Change of Guard seems imminent in Japan

Introduction

Japan goes to the polls on August 30, 2009. Prime Minister Taro Aso who heads the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the LDP-New Komeito coalition announced snap polls after a resounding defeat in Tokyo’s Metropolitan Assembly elections early in July 2009. In this election, the Opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) trounced the LDP with 54 seats to 38, thus precipitating the snap polls.1

Like the Congress in India, the LDP has dominated the Japanese politics and ruled Japan much of the last six decades, except the 11 months period in 1993, when it lost its majority temporarily. All of these are poised to change in the forth-coming elections on August 30. In fact, after the successful five-year tenure by Junichiro Koizumi, there has been a leadership vacuum within the LDP. After leading the LDP to a resounding victory in 2005 by securing more than 300 seats in the 480-seat chamber, Koizumi retired from politics in 2006 but his successors could not live up to the mark. Between 2006 and 2009, Japan saw three Prime ministers—Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda and Taro Aso—but all of them lacked Koizumi’s charisma, astuteness, and professionalism. Since then the fortunes of the LDP has seen a downslide. The defeat of the LDP in the Tokyo Assembly elections appears to be the last nail in the LDP coffin as the Opposition DPJ is most likely to trounce the LDP on August 30.

The LDP had held its top position in the Assembly since 1969. In the election, not only did the LDP-Komeito camp lose its majority but also the number of LDP seats sunk to the record low set in 1965. The DPJ contested 58 seats and won 54, thereby increasing its tally by 20.

That the people wanted a change was demonstrated from the fact that a larger number of voters—54.49 per cent as against 43.99 per cent in the previous elections—turned out to cast their votes. Though local issues such as the plan to move the Tsukiji fish market and abolishing three children’s hospitals were important, the higher voter turnout could probably be attributed to deeper issues such as economy, unemployment, faltering social security system and allocation of budgetary funds.

Though the defeat in Tokyo temporarily sparked talk in the LDP of replacing Aso with a new leader, it seems improbable that the party’s prospect will be better as the last three Prime Ministers ruled Japan without a voter mandate and a fourth was unlikely to do better. After all, people in general are getting disenchanted with the LDP’s style of governing the country and looking for a change. Even if Aso has called for the snap polls to thwart his opponents, the DPJ will deny the LDP a free ride this time. The mistakes committed by the LDP during the last three years cannot be corrected in a short period. The Japanese voters are mature enough not to understand Aso’s strategy.

The DPJ seemed to have kept its house in order. Owing to ill health and the recent fund-raising scandal in which his political secretary was involved, the DPJ supremo, Ichiro Ozawa, paved way for younger Yukio Hatoyama. While on the one hand, the LDP suffers from a serious image problem, on the other DPJ’s Hatoyama boasts of a Ph.D from Stanford University and his relative youthfulness may be attractive to the Japanese voters.

LDP’s Faltering Image

The LDP is in disarray. Some LDP members openly voice their displeasure with Aso. Such voters may be swayed towards the DPJ. The LDP’s strategy of roping in Hideo Higashikokubaru, the Governor of Miyazaki Prefecture, to get votes proved to be counterproductive as he demanded the LDP presidency, thereby making the LDP a laughing stock among the voters.2 Voters seem to prefer young leaders as was demonstrated in the recent election to the Mayor position in the ancient Japanese capital of Nara, in which the DPJ-backed 33-year-old Gen Nakagawa was chosen over the LDP-backed former Lower House Assemblyman. The general perception amongst youngsters in Japan is that six decades of domination in Japanese politics has made the LDP complacent and corrupt. This does not imply that the DPJ will fare better but at least the voters want to give the DPJ a change to prove its worth.

While Hatoyama may be preparing to be Japan’s Prime Minister in a few weeks’ time, the LDP runs risk of breaking apart if it finds itself in the unusual position of losing power. A poll conducted in the first week of July 2009 for widely-read Asahi Shimbun showed that 37 per cent of those surveyed said they would vote for the Opposition DPJ in national elections, compared to 22 per cent for the LDP.3 A poll by another newspaper, Yomiuri Shimbun, found Aso’s approval rating had fallen to 20 per cent.4 The three Prime Ministers who succeeded Koizumi to rule Japan for three years only deepened the country’s political paralysis and could not arrest its economic decline.

In yet another survey made by the Kyodo News on July 18 and 19 soon after snap polls were called to probe their views on the elections, 39.3 per cent of the respondents hoped for a government led by the DPJ, while 14.8 per cent wanted continuity with the LDP.5 The results showed that 20.8 per cent of the respondents favoured having a government formed under a new framework through reorganisation of political parties, and 16.7 per cent to have one formed by a grand coalition of the LDP and DPJ. In the same survey, while 48.4 per cent chose DPJ President Hatoyama as the prospective Prime Minister, only 21 per cent preferred Aso.6

Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintaro was critical of Aso as his position was undermined after the loss in the Tokyo Assembly elections. Aso’s popularity further eroded when some LDP insiders, in particular reformist Nakagawa Hidenao, openly criticised Aso for calling snap elections and not resigning after defeats in local and prefectural elections in Shizuoka, Tokyo, Chiba and Nara. Aso’s argument, however, was that local election results had no bearing on national elections.7 Even Takebe Tsutomu, the former LDP General Secretary and Koizumi’s lieutenant, opined that Aso acted “arbitrarily” in calling snap polls. That Aso could outmanoeuvre the reformists within the LDP could be discerned from the fact that he went ahead in dissolving the Lower House and called snap elections. This was probably for the first time since his assumption of office as the Prime Minister that Aso acted decisively and ignored the objections from the reformists. Change of guard would not have brought major changes within the LDP. Aso could judge that there was no Koizumi around in the LDP’s wing who could resuscitate the party’s fortune singlehandedly. He could again judge, probably correctly, that there was also no Ichiro Ozawa who could pull his reformist faction out of the party as a group as Ozawa successfully did in 1993.8

In fact, the denouement of the LDP has been such that the question of holding general elections loomed in the horizon ever since Aso assumed office last September. But he wanted to wait to give the economic stimulus measures time to take effect, and possibly revive his party’s flagging popularity. That does not clearly seem to be the case as the downward slide continues.

Key Issues

What are likely to be the key issues that the parties are going to place before the electorate? The focus is almost exclusively on the economy. Japan has been in an intractable economic slump for nearly two decades, following the bursting of its “economic miracle” bubble in the late 1980s. As a result, Japan faced a crisis of identity as a result of four factors.9 First: economic malaise yielded slow to no growth, persistent deflation, and the highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the developed world. Second: China has grown in stature and influence so much that it threatens to eclipse Japan’s position as the world’s second largest economy. Third: demographic changes in Japan are putting enormous strain in the government’s social security sector. Fourth: Japan faces a critical dilemma in defining its own status amidst other emerging economies.

Aso passed three stimulus packages, the latest totalling approximately $ 150 billion, or three per cent of the GDP, to pull the country out of recession. The public has not warmed up to this agenda, however. The DPJ offers an alternative stimulus package worth about four per cent of the GDP, centring on payments to households in an attempt to increase consumption. Both face huge challenges in explaining as to how they would raise money for their policy prescriptions.

Impact on Japan-US Alliance

On the foreign policy front, the DPJ wants to have a re-look at Japan’s security alliance with the United States. The DPJ has already an overwhelming majority in the Upper House having won the July 2007 elections decisively. In the ultimate analysis, if the DJP assumes power in the Lower House, Japan is poised for major policy changes, both in domestic and foreign policy fronts. Should the DPJ grab power, it is likely to adopt an independent policy. As a result, its reliance on the alliance with the US may be weakened.

The membership of the DPJ spans a wide spectrum—from former Left-wing socialists to some former Right-wing LDP members. While the former category of members is philosophically opposed to the Japan-US alliance, the latter category supports a more hawkish Japanese security policy. There are others within the DPJ who envision closer relationship with China and pursue Asian economic integration. This category of members also would rejoice if the security alliance with the US is diminished.10

The impact of a possible victory of the DPJ on the Japan-US can be immediately felt especially in one area: the DPJ might look towards negotiating the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that has governed the terms of the US troops’ presence in Japan since 1960. The DPJ would want the cost of the US military presence in Japan to be rebalanced, which may not be good news to the American taxpayers.

On another front, the DPJ might demand that the US troops in Okinawa, particularly the training facilities in the Futenma air base, either be relocated or closed. That would reopen a raw wound in the alliance as an agreement was reached between the two countries after painful negotiations and towards a compromise.

If that happens, US President Barack Obama will be grappling with critical challenges in redefining the US’ northeast policy. With the North Korean issue keeping major powers in the region—Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and the US—engaged, an untested government in Japan may hamper a coordinated policy response towards the Korean peninsula; while at the same time embolden North Korea to adopt a more belligerent posture. The security environment in the region is likely to get complicated further as a result.

A belligerent North Korea with its missile launches and an aggressive China with its military build-up may pose serious problems to the US’ northeast policy if the arrangement of US forces in Okinawa is tampered with. So far the previous US Administrations and the LDP governments have maintained a workable relationship in northeast Asia. The DPJ threatens to topple this applecart.

Another significant departure from the LDP’s stance in the Japan-US relations would be that Japan under the DPJ-led government would wrap off a ‘secret’ nuclear pact. Though the LDP maintains a secret pact which allowed US ships carrying nuclear weapons to stop over in Japan, the government kept denying the existence of such a pact. Open admission of the pact would have contradicted the country’s non-nuclear principles of not possessing, producing or allowing nuclear weapons on its territory. But the former Vice Foreign Minister, Ryohei Murata, testified to the existence of the accord in various media interviews.11 Also, declassified US documents indicate the existence of such a pact.

Under the secret deal, which the two countries agreed on in revising the Japan-US security treaty in 1960, Japan gives tacit approval for stopovers by US military aircraft or vessels carrying atomic weapons, though the treaty stipulates that the US must hold consultations with Japan before bringing arms into Japan. In view of the sensitiveness of the issue in Japan, successive governments have been publicly upholding the three non-nuclear principles and denied the existence of the secret pact with the US, while at the same time allowing the former a free rein on this.

Since the DPJ has a majority in the Upper House, having won decisively in the July 2007 elections by dethroning the LDP, its political alliance with the Socialist Party will facilitate its foreign and security policy further to the Left and away from a broader consensus that has defined Japan’s security alliance with the US for three generations.

Such an assertion may be misplaced. It will not be that easy for the DPJ to sell the idea of weakening the Japan-US alliance to the general public. Despite much euphoria on this, the most likely position of the DPJ on the Japan-US alliance will be to maintain the status quo. Whatever the level of the DPJ’s articulation for renegotiating the status of US forces in Japan as an election plank, it is unlikely to emerge as a major priority issue for the government. After all, Okinawa will be of low priority outside of Okinawa prefecture and is unlikely to overtake other important issues such as administrative reforms, pensions, health care and the economy.12 Though the Socialists and the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) within the DPJ may make some noise, there would be others who would vouch for a hawkish Japanese security policy.

Another point to argue would be that the DPJ would not like to spend more on defence than what was during the LDP era. Though the hawks within the DPJ shall try to see that defence spending does not fall short of the LDP figure, a DPJ-led government might hesitate to divert funds from the social sector. In the realm of governance, which will be the first of its kind for the DPJ, tampering with the six-decades-old tested security alliance would be bad diplomacy. A DPJ-led government might hesitate to support any US initiative to participate in wars far from Japan’s shores if it does not have the UN approval13 and would opt to deepen Japan’s cooperation with other Asian countries as it would like to engage itself more deeply economically and politically with its Asian neighbours. One would therefore expect subtle but not radical changes in a DPJ-led government’s foreign policy.

There are other scenarios. One is that the DPJ would like to make the alliance equal. But the conservatives within the DPJ may not feel comfortable with this kind of arrangement. The second scenario may be that the DPJ will maintain the alliance in its present form but periodically make noise and seek an international role much to the US’ displeasure. But if the US concedes Japan a global role, it has to contend with periodic demands from Japan on issues that may be at odds with it. The third scenario would be that despite much noise being made by the DPJ prior to victory, much of its hard stances would be softened as other issues would take precedence after it assumes office and the real burden of governing the country dawns on the party.

Future

As per the current projections, the DPJ seems to be sitting comfortable. If the DPJ scores a landslide victory, it will find itself in the most enviable position to control the legislative agenda. If the DPJ falls short of majority, it might look for coalition partners. In the unlikely scenario of the LDP emerging as the single largest party but falling short of the two-thirds majority it currently enjoys (and depends on to override vetoes of legislation in the Upper House), it would result in an extremely weaker coalition government.14

Hatoyama has vowed to make the general elections a “revolutionary” one that would put an end to “bureaucratic-led politics and to make the public proactive”.15 In the just-dissolved 480-seat chamber, the LDP had 303 seats, while its partner New Komeito had 31. The DPJ had just 112. This equation is destined to change.

The ruling LDP-New Komeito looks like a coalition in its death throes ahead of an election as successive surveys show its imminent demise. The LDP probably deserves to sit in the Opposition for some time and it is only then it could re-emerge as a formidable challenger to the DPJ. A possible DPJ-led government could bring in measures that would satisfy the individual consumers and workers as against the LDP’s priority of protecting the interests of builders, farmers and businesses.

Though the LDP is likely to lose, it will survive and is not going to look like the Christian Democrats in Italy, who fell apart and never got their act together.16 The trouble is that if Hatoyama becomes the Prime Minister, can he provide a strong leadership? With no previous experience, it would be a huge challenge for Hatoyama to deliver, or else he would risk losing the advantage gained in the polls and voters can have a chance to relook at options when elections to the Upper House will be due in 2010.

As Professor Gerald Curtis of Columbia University, himself a Japan expert, says, a big defeat could make it easier for the LDP to change, since many of the old guards are likely to lose their seats. Says he: “The organised groups can’t deliver because people’s values and interests have become more pluralistic.”17 It seems more realistic to agree with Professor Steven Reed of Chuo University when he says that in 10 years from now, Japanese politics will be dominated by two main parties—the LDP and the DPJ.18 Such a scenario gives hope to the LDP’s future and the interim period will be an opportunity to re-establish itself and regain the trust of the people that it has enjoyed for the past 60 years, barring a short gap of 11 months in 1993.

As regards the DPJ’s India policy, no statement has come out from any of the leaders so far. However, if the DPJ comes to power its foreign policy is likely to be more Asia-centric. Consequently, the existing level of relationship between the two countries is likely to be deepened further. India would expect that it would figure prominently in Japan’s foreign policy radar. In view of the framework in place, a deeper level of cooperation in defence matters will be in order. Prime Ministerial visits have been taking place for the last few years and a return visit of the Japanese Prime Minister to India is due. It will be befitting if Hatoyama chooses India as one of the first countries to make an overseas visit. That will send a strong message not only to the outside world but also to the corporate houses in Japan to identify projects for collaboration and deepen the complementarities.

References

1. The Japan Times, editorial, July 14, 2009. http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/ed20090714a1.html (Accessed on July 16, 2009).

2. “Japan Seeks Change”, http://www.thestatesman.net/page.print.php?usress=1&id=261044&clid=4 (Accessed on July 16, 2009).

3. Martin Fackler, “Facing Party Rift, Japan’s Premier Calls Elections”, The New Yorks Times, July 14, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/world/asia/14jap-an.html?_r=1&ref=wprld&pagewant... (Accessed on July 16, 2009).

4. Ibid.

5. “About 40% hope for govt led by opposition DPJ: Survey”, Xinhua, July 20, 2009, http: //world.globaltimes. cn/asia-pacific/2009-07/448821.html (Accessed on July 22, 2009).

6. Ibid.

7. Tobias Harris, “The LDP’s disorder deepens, but it mains one party – for now”, July 14, 2009, http://www. observingjapan.com/2009/07/1dps-disorder-deepens-but-it-remains.html (Accessed on July 22, 2009).

8. For a background, see Gary W. Cox, “Anatomy of a Split: The Liberal Democrats of Japan”, Electoral Studies, vol. 14, Issue 4, December 1995, pp. 355-376.

9. Dan Twining, “The Coming tsunami from Japan”, http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/07/14.the_coming_ tsunami_from_japan. (Accessed on July 16, 2009).

10. Ibid.

11. “DPJ wants to wraps off ‘secret’ nuclear pact with US”, The Japan Times, July 16, 2009. http://search. japantimes.co.jp/print/nn20090716a3.html (Accessed on July 16, 2009).

12. Tobias Harris, “Japan: The coming DPJ tsunami?”, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/07/18/japan-the-coming-dpj-tsunami/print/ (Accessed on July 20, 2009).

13. Ibid.

14. Nicholas Szechenyl, “The Upcoming Election in Japan”, July 14, 2009, http://csis.org/publication/upcoming-election-japan (Accessed on July 16, 2009).

15. “Japan’s election battle escalates as lower house dissolved”, Xinhua, July 22, 2009 http://world. globalpolitics.cn/asia-pacific/2009-07/449737.html (Accessed on July 22, 2009).

16. Linda Sieg, “Reports of Japan ruling party demise exaggerated”, July 20, 2009. http://www.forexpros.com/news/general-news/analysis-reports-of-japan-ruling-party-demi... (Accessed on July 22, 2009).

17. Quoted in ibid.

18. Quoted in ibid.

Dr Rajaram Panda, a Japan specialist, works as a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.