Wooing our Neighbour?

The visit by US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, was immensely significant for the India-US strategic partnership, perceived to be shaky under the Obama Administration. Gates’ primary agenda was to clear hurdles in defence ties and bolster negotiations on pending military pacts such as Logistics Support Agreement and similar other agreements. Afghanistan and Pakistan figured prominently in his talks with the Indian establishment. Gates referred the Afghan situation as crucial for regional stability and global security. Gates persisted with Washington’s prolonged efforts to wheedle India for a greater role in Afghanistan’s security management, despite Pakistan’s resistance. Sensing an Indian overdrive on Pakistan’s failure to book the 26/11 perpetrators, Gates appreciated India’s restraint after the attack calling it ‘statesmanlike’ and forewarned that Indian response could be aggressive if such events recur. At the other end, Gates was briefed on the inexpediency of technological partnership as the licensing system is not favourable to India.

Being his third official visit to New Delhi, it might be appropriate to call it the third Gates’ Mission to India. This is the third visit of Robert Gates to India and second in the capacity of Defence Secretary, the first being in February 2008. In this regard, it would be interesting to discern Robert Gates’ early association with India which goes way back to May 1990. Indo-Pak relations were at an all time low over rising incidence of Pakistan backed militancy in Kashmir. Hence, President George Bush, Senior sent his Deputy National Security Advisor, Robert Gates, to the Indian subcontinent along with Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly on what came to be known as the ‘Gates Mission’—to defuse the crisis in the subcontinent and ‘avert a possible nuclear confrontation’. In fact he won considerable accolades for his diplomatic feat in the American media circles. Later on, various statements from Gates conveyed that it was his diplomatic efforts that succeeded in averting a possible nuclear confrontation in South Asia. This was the time when the US believed nuclearisation of South Asia and resolution of the Kashmir dispute were inextricably linked.

In the backdrop of a nascent strategic partnership, the second ‘Gates Mission’ to India in February 2008 was multidimensional, spanning regional and bilateral issues, though it was reported that Gates was here to push the case for American companies vying for the coveted contract for 126 multi-role fighter jets. Ever since the Defence Framework Agreement of 2005, the two countries apparently had been working to strengthen defence ties vis-a-vis China’s rising power. During the 2008 visit, Gates also acknowledged his support to the 123 proposal viewed as the cornerstone of Indo-US strategic relationship.

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The two decades of Robert Gates’ association with India has witnessed an unprecedented shift in the Indo-US bilateral relations. This change was acknowledged by the Defence Secretary during his last visit to India. At present, the relations between the two states are burgeoning and there is concurrence on a range of issues including the defence agreements. The much-awaited civilian nuclear pact is a reality. Since the signing of the Defence Framework Agreement and the Indo US Nuclear Deal, the process of mutual understanding and cooperation in the defence sector is progressing. Robert Gates has the essential credentials of an avid statesman. His retention as the Defence Secretary under the Obama Administration underscores bipartisan support for Gates. He inherited the office of Defence Secretary from Donald Rumsfeld, largely held responsible for all the ills in the Bush Administration. Notably, Gates has been working zealously ever since to redress US interests particularly in South Asia and hence this visit.

So what lies behind Gates’ Mission-three? Is it just another US diplomatic feat set against its chosen context or a well-thought political hedging? Since his first visit, Indo-US relations has metamorphosed with Washington’s perceptions on India shifting towards an optimistic plane, especially on its economic growth potential and an equally conscientious nuclear power. These developments in the bilateral ties are undoubtedly overwhelming. However, contentious issues revolving around Pakistan and its relentless support to cross-border terror are incessantly affecting the strategic equilibrium between India and US. India is justified in feeling that the US is complacent when it comes to dealing with Pakistan-aided terrorism against India. Despite solid proof of Pakistani involvement in the 26/11 attacks, the US could do nothing substantive to address India’s demands, apart from reprimanding Pakistan. The denial of access for Indian agencies to Headley has further strengthened the belief that the US engagement with Pakistan is unfettered and its key counter-terror goal is to rein in the Al-Qaeda and Taliban with Pakistan’s assistance.

Interestingly, Gates made an ‘unannounced’ stopover in Pakistan on his way back to the US. In Islamabad, Gates did the same rope-trick by commending Pakistan’s anti-Taliban operations in South Waziristan though admitting that Islamabad is reluctant to act against militants operating across the Indian border. It was, however, dismaying that Gates consciously refrained from making any reference to the post 26/11 actions by Pakistan during his short stay there. Instead, he promised to provide Shadow UAVs to Pakistan for fighting the Taliban, adding handsomely to the booty of F-16 fighter planes, with the affirmation that the regional balance would not be harmed. By doing so, Gates merely added to the inherent contradictions prevailing in US policy towards its all-weather ally. It is common knowledge that these technologies are of no avail in fighting extremists and rather could end up being used against India.

The case of building a strategic partnership with India would be disarrayed if the US fails to explain the persistent flow of sophisticated weapons to Pakistan along with huge aid packages. Apart from this, there are constant irritants which need attention before India and the US pledge strategic allegiance. US inaction on the ISI’s clandestine activities is intriguing as to how it hopes to deal with the Al-Qaeda and Taliban without breaking the nexus which revolves around the agency. Would it take another 9/11 for the US to realise the gravity of such terror linkages? More interestingly, how would the US react if India undertakes punitive actions against Pakistan in the event of another 26/11? Will Gates walk the talk by backing such action against Pakistan-based terror elements?

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Gates had enunciated the possibility of the Al-Qaeda fomenting tensions between India and Pakistan in an attempt to destabilise the region. His objective of downplaying tensions between India and Pakistan is belied by the rising infil-tration in Kashmir along with border skirmishes —essentially underlining that the umbilical chord between the ISI and these groups remain. Though Indo-US relations certainly cannot be held hostage to US-Pakistan ties, such high-profile visits will have little impact unless the US reviews its policy towards Pakistan to make it more coherent and reflective of its stated goals in South Asia. Without convincing and tangible steps in this direction, ‘shared values’ and ‘greater cooperation’ between India and the US would not be realised.

Gates was successful in his first mission to South Asia in 1990, as a plausible conflict situation—though exaggerated by adding the nuclear dimension to it—was nonetheless dispelled. As far as his second mission is concerned, the end results could be well identified as the nuclear deal was back on the negotiating table leading to its finality in October 2008. It is premature to interpret the gains India accrued from Gates’ latest visit. At the moment though the Defence Secretary certainly owes some explanation on his liberal commitments across the border to end the cycle of suspicion here in India.

The author is a researcher at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views presented here are personal.