Washington’s Strategy in the Context of Afghan Elections

The hard reality in Kabul today is that Washington is averse to the emergence of a strong leader in the Afghan capital enjoying an independent power base.

This was quite evident from the US’ overdrive to tear apart President Hamid Karzai’s front with the Northern Alliance groups against the backdrop of the September 18 parliamentary elections in the South West Asian state. At the other end Karzai’s approach has been different: he is interested in working out a genuine reconciliation with the insurgents with a sense of fairness of purpose—accommodating the Taliban but within the democratic life of Afghanistan and on the basis of the clear understanding that the “reintegrated†Taliban will have to cohabit with all elements of the plural Afghan society. This is not to the US’ liking. Why? Presumably because Washington wants to deal with all these groups separately in order to garner maximum benefit for itself; that won’t be possible if it faces a unified Afghan entity.

Meanwhile the US Congress has been investigating at the moment the Pentagon’s engagement of war contractors and the Afghan private militia. At the same time the CIA has been extensively bribing Afghan officials, politicians and members of the civil society—this is intended to build its own network of those who would actively work to promote US interests. According to UN estimates, only about 20 per cent of foreign aid is actually routed through the Kabul Government.

The US’ strategy is to keep up pressure on Karzai in the near future even as the mother of all questions—how long would the US military be present in Afghanistan?—is yet to be addressed. In this connection it is noteworthy that the Pentagon is learnt to be beefing up its massive military bases in Bagram and Kandahar and has also notified the US Congress about its plans to build new military bases in Mazhar-e-Sharif, Shindand and Camp Dwyer at the cost of billions of dollars.