had been effective, Mehbooba Mufti’s daughter would not have lost in her home constituency. A CPI(M) candidate would not have triumphed significantly over a Jamaat-e-Islami candidate in Kulgam, nor would Engineer Rashid’s AIP and Sajad Lone’s JKPC have achieved only a single victory each within their own strongholds. Additionally, an array of independent candidates—representing approximately 40% of those contesting—managed to secure only seven seats, underscoring the emergence of a more discerning electorate. This electoral verdict, therefore, signals a significant shift in voting behaviour, particularly in the Kashmir Valley, characterized by a rejection of emotional politics and a demand for integrity, authenticity, and rationality in leadership. The best lesson that newly emerged small parties (one leader parties-Apni party, DPAP,AIP, JKUM) besides PC and few others can learn is that Jammu and Kashmir electorate has rejected their politics and they hardly can grow robust and powerful in future if they continue with their parties and ideologies. They need to join either the national political parties (BJP, Congress) or the regional established parties. Beyond established party politics there hardly seems any future for small parties in Kashmir.

J&K Youth towards a Conscious Political Engagement

Emotional narratives and populist rhetoric struggled to resonate with an electorate that increasingly demands integrity and accountability from their leaders. This phenomenon, characterized by the presence of angry but silent voters, reflects a deliberate shift toward logic and rationality in political engagement, resulting in the mandate observed in Jammu and Kashmir on October 8, 2024. The people of Jammu and Kashmir aspire to move toward peace, prosperity, and development while seeking redress for their basic issues. They demand candidates who will advocate for their voices, dignity, and the creation of employment opportunities through a clear roadmap and a special employment package from the Centre. The remarkable participation of the electorate, especially young voters, conveys a strong message to the incoming government: "If you fail to deliver, you will have the same seats in the next elections as PDP has now."

Last Word

Reportedly Omar Abdullah will be sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Union Territory on October 16, since the president’s rule has finally been revoked in J&K. However, he has tempered his demands for the restoration of Article 370 and exhibits no antagonism towards the Centre, there by recognizing the necessity of collaborating with them to effectuate the essential reforms and expedite the restoration of statehood.

(Author: Dr Adfer Rashid Shah is a New Delhi based Sociologist, George Greenia Research Fellow and Associate Editor at Eurasia Review. Email: adfer.syed[at]gmail.com)

References

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