It was this month, exactly 64 years ago, that India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, facing the worst crisis of his government since the 1947 -48 India War, received a letter from American President Kennedy offering both ’moral and tangible support’ in its ongoing war with China.
A week earlier, on October 20 1962, China had launched two simultaneous attack on India’s western and northeast borders. Over the course of next eight days PLA forces overran all the posts and completely routed a brigade at Thag La ridge taking its commander, Brigadier Dalvi as prisoner. The Indian Army was outnumbered by atleast three to one and many of the soldiers, moved from the plains to high altitudes, had not yet acclimatised to mountain warfare. The reaction in New Delhi was one of complete surprise but the nation rose as one man behind Jawaharlal Nehru who the people felt had been stabbed in the back, and let down by some of his colleagues and even the senior officers in bureaucracy and armed forces.
Kennedy, who held Nehru in very high esteem, would have reacted earlier but could not as he was neck deep in the Cuban crisis which was heading towards a nuclear war with Soviet Russia. But the young President handled the situation with great dexterity and diplomatic finesse, and the Russian (then Soviet) Premier Khrushchev withdrew the nuclear tipped missiles and IL -28 bombers in return for an American public pledge that Cuba will not be invaded.
Asking for American aid was a difficult moment for Nehru, the founder of nonalignment and India’s independent foreign policy championing world peace. But setting aside his life long principle in national interest, Nehru asked the American ambassador John Galbraith to convey to Kennedy India’s acceptance of military aid. He did so after Galbraith assured him that no conditions would be imposed like joining a military bloc or compromise with Pakistan on Kashmir. That was the courage of India’s first Prime Minister that needs to recalled again and again.
No wonder when Nehru died less than two years later, then 40 year old Jan Sangh leader AB Vajpayee, in his tribute to him in the Rajya Sabha said: ’ He ( Nehru ) was never afraid of a compromise with anybody but never compromised out of fear...When he was told we would have to fight on two fronts if there was no compromise on the Kashmir problem, he flared up and said we would fight on both fronts if necessary. He was against negotiating under any pressure. ’
The next day, October 29, following Galbraith’s communication to him Kennedy sent a letter to Pakistan President Ayub Khan describing the Chinese attack on India as an act of aggression and informing him that the United States would provide support to India. He also asked Ayub to reassure India that it would not take advantage of the Chinese attack and remain neutral as Pakistan was member of two alliances built to fight communism. ’This was why Pakistanis and Americans were treaty allies : to fight communism.’ The Pakistan dictator was left with no choice and succumbed to American pressure, though he did argue, wrongly, that it was Nehru who had provoked the war and Washington and London were overreacting. But if Ayub Khan had , ignoring the advice of Kennedy and MacMillan, attacked Kashmir it would have stretched India’s military to the breaking point. Kennedy thus played a decisive role in forestalling a Pakistan attack on Kashmir. He made it clear that both US and UK would view any Pakistan move against India as a hostile and aggressive action inconsistent with SEATO and CENTO treaties.
The United States and UK responded very quickly to the grim situation on the Sino - Indian border and Nehru’s request for armaments. US Air Force aircraft, flying from bases in Europe and Thailand began airlifting weapons and ammunition to India, by November 2, eight flights a day were each bringing in almost twenty tons of supplies to Calcutta. USAF C-130s then transported the arms from Calcutta to airfields near the frontline. The Royal Air Force ( RAF) also soon began airlifting supplies to India, and London began consulting Australian, New Zealand and Canada on providing military aid from the Commonwealth.
There was a lull in fighting in late October - early November. The Chinese offensive in mid November 1962 was much larger and more devastating than October. By 19 November the Chinese had taken over most of NEFA, but in Ladakh the Indian Army repulsed the Chinese attack in places like Rezangla where a company led by Major Shaitan Singh fought till literally the last man ( Shaitan Singh was awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously). It was then that Prime Minister Nehru again wrote to Kennedy describing the grim battlefield situation and sought "air transport and jet fighters to stem the Chinese tide of aggression." But the Indian Air Chief and his senior commanders warned that Air attacks would prompt retaliation, including aerial bombardent of cities like Calcutta and Guwahati. Meanwhile Kennedy had despatched an aircraft carrier to the Bay of Bengal and ordered to substantially increase the airlift of supplies to India. But before the American President could take the decision on USAF manned jet fighters for India, China declared a unilateral ceasefire alongwith the
entire Sino - Indian border on the midnight of November 20, and the war was over.
China also declared that the PLA would "withdraw to positions twenty kilometers behind the line of actual control ( LOAC, now LAC) which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959. The Chinese statement further clarified that in the eastern sector China was withdrawing from the territory it had conquered by force in NEFA. In the Ladakh sector, though they will stay in Aksai Chin, but would pull their combat forces 20 kilometers from the LOAC. India was also expected to keep its forces twenty kilometers from the LOAC in both the sectors.
So why did China suddenly declare a ceasefire and withdrew from areas it occupied in the month long war ( though the actual fighting was only for ten days) ? According to Bruce Ridel, author of JFK’s Forgotten Crisis ( Harper Collins Publishers India) Galbraith met Nehru on November 22 and asked him the same question. The Prime Minister cited two factors : First was the ’anger of Indian people when aroused’ ( the
whole nation had stood behind Nehru like a rock). The second was the " speed of the American response. " This is corborrated by Brig Dalvi, a POW who has written in his book The Himalayan Blunder : ’ Kennedy gave this unmistakable warning to China : " If China advanced any further they would be forcing the hand of the President of the United States. " Significantly the Chinese withdrew two days later. ’
After the war the Kennedy administration began working on a massive military aid to India to the extent of 500 million dollars for the next five years. But before the deal could be finalised on November 26, 1963, Kennedy was assassinated. That was the end of a golden chapter in India - US relations, largely the consequence of Kennedy’s admiration for Nehru and saving his democratic nation from the threat of communism.
(Author: Praveen Davar, an ex Army officer, is a columnist and author of books/ articles on Freedom Stuggle and Partition of India )
Mainstream Weekly