How the PM fared in Parliament

Just a week ago it was written in these columns that while one cannot deny the turmoil the India-Pakistan Joint Statement following the meeting between the two PMs, Manmohan Singh and Yusuf Raza Gilani, on the sidelines of the 15th NAM Summit in Egypt has caused in the country at large and even the ruling Congress,

a dispassionate analysis of what has been agreed upon at Sharm el-Sheikh on July 16 makes it abundantly clear that the overall outcome of the Manmohan-Gilani talks has been positive. As the Indian PM himself explained, while the discussions there did not unveil any roadmap for the resumption of the composite dialogue, “we have an obligation to engage Pakistan” as only through engagement can one help push Islamabad in the desired direction of taking action against terror being perpetrated in India from Pakistani soil.

What was left unexpressed in that paragraph has now been conveyed by the PM himself. Speaking on the subject in the Lok Sabha on July 29 by way of clarifying the Joint Statement as also his own conduct during his meeting with Gilani, he pointed out that “Pakistan must defeat terrorism before terrorism consumes it” and hence the need to engage Islamabad. Behind this approach lies the imperative need to reinforce those progressive, democratic, forward looking forces within our northwestern neighbour that think alike and desire peace and cooperation with New Delhi. This indeed is a positive objective as has been articulated in some sections of our media as well.

This apart, he made another significant point.

We do not dilute our positions or resolve to defeat terrorism by talking to any country. Other major powers affected by Pakistan based terrorism are also engaging Pakistan. Unless we talk to Pakistan, we will have to rely on third parties to do so. That route, I submit to this august House, has very severe limitations as to its effectiveness, and for the longer term the involvement of foreign powers in South Asia is not something to our liking.

The strength of this argument cannot be overemphasised and Manmohan’s words would
elicit unreserved support from all those engaged in people-to-people contacts between India and Pakistan, that is, peace activists in both countries who have been painstakingly striving to build an atmosphere of trust and amity overcoming all misperceptions among the two states and their bureaucratic-military complexes with a modest degree of success (far beyond what the so-called Track Two diplomacy can ever hope to achieve).

Nevertheless, one must hasten to add that serious misgivings about the way the Government of India handled the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting still persist. The idea of delinking concrete action by Pakistan against the infrastructure of terror (operating within that country for carrying out terror acts in India) from Indo-Pak negotiations should have been followed by the qualification now being made by Manmohan on the issue of resumption of the composite dialogue—that no such dialogue is possible till Pakistan adopts substantive measures against the masterminds of the Mumbai terror attack on 11/26 last year and brings the culprits to book. Absence of this in the Joint Statement has obviously caused confusion in India, and if some people seek to interpret this as a reversal of India’s original stand, spelt out shortly after the Mumbai carnage, one cannot possibly accuse them of being biased. It is good that the PM has clarified the government’s position but the Joint Statement, bereft of this clarification, gives a different picture, and this will create problems in future as it is documents like the Joint Statement that become points of reference (and not their interpretations), as was ably underscored by BJP leader Yashwant Sinha.

Then comes the more important section on Balochistan. Here the Pakistani allegation of “interference” is embodied in the Joint Statement; although no country has been named in it, it is implicit that Islamabad’s accusing finger is at New Delhi. Hence the Indian draftsman should have at least incorporated the Indian denial in the form of Manmohan’s assertion that we are not opposed to any scrutiny as “we have nothing to hide” and “our hands are clean”. Since that was not done Pakistani diplomats can legitimately claim a coup d’etat to the detriment of Indian interests and consternation among public opinion in the country. Here too the Opposition’s criticism is valid and the Left’s observation that this was done under US pressure cannot be simply brushed aside.

Manmohan Singh has hinted that the Pak dossier sent to India (after his meeting with President Zardari in Yekaterinburg and before his meeting with PM Gilani in Sharm el-Sheikh) that admitted “for the first time that their nationals and a terrorist organisation based in Pakistan (LeT—S.C.) carried out the ghastly terrorist act (the Mumbai carnage—S.C.) in India” made him change tack and sign the Joint Statement. If that was so, why was this not explained earlier when Manmohan briefed the Indian media in Sharm el-Sheikh shortly after his meeting with Gilani? From all available indications the PM’s explanation appears to be an afterthought.

The PM also sought to clear the air on the End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) with the US finalised on July 20 during US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to New Delhi. He took pains to explain that India now has the “sovereign right to jointly decide, including through joint consultations, the verification procedure”. However, he did not sound convincing. What was the need for such a generic formulation in the first place? And if it was that vital why wasn’t it brought to Parliament before its finalisation? Manmohan has failed to respond to the editorial submission made in The Hindu in this regard (reproduced in these columns last week in view of the intrusive character of the EUMA):

...there is no justification for allowing onerous end-use verification for American military hardware when other suppliers do not insist on the same. If the Manmohan Singh Government thought otherwise, it should have had a proper discussion in Parliament ahead of concluding any agreement on so sensitive a matter.

While one cannot but mention and acclaim the positive results (in terms of resumption of Indo-Pak engagement in general even if substantive talks like the composite dialogue would depend on Islamabad’s concrete steps against anti-India terrorist outfits in that country) flowing from the two PMs’ talks at Sharm el-Sheikh on July 16, it must be acknowledged in all frankness that the PM has not succeeded in his effort to remove the misgivings generated by the Joint Statement following the Manmohan-Gilani meeting in Egypt as well as the EUMA finalised during Hillary Clinton’s visit to India. Regardless of how far the Congress President backs Manmohan in these matters, the Opposition’s criticisms on these issues would continue to haunt the UPA-II dispensation and definitely place it on the backfoot in the days ahead.

July 30 S.C.