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Mainstream, Vol 64 No 27, November 16, 2026

From Rate Cuts to Rupee Support: The RBI’s Tactical Rebalancing Toward Flow-Based Transmission (June-August 2026) | Akki Maruthi

Monday 16 November 2026

Abstract

On 5, June and 5, August 2026, the Reserve Bank of India kept the repo rate steady at 5.25%, seen as a hawkish pause. However, the key action was in the capital-flow and exchange-rate policies announced with the June decision, not the rate hold. Due to domestic rate transmission, the 125-basis-point cut by 2025 only partly affected retail rates. Since an imported supply shock mainly drove inflation, the RBI focused on capital-flow and forex tools to support the rupee while keeping policy-rate flexibility. This commentary frames as a tactical move within its operational framework, not a change in interest-rate policy, similar to Indonesia’s multi-instrument exchange-rate management. It warns that flow-based measures pose medium-term risks, such as vulnerability to foreign flow reversals, and success depends on inflow stability and duration, not just volume.

Keywords: Monetary policy transmission, Reserve Bank of India, Exchange rate management, Capital flows, Inflation targeting, Repo rate


Introduction

A key policy puzzle emerges: between February and December 2025, the RBI cut the policy repo rate by 125 basis points, from 6.50% to 5.25%, and then kept it unchanged through August 2026. Ideally, such easing would have reduced retail lending rates and monthly EMIs, but this only partly materialized. While total credit grew by 15.4% year-on-year in 2025–26, up from 12.1% the previous year, indicating a functioning credit channel at the aggregate level (RBI 2026a), the RBI noted that actual transmission had slowed. Interestingly, deposit and lending rates increased despite the policy hold and excess liquidity. Although the rate was reduced, retail lending rates did not decline proportionally. This analysis emphasizes the policy-rate baseline but overlooks the operational measures introduced with it. The core idea is that the RBI has tactically adjusted its transmission strategy, employing a flow-based approach to stabilize prices while maintaining the repo rate. ‘Flow-based transmission’ involves managing domestic inflation through foreign currency inflows, rupee stability, and imported prices, rather than directly altering domestic borrowing costs.

Why the Rate Channel Is Impaired

Three mechanisms underpin this structural dampening. First, liquidity seems to be parked rather than lent: the net Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) position has averaged a surplus of ₹2.63 lakh crore since April 2026, and the weighted average call rate has remained within the policy corridor, even as banks facing geopolitical uncertainty prefer holding liquid assets over extending credit. Second, competition for deposits keeps deposit rates sticky. Although inflows from Foreign Currency Non-Resident (Banks), or FCNR(B), deposits increase foreign currency liquidity, they compel authorized dealer banks to balance assets and liabilities, escalating competition for domestic rupee deposits needed to fund localized credit growth. As a result, the marginal cost of funds is not only the repo rate but a blend of deposit and wholesale funding costs. Third, risk premia have risen again: corporate bond yields briefly fell in April 2026 following a West Asia ceasefire but increased again in May as tensions resumed. Mishkin (1996) explains this through bank-level frictions, such as asymmetric information, balance-sheet constraints, and risk revaluation, which hamper the transmission of policy rates to actual borrowing costs. When external shocks influence domestic inflation, the interest-rate channel’s impairment underscores the importance of the RBI’s tactical measures and helps the audience understand the broader context.

The weakness of the interest-rate channel should be seen as uneven transmission, not failure. External benchmark-linked lending rates usually respond nearly one-for-one to repo rate changes, while rates on existing loans adjust more slowly due to reset intervals, fixed components, older regimes, and risk premiums. Between May 2022 and September 2024, a 250-basis-point repo rate hike led to a similar rise in external benchmark rates. However, weighted average rates on new and existing rupee loans increased by 186 and 118 basis points, respectively (RBI, 2024). The main issue is the lag and uneven transmission across borrowers, not a complete breakdown. When transmission is uneven and inflation is mainly supply-driven, a rate cut offers limited immediate stimulus, while a hike could harm interest-sensitive borrowers without fixing the external shock. Holding the repo rate steady aims to maintain domestic monetary conditions while other tools address currency and imported-inflation pressures.

The June Capital-Flow Measures

This is where capital-flow measures come in. Announced with the June 2026 decision, they came from two sources. The RBI lifted restrictions on Foreign Portfolio Investors (FPI) in government securities, increased equity limits for Non-Resident Indians (NRI) and Overseas Citizens of India (OCI), allowed authorized banks to cover FCNR(B) hedging costs, and returned export proceeds realization to nine months. The government also exempted FPI capital gains on G-Sec income from tax to boost inflows via the Fully Accessible Route (FAR). These measures affect the exchange rate and inflation through capital inflows and currency stabilization, showing their strategic role in policy.

The link between measures and inflation mainly works through the rupee. India relied on imports for about 88.7% of crude oil in 2025–26, making energy costs sensitive to oil prices and rupee movements (PPAC, 2026). Estimates show exchange-rate pass-through is incomplete. An RBI study found a 10% depreciation raised domestic prices by 0.6% short-term and 0.9% longer-term (RBI, 2009). Chinoy et al. (2016) estimated that a 1% rupee appreciation reduced inflation by about eight basis points, suggesting depreciation has a similar inflationary effect. The oil-price channel increases exposure. Kundu et al. (2025) found a 10% rise in crude-oil prices could boost India’s inflation by about 20 basis points. The overall impact depends on excise duties, prices, exchange rates, and how fuel costs affect other categories. Rupee support can’t prevent an external oil shock but can help lessen its impact on domestic prices.

India’s reliance on imported crude means that when the rupee depreciates, oil costs rise, fueling inflation and increasing input costs. Interest rate hikes often defend the currency by attracting foreign investment, but during slow growth and supply-driven inflation, they can hurt demand without solving core issues. Instead, the RBI and government could lower costs for foreign investors holding Indian assets, encouraging capital inflows without raising rates. This would strengthen the rupee, reduce imported inflation, and lessen the need for rate hikes, avoiding the collateral damage of tightening during a supply shock. By 31 July 2026, USD 36.725 billion was received through the FCNR(B) swap facility and FPI inflows via the FAR (RBI, 2026b). This indicates a specific policy measure caused rapid capital mobilization within a single inter-meeting period, more immediate than the slow pass-through of rate cuts to retail lending. The asymmetry in visible effect suggests the June package was the more significant policy action, not deliberate inflows timing.

A better evaluation distinguishes gross mobilization from net foreign-exchange liquidity additions and reviews four outcomes: the rupee’s performance against similar currencies, changes in foreign portfolio debt flows, movements in the RBI’s foreign-exchange positions, and hedging costs. This matters because the RBI can intervene in the currency market and conduct offsetting domestic liquidity operations simultaneously. In 2025–26, net foreign-exchange operations withdrew about ₹4.69 lakh crore of liquidity, offset by ₹8.78 lakh crore in net open-market purchases and other liquidity measures, including ₹2.27 lakh crore from long-term foreign-exchange swaps (RBI, 2026). The mobilization through the FCNR(B) facility shows strong investor response, but exchange-rate, reserve, hedging, and liquidity outcomes would better assess macroeconomic effects.

Evidence from the August Minutes

The August minutes introduce three key points to this overview. First, the outlook for growth and inflation has slightly improved: real GDP growth for 2026–27 increased by 10 basis points to 6.7%, while CPI inflation decreased by 10 basis points to 5.0% (RBI, 2026b), marking the first positive combined revision in the cycle. Second, capital-flow measures seem to be functioning as intended: inflows from FCNR(B) and FAR are, on the one hand, supporting rupee stability and mitigating imported inflation (Singh, 2026). Third, the minutes explicitly indicate that a rate increase later in the year remains a real possibility. The Deputy Governor’s statement highlights that, with headline inflation expected to peak around 5.9% in Q3 2026–27, an increase could be considered during the year (Gupta, 2026).

Clarity is key when defining evidence. The MPC resolution records a unanimous decision, but individual members’ statements are more cautious. Any suggestion that the Committee’s reaction function is changing goes beyond the minutes. One member warns that high fuel prices could boost inflation and household expectations remain high (Bhattacharya, 2026). The Governor’s statement clarifies that rate hikes may depend on a supply shock affecting broader inflation, expectations unanchoring, or persistence, though evidence is limited (Malhotra, 2026). It notes inflation is returning from last year’s lows, possibly prompting a policy rate revision, but recommends waiting for more certainty (Malhotra, 2026).

An additional statement from an Executive Director highlights a key distinction: traditional forward guidance, which obliges a central bank to a specific future rate trajectory, versus framework guidance, which outlines the bank’s goals, assessment, and response strategies without setting a fixed timeline (Bhattacharyya, 2026; Cœuré, 2018; Bell et al., 2026). Under this view, two consecutive rate holds do not necessarily signal policy inertia; instead, they may reflect a strategic choice to specify how the Committee would respond to certain triggers while avoiding commitments about the timing of future actions.

The policy statements suggest a conditional reaction, not a fixed interest-rate path. Relying on exchange-rate and capital-flow measures remains justified if inflation stays contained, expectations stay anchored, wage and services inflation are stable, and external shocks don’t cause lasting second-round effects. A rate hike becomes more likely if indicators worsen, especially if rising fuel, transportation, and imported costs affect core goods and services.This formulation makes the tactical-rebalancing argument testable. Alternative tools should matter only when inflation is limited to externally exposed or supply-constrained categories and domestic demand does not drive broad price pressures. If external inflation gets embedded in wages, services, expectations, and pricing, the difference between first- and second-round effects weakens, making the policy rate the main tool for price stability.

Successful inflow management creates a second-order policy problem: RBI’s foreign currency purchases to prevent rupee appreciation inject rupee liquidity, which may need absorption via open-market operations, liquidity facilities, reserve requirements, or other measures. Sterilization limits monetary impact but is neither costless nor perfectly effective.
Persistent sterilization can raise the central bank’s costs if interest paid on domestic liquidity tools exceeds returns on foreign reserves. It also keeps domestic interest rates attractive, encouraging inflows and creating a self-reinforcing cycle. Large, volatile inflows may cause asset-price inflation, lower risk premiums, and increased vulnerability to a reversal in investor sentiment (IMF, 2011). The flow-based strategy depends on domestic monetary policy, shifting adjustment from the repo rate to the RBI’s liquidity operations and balance sheet.

Alternative Interpretations and Limits

The evidence supports a limited departure from solely using the interest-rate channel. A policy pause and capital flow measures serve as exchange-rate management, crisis intervention, or to keep monetary flexibility, not to replace each other. These tools often work together, contradicting the idea of abandoning one. Since domestic rate transmission is weak and inflation driven by imported shocks, the RBI uses capital-flow and exchange-rate measures to support the rupee while keeping policy-rate flexibility, reflecting an tactical adjustment, not a shift away from any instrument.

This formulation relates to an ongoing debate about how central banks behave under officially flexible exchange-rate regimes. Since 2016, India has operated under a flexible inflation targeting framework, using the repo rate as its main tool. Calvo and Reinhart’s (2002) concept of the “fear of floating” is relevant here: active currency management, as in 2026, does not necessarily conflict with a flexible regime, since such management has long existed alongside inflation targeting in practice. Dornbusch’s (1976) overshooting model offers a reason for early intervention: since financial markets tend to clear faster than goods markets, an unaddressed exchange rate shock can overshoot its equilibrium value before domestic prices adjust, prompting a central bank to stabilize the currency regardless of the policy rate. Frankel’s (2019) research on monetary rules for commodity-importing economies broadens this point: a single-instrument approach is often too limited for economies facing significant terms-of-trade shocks, which frequently use reserve and capital-account tools alongside the policy rate. Collectively, these frameworks support viewing the RBI’s 2026 actions as an example of the multi-instrument approach that inflation-targeting regimes have traditionally relied on.

Two key questions determine whether this diagnosis is correct: whether inflation is mainly supply-driven and whether domestic demand is strong enough to cause second-round effects. Regarding the first, Johnson’s (1984) structuralist framework is relevant: in developing economies, inflation often results from inelastic supply, especially in agriculture, and foreign-exchange restrictions, rather than excess demand. This suggests that tightening policy might not only be ineffective but could also harm growth. CPI inflation rose to 4.4% in June 2026 after sixteen months below target, but core inflation (excluding food and fuel) stayed at 3.9% during May–June, and was even lower at 2.3–2.5%, excluding precious metals (RBI, 2026b), indicating a benign demand trend. Concerning the second, agriculture, industry, and services all show resilience without signs of overheating: June’s rainfall shortfall improved in July, foodgrain stocks remain well above buffer levels, manufacturing and services PMI increased through May, and credit growth remains strong without household demand surging beyond steady momentum (Gupta, 2026; Singh, 2026; Bhattacharya, 2026). Both indicators suggest inflation is supply-driven, not demand-driven.

Mohaddes and Raissi (2016) introduce a threshold related to the duration of patience, finding that inflation above around 5.5% leads to a noticeable growth penalty. The RBI’s forecast for Q3 FY27 CPI is 5.9%, above this threshold, suggesting vigilance rather than tightening policy now. The threshold literature emphasizes growth costs from inflation persistence rather than recommending pre-emptive tightening. This cost hits lower-income households harder, as food and fuel make up a larger share of their spending. Imported, supply-driven inflation shocks thus disproportionately affect those least able to bear them, a nuance that a simple aggregate analysis might overlook (Bhattacharya, 2026).

A Brief Comparison with Indonesia

Indonesia is a useful comparison, although its operating framework is better understood as a contrast than as a direct analog. Bank Indonesia’s “triple intervention” involves coordinated operations in the spot foreign-exchange market, the domestic non-deliverable forward market, and the secondary government-securities market. These interventions are intended to limit excessive rupiah volatility, keep the currency broadly aligned with economic fundamentals, and maintain orderly conditions in domestic financial markets (Bank Indonesia, 2020). The RBI’s June 2026 package mainly lowered regulatory, taxation, and hedging costs for foreign capital, exempting qualifying foreign portfolio investors from Indian income tax on certain securities from April 1, 2026 (Ministry of Finance, 2026). Both strategies aim to ease exchange rate pressure without solely relying on policy rate changes. Indonesia intervenes directly in markets, while India adjusts investor incentives. The comparison supports the argument that emerging-market central banks use multiple tools when inflation partly stems from external conditions. However, it does not show that India and Indonesia follow identical reaction functions or give the same role to their policy rates.Brazil and Turkey mainly serve as cautionary extremes rather than direct parallels. Brazil’s history of rapid, credibility-based tightening during inflation surges and Turkey’s currency crisis after unorthodox easing under political pressure illustrate the spectrum within which the RBI’s approach sits. Ultimately, the RBI’s capital-flow rebalancing depends on its inflation-targeting credibility, which could be undermined if flow measures are seen as avoiding necessary, data-driven rate hikes.

Risks and Conclusion

The principal medium-term risk is that instruments designed to attract foreign capital may increase India’s exposure to a subsequent reversal in global portfolio flows. Tax concessions, expanded access to government securities, and subsidized hedging can strengthen near-term demand for rupee assets. However, they may also increase the foreign-investor share of markets that remain sensitive to changes in advanced-economy interest rates, global risk appetite, and exchange-rate expectations. A sudden reversal could simultaneously weaken the rupee, raise domestic bond yields, reduce financial-market liquidity, and force renewed foreign-exchange intervention.

This risk does not make the tactical rebalancing inappropriate, but it changes the standard by which the policy should be evaluated. Success should not be measured solely by the amount of foreign currency mobilized. It should also be assessed through the maturity and stability of those inflows, changes in hedging behavior, the degree of sterilization required, the resulting costs to the RBI’s balance sheet, and the resilience of domestic bond and foreign-exchange markets under adverse global conditions.

The June–August 2026 episode is therefore best understood not as a replacement of interest-rate policy but as a temporary redistribution of work across monetary instruments. The repo rate continued to anchor the domestic monetary stance, while capital-flow, foreign-exchange, and liquidity measures addressed the more immediate external source of inflation risk. The durability of this arrangement will depend on whether it stabilizes the rupee, limits exchange-rate pass-through, preserves control over domestic liquidity, and avoids creating vulnerabilities to a later reversal of foreign capital.

(Author: Akki Maruthi, Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce, SKNG, Government First Grade College, Gangavathi, Koppal, Dist. Karnataka. E-mail: akkimaruthi[at]gmail.com)

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