The Uncharted Trajectory of India and Pakistan Conundrum | Ajay Kumar Mishra

Introduction

India and Pakistan find themselves once again on the verge of a perilous clash. The rising tensions have propelled the subcontinent into unfamiliar territory, increasing the likelihood of a serious crisis as diplomatic channels are neglected and relations between the two countries deteriorate further. Both sides of the border exhibit a tendency towards war, influencing public sentiment regarding readiness for conflict. Additionally, religious extremism appears to foster a distinct culture that is frequently harsh, oppressive, and closed off, making its effects challenging to eliminate. Social constructivists highlight the importance of shared societal beliefs in forming a society’s unique identity, which impacts its collective interests. These collective interests then determine how society acts as a whole. Constructivist theory suggests that any major change in societal behaviour can only happen when there is a change in the common beliefs that bind the society together.

Additionally, ideational nationalism, viewed as a social construct, plays a significant role in state formation, particularly with the rise of right and far-right political parties that define the state in intensely nationalistic terms [1]. In the case of Pakistan, the distinct historical path and the fundamental characteristics of the state have led to the security establishment becoming a key player in shaping and managing what is commonly known as the Grand National Narrative (GNN). Using various tools and strategies, this narrative is meticulously designed to emphasize security-focused priorities. Importantly, the GNN is closely linked to Pakistan’s military circles, which perceive India as an “existential threat [2].”

In light of the religious extremism currently influencing the direction of foreign policy following the terror attack in Pahalgam, this article seeks to examine whether India’s justified use of force is viewed as the most fitting reaction to Pakistan’s unjustified aggression. Alternatively, could there be a different approach to understanding the origins of this violence and progressing towards a state of shared rationality through self-reflective education and widespread awakening? These questions are particularly significant to examine India’s choices in the context of the rising tensions between India and Pakistan amid the increasingly turbulent global environment.

Conflict in the Present Lawless Global Structure

Historically, wars between India and Pakistan have been short-lived, with international interventions facilitating prompt ceasefire agreements. Given the current global and regional landscape, coupled with India’s growing influence, it is uncertain whether sufficient pressure from external powers could be applied to swiftly end any large-scale war. It is essential for both nations and the surrounding region that the ongoing hostilities do not escalate into a comprehensive military conflict.

With the current decline of multilateralism, the world appears to be descending into a continuous state of anarchy. There is nothing to support the rule-based international order in such a chaotic environment. For example, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the violence between Israel and Hamas, has persisted without the influence of a rule-based global framework. Moreover, parochial national interests emerge to fuel the ongoing conflicts. Meanwhile, these wars seem to only come to an end upon the US’s withdrawal as a key player [3].

It suggests that in a state-controlled global context, a nation can start a conflict; however, the results are shaped by the interests of a third country if its intervention is welcomed. Consequently, India has consistently opposed any external involvement in its bilateral conflicts. In addition, given its limitations, Pakistan’s war aim may be to provoke a limited conventional conflict that could lead to international mediation, reset the link between Pakistan and India, and re-globalize the Kashmir issue [4]. This situation could have broader implications, especially as India faces challenges along its border with China.

Due to the restricted opportunities for international mediation in a disordered global landscape, countries must settle their disagreements through direct negotiations. In the context of India and Pakistan, the likelihood of diplomatic dialogue is limited by a deficiency of geopolitical insight among the political elite. Additionally, Pakistan’s behaviour as a rogue state is dominated by its military, which promotes the antagonistic two-nation theory rooted in religious differences to shape the contemporary nation-state [5].

Constraints of Diplomatic Reactions and Geopolitical Vision

The obstacle facing both nations, and indeed the entire Indian Subcontinent, is for the various countries that have emerged over the last hundred years to discover leaders capable of guiding them into a new period of peace and development, both regionally and domestically. Unfortunately, there is a scarcity of such political leadership in South Asia. Since gaining independence from colonial rule, the region has been hindered by its internal conflicts related to its history, geography, and lingering issues from the past. Additionally, the South Asian dilemma lies in the belief held by many in the region that they can link their fortunes to the global community and pursue progress without enhancing their relationships with neighbouring countries [6].

Furthermore, it signals that hyper-nationalism as a powerful emotion that is easy to become addicted to, as it simplifies complex realities, creates dichotomies, popularizes conspiracy theories, dismisses the potential for genuine self-reflection, and casts the nation’s ’enemies’ as the cause of every challenge it faces. It is no surprise that the promotion of hyper-nationalism, instead of fostering rationality and dialogue, leads to an unending cycle of violence and retaliation. As a result, the absence of a feasible choice for open conflict pushes both countries towards vengeance and retribution, illustrating to their populations that they are responding, which in turn intensifies the hyper-nationalistic rhetoric surrounding the India-Pakistan issue. For instance, in the wake of the Pahalgam attack, the following measures have been implemented: putting the Indus Waters Treaty on hold, shutting down the Integrated Check Post at Attari, abolishing the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme designed for high-ranking officials and special categories of Pakistani citizens, halting visa services for individuals from Pakistan, and decreasing the number of personnel at the high commission [7].

Nevertheless, without the implementation of projects designed to store and reroute Pakistan’s water allocation for use in the Indian plains (constructing such projects in mountainous areas is not only technically challenging but also requires significant time and financial resources), the short-term effect of this decision may not be significant. Additionally, the Attari check post had already been severely underutilized following Pakistan’s trade suspension in 2019, and the number of visas issued to Pakistani citizens had significantly decreased. Consequently, diplomatic efforts have diminished, and diplomatic interactions are becoming less frequent with each decrease in the size of the respective embassies.

As a result, the two nations rely solely on deterrence and coercion to navigate their relationship. Ideally, coercion should serve as a tool to achieve an objective, ultimately persuading the adversary to adopt a more reasonable stance. Thus far, Pakistan has demonstrated no alteration in its actions. As a result, coercion appears to be turning into a goal in itself. Such a situation is susceptible to instability and conflict. However, classic strategic theory suggests that deterrence encompasses more than just the threat of punishment. It involves the imposition of credible, evident, and cumulative costs that progressively influence the adversary’s behaviour over time. Meanwhile, the persistent attacks sponsored by Pakistan against India indicate that India’s responses fail to have any deterrent effect.

India’s Choices in Light of an Approaching Stalemate

It indicates that India lacks enough options to counter Pakistan’s threats. Maintaining strategic patience to diplomatically navigate relations with Pakistan is no longer politically feasible. Additionally, military actions will not provide a viable solution. Consequently, there has been a gradual increase in the Indian military’s response to terrorist attacks carried out by Pakistan-based groups: 2001-2002 (mobilization without direct action); the 26/11 attacks (no clear retaliatory measures); 2016 surgical strikes (limited in reach and effect); 2019 Balakot strikes (narrow objectives). However, the 2025 Operation Sindoor significantly surpasses the scope, intensity, results, and potential for escalation of any previous operations. It refers to the concept of limited warfare that stays below the nuclear threshold carries only ‘experimental risks’ and should not be avoided entirely. Moreover, a backchannel must be quickly re-established to prevent miscalculations, manage the crisis, and keep it from escalating. However, in the wake of such a grave incident, both nations risk falling into disarray. Much like Yeats’ metaphor of the falcon that falls as it "turns and turns in the widening gyre,” [8] severing all connections leaves nothing to lose or gain. For effective coercion or deterrence, India must engage with Pakistan. Therefore, three options seem pertinent. First, India has to upgrade its defence capability of targeting of terrorist in real time and space such as limited airstrikes or Special Forces raids close to the border with Pakistan. Second, India should combine counter-terrorism operations and unpredictable firing along the Line of Control (LoC) with diplomatic efforts at the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Third, engaging Pakistan’s civil society and promoting non-state actors in sports and culture can enhance backchannel diplomacy and foster societal engagement. Their core duty is to ensure that socio-political pressures do not rise to a point where social cohesion lies in tatters [9]. Cultural collaborations mean socioeconomic growth, unity, and serve as social safety valves.

Additionally, a fourth option arises from a pessimistic view of the third, which involves treating the Line of Control (LoC) or ceasefire line as a de facto border, with the aim of eventually making it a permanent international boundary. This option appears to be both ambitious and bold for the current leaders of both nations. However, when considering the on-ground realities, it is evident that Pakistan has accomplished demographic changes by settling non-Kashmiris, military personnel, and others in occupied Kashmir (PoK), along with administratively separating Gilgit-Baltistan into a federally controlled region [10]. These regions would be nearly impossible for India to govern, even if they were to attempt to take control through force.

Conclusion

When conflict shapes societal values and behaviours, there is little to gain and everything to lose. Moreover, the absence of a rules-based international system allows warfare to enter uncharted territories, often benefiting external parties’ interests. As a result, India has little choice but to avoid military confrontation with Pakistan. Instead, it should prioritize backchannel diplomacy and consider beyond-state-centred approaches to engage with Pakistan.

(Author: Ajay Kumar Mishra teaches Economics at Lalit Narayan Mithila University, Darbhanga, India)