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Mainstream, Vol XLVII, No 40, September 19, 2009

Afghan War reaches a Tipping Point

Monday 21 September 2009, by M K Bhadrakumar

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The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) handed down to the Taliban a big political victory as a result of the air strikes in the northern province of Kunduz on September 4, which left over 100 people dead and injured. The Taliban propaganda portrayed the incident as “an intentional massacre”.

However, the political impact is felt on several planes. These include, first and foremost, the sense of shock in Germany, where well over two-thirds of people already favor a withdrawal of the 4500-strong German contingent from Afghanistan. Given the burden of history that Germany is fated to carry, the mere suggestion of the Bundeswehr having committed a war crime abroad becomes a sensitive issue. The political class in Berlin will keenly watch how the groundswell of public opinion pans out in the federal election due on September 27.
Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded on September 6 that the international community needed to “apply pressure [on Kabul] in order to find a way to get the Afghans to appreciate that they have to take responsibility step by step... so that the international engagement can be reduced”.

Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeir of the Centre-Left Social Democratic Party, who is Merkel’s main challenger in the election, has been saying for a while that if his party emerges victorious, “as Chancellor, I would push for us to develop plans with the new Afghan Govern-ment to establish a clear perspective for the duration and end of the military engagement”.

Steinmeir said Berlin would push such an agenda during the forthcoming negotiations over the extension of the so-called Afghan Compact, the international aid treaty which expires next year. Steinmeir said that while it may seem “irresponsible” to set an absolute date for German withdrawal from the war, he wanted to negotiate a “concrete schedule” and he thoroughly disagreed with the stance of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union that the Bundeswehr may have to stay in Afghanistan for another five to 10 years.

But Berlin’s policies will influence other European countries. Britain’s Telegraph newspaper reported on September 6, quoting defence sources in London, that both the United States and British governments no longer expected any of the NATO’s main partner nations to send more troops to serve in the combat zones in southern Afghanistan.

Indeed, a pall of gloom descended on the two-day European Union (EU) Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Stockholm over the weekend. According to reports, the EU Ministers showed “no optimism or idealism” in their speeches, which were laced with depressing and “occasionally grisly anecdotal evidence” of the war that is going horribly wrong. The disputed presidential elections in Afghanistan and growing Afghan intolerance toward foreign involvement—and now the Kunduz incident—dominated the Stockholm discussions.

Bundeswehr Draws Blood

The Kunduz incident has triggered a US-German rift as to whether the German commanders or the US pilot were at fault. The German ground commander ordered the strike after assessing the “target” on the basis of the image relayed by the US aircraft, whereas, according to the rules of business, the US pilot has the ultimate discretion to ignore if he isn’t convinced about the “target”. The issue may become an inner-NATO tussle. The Germans are on the defensive to explain why they ordered an airstrike at all. They and the US officials have tried to deflect the blame.

No military likes to be branded as cowardly, yet that is what US critics insinuate about the Bundeswehr’s record in northern Afghanistan. Military analyst Anthony Cordesman, who advises the top US commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrystal, lost no time in lampooning the Bundeswehr’s record in northern Afghanistan.

Cordesman said German soldiers lacked “situational and combat experience” to confront the Taliban on the ground. “They’re as oriented toward staying in their armored vehicles as any group I’ve met. They’re not active enough to present much of a threat to the Taliban most of the time,” Cordesman mocked. The German Defence Ministry pushed back the US criticism, saying it was self-serving. These are unusual public exchanges for two NATO allies. Merkel’s statement on September 6 suggests that Germany will take to the high ground rather than be the butt of ridicule.

Meanwhile, the ground reality is that the situation in northeastern Afghanistan has dramatically worsened in the past two-year period and the German contingent is now taking the blame. The Germans used to think that the war was far away as the northern region has been tranquil so far. They often taunted US commanders in southeastern Afghanistan that the war against terror could also be fought through peaceful means. This thesis has now been blown to pieces, as Kunduz province has become a dangerous place for German soldiers.
To quote Germany’s mass circulation daily Bild, “The Americans—who still have the massive German criticism of them ringing in their ears—can barely conceal their schadenfreude: look the good Germans too are responsible for killing civilians.”

The Germans never wanted to get involved in combat, but they now find themselves in the thick of it. “We are involved in gun battles every other day. We are being shot at and we are shooting back, and we are killing a few of them,” Der Spiegel quoted a German officer as saying. As the weekly put it, “The Bundeswehr must now come to terms with the fact that Germans have previously found difficult to accept: winning the war in Afghanistan requires engaging in active combat.”

Taliban Strategy

On the other hand, the Taliban are spreading their wings in the northern provinces, all according to a plan. The stage has come when it is important for the Taliban to demonstrate in political terms that they can expand the war to places of their choice. In military terms, the Taliban tactic aims at overstretching the NATO.

Again, the Taliban are establishing a presence on the routes through which the NATO’s supply lines pass from the north—from Russia and Central Asian states. They are copying a tactic effectively used by the Afghan mujahideen in the jihad against the Soviet forces in the 1980s.
The Taliban are also moving “foreign fighters” to the north as part of a calculated strategy, rather than this happening due to pressure from the Pakistani military in the tribal areas in the south and southeast. Afghan Defence Ministry spokesmen have confirmed the arrest of foreign nationals in Kunduz and have speculated that cadres of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are involved. If so, it goes to underscore that there is a grand Taliban/Al-Qaeda design towards the Central Asian region, especially towards Uzbekistan, which has been cosying up to the US lately.

No one needs to explain to the Taliban the strategic importance of Kunduz, which used to be the centre of their military command in northern Afghanistan before their ouster in October 2001. The demographic structure of the region provides an ideal platform for the Taliban’s political work.

The scattered Pashtun, Uzbek and Tajik (and Hazara and Arab) communities and their intra-ethnic and intra-tribal tensions are open to exploitation by the Taliban to broaden their political base. Despite his great skills as a politico-military strategist, Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud incrementally began ceding Kunduz province to the Taliban by 1999. This helped the Taliban on the one hand to consolidate their control over the whole of the Shomali plain that stretches up from Kabul to the mouth of the Panjsher Valley, and on the other hand to effectively intercept Northern Alliance supply lines from Tajikistan.

Call Dostum Back!

As the northern provinces get engulfed in a full-blown insurgency, the NATO faces the grim reality that trying to contain an insurgency in a region like Kunduz is going to be beyond its capacity. The US did a smart thing to engage the Northern Alliance “warlords” to do the job of evicting the Taliban from Kunduz in 2001, rather than committing American troops.

Equally, the US (and NATO) may have no choice but to seek erstwhile mujahideen commanders whom they decry presently as “warlords”—Mohammed Fahim, Rashid Dostum, Mohmmed Mohaqiq and Ismail Khan, among others—if the Taliban’s march towards the northern and western provinces is to be effec-tively countered. This is where President Hamid Karzai’s political strategy to work with the established local power groups may prove correct.

The complex ethnic make-up of the region around Kunduz and in the Amu Darya region to the west is such that the NATO will have no alternative but to quickly “Afghanise” the war. There can be no effective anti-Taliban strategy in the Amu Darya region without active local participation. The various ethnic groups live as interspersed communities. Kunduz, in particular, is a tinder box.

For the foreseeable future, therefore, if and when a professional Afghan Army finally takes shape, any “Afghanisation” in northern and western Afghanistan will have to depend heavily on local forces that can offer resistance to the Taliban.

Merkel seemed to be anticipating the looming crisis when she forcefully stated on September 6 in Berlin that “the time has come” to Afghanise the war. She unveiled a joint proposal in consultation with Britain and France calling for an international conference on Afghanistan as soon as the next government is formed in Kabul, to press the point with the newly elected Afghan leadership and “to create some momentum”.

Merkel will be jointly writing, along with British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, to the United Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, to convene an international conference on Afghanistan at an early date.

Peacemaking Initiatives

Several templates have appeared simultaneously. Germany has lost its innocence in the Afghan war. For a country carrying a huge historical burden, foreign wars are never going to be easy. On the other hand, Germany has taken a well-thought-out, long-term decision to assume an “internationalist” role in conflict situations worldwide in line with its aspirations to play an influential role in world politics; there is no going back merely because it is accused of taking 100 or so innocent Afghan lives.

Germany is well aware that wars abroad are a serious business. In Afghanistan, in particular, the war has far-reaching consequences, being vastly more than a mere fight against inter-national terrorism; it is also about the NATO’s future role as a global political organisation and the “unfinished business” of the Cold War, as well as about defining the new world order.

Isolationism, therefore, is most certainly not being considered by the leadership in Berlin. All the same, the Kunduz incident has forced the compulsion, which has been felt for a while already in Berlin, to redefine the German role in Afghanistan. It is against this backdrop that the weekend’s German-British-French initiative on Afghanistan was born.

The initiative may appear a European one, but it has evidently taken place in consultation with Washington and therefore has the added advantage of evolving a trans-Atlantic position on the coming new phase of the Afghan strategy that will provide an underpinning for the new strategy being contemplated by the Barack Obama Administration.

Britain will feel gratified that it has played the cementing role in Europe for the US—which in today’s circumstances for Brown has the added virtue of assuaging an increasingly strident domestic public opinion. In this perception, his government is blundering in the Hindu Kush and precious young British lives are needlessly being wasted in a war that no longer makes sense.

The big question is whether Merkel will insist on a European—and within that, a German—lead role in any Afghan settlement as a quid pro quo by Washington for Berlin’s continued active participation in the war. Surely, there is also the related Russian question. Russia, with which Germany is fostering close ties, will be keenly watching. Moscow has made it clear that it, too, is ready to play a role “politically” in Afghanistan as there is a congruence of interests with the NATO in this sphere. Moscow and Berlin consult regularly on Afghanistan.

Moscow is counting on the changing of the guard at the NATO headquarters in Brussels last month to bring in new thinking about the alliance’s ties with Russia. Meanwhile, a body of opinion has also surfaced lately in influential quarters in the US, Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brent Scowcroft etc., that there is nothing abominable—as the Cold Warriors might think—if the NATO cooperates with the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation and takes Russia’s help in stabilising Afghanistan. The ball, clearly, is in Obama’s court.

The Kunduz incident has displayed a ghastly truth. There is Afghan blood equally on the hands of all NATO countries. Conceivably, those who kill will also insist on having the right to have a say in the downstream of the killing. The September 4 incident in Kunduz may well prove the tipping point in the war.

(Courtesy: Asia Times)

Ambassador M.K. Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

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