Navigating India - Bangladesh Relations In The Post- Rebellion Context: From Irksome Chapter To The Horizon Of Possibility | Gouri Sankar Nag & Arpan Bhattacharya

Time is volatile with newer crises that make the beacon of hope a more challenging pursuit not only in the war-ravaged Eastern Europe or in the Middle East but even the episode of the July rebellion of Bangladesh that torpedoed the Indian peninsula. We don’t however know how far the US had a role in the regime change, or whether the policy wonks at New Delhi had any tip-off about the impending crisis, but the swift and successful changes in Bangladesh have rendered things more precarious, especially from the point of view of beleaguered Bangladesh’s troubled relations with her western hegemonic neighbour. By now it is conspicuous that the euphoria during the Modi-Hasina chemistry that lasted for more than a decade won’t set the ball rolling. Already India seemed offended by ‘megaphone diplomacy’ by Dr Yunus that raised “contentious bilateral issues through the media” [1]. Although India congratulated the veteran Nobel laureate on his taking over the charge of the interim administration, it was not clear however whether Indian diplomacy was either prepared to adapt to that political transformation which was a matter of its prognosis to connect to the changing pulse of the Bengali nationalism or to face the fresh assertion of demand of Dhaka’s new helmsmen for “fairness and equality” from India. Such a situation is somewhat strange given the cultural ethos India traditionally shares that makes a normative convergence apart from the froth and foam of apparent flirtation maintained with the optics of leadership chemistry. Yet in the days of competitive regionalism spurred by the “Growth Triangle” or “Growth Groupings”, it is difficult to be reluctant about bogey of the fairness treatment since the South Asian theatre is hegemonic. Hence, our purpose in this take is to flag the critical importance of a tension-free rapprochement that would pacify the potential for friction between the two neighbours. Hence while we identify contentious issues, we believe that benign cooperation is required to be maintained not only for spillover from one to the other sectors but also to produce regional stability in which some sacrifice by the hegemonic power, here India, won’t upset the overall benefits that might not be permissible within the Hobbesian paradigm of realism-led bilateralism. So, here we propose new vistas and perspectives to reflect on Bangladesh’s developments, identify persistent and emerging challenges and suggest ways forward for better engagement in the new context.

Firstly, there was a need to move beyond traditional geopolitics and understand the country from the prism of ‘geopolitics of emotion’- a concept highlighted by Dominique Moisi in his book titled “The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation and Hope are Reshaping the World.” [2] In the case of Bangladesh, this emotion is particularly palpable with its Gen Z and digital nomads bubbling with hope that is inextricably linked to their desires for better professional openings and a proactive approach. This current situation is altogether different from the reality of the early 1970s when India’s strategic perspective to Bangladesh was marked inter alia by apparent aggressive behaviour [3] and anti-Americanism. On the other hand, now Bangladesh is a lucrative destination of investment and simultaneously its relative success in the reduction of its poverty rate, socioeconomic growth and the development in its human development index has made the people of Bangladesh aspirational about their future. Thus, they seek greater economic prosperity through improved trade, connectivity and infrastructural development, which finds reflection in the Indo-Pacific Outlook. Hence, a sustained partnership with India would be vital in realising these objectives. [4]

Secondly, China is not Bangladesh’s largest investor, but through the Belt and Road Initiative (i.e. BRI), it has become a major player in the infrastructure sector of the nation. Two prominent examples of China’s involvement are the Payra Power Plant and the Padma Bridge. Sheikh Hasina’s strong links to India are said to have contributed to the reported deterioration of Beijing-Dhaka relations over time. Now Dhaka may try to shift towards Beijing or other extra-regional powers to which India should be sensitive for its security-related implications. India is the second-biggest export partner of Bangladesh and has made investments in several important areas, such as consumer products, infrastructure, and power. India has historically backed Bangladesh but such a legacy should not constrain her sense of caution to deal with Bangladesh not only due to the shifting political landscape of the country but also because smaller powers are structurally driven by sovereignty concerns, hence more likely to be more apprehensive than liberally inclined.

Thirdly, Bangladesh stands at the centre of India’s flagship ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East’ policies. A perennially stable relationship with Bangladesh is also perceived to be helpful in ensuring peace and trust that New Delhi is so eager to maintain in the North Eastern Region. Bangladesh is also collaborating with India in various regional and sub-regional cooperation groups like the BIMSTEC, BBIN, BCIM-EC. However, several crucial factors are threatening to affect the relationship. The residues of colonial hangover undergirding India’s approach towards geopolitics, her unresolved border dispute with Beijing and the mistreatment of Muslims are potential irritants to hamper India’s cooperation with Bangladesh. Besides, according to Kautilya’s Mandala theory, the location of Bangladesh as India’s immediate neighbour needs high tactfulness to manage the dilemma of relationship because confrontation is usually disadvantageous and troublesome. This old insight has given way to India’s tactical posture of concession and conciliation rather than dissension that characterises our Act East and Neighbourhood First Policy. Connectivity, trade, infrastructure and capacity building figure prominently in India’s engagements in the Indo-Pacific. The country deems such ties as important not only from the security perspective but also for mutual economic development as is manifested in its relations with Bangladesh. The Bay of Bengal is a central part of this cooperation as a shared maritime space, connecting the two countries with its other littorals and the wider Indo-Pacific. An interest in finding a foothold in the resource-rich Bay, has also brought many major powers such as Japan and Australia to the shores of India and Bangladesh. These countries are rapidly becoming part of the Bay of Bengal growth story with their investments in connectivity and infrastructure building in both countries, creating in effect trilateral cooperation which holds significance for the wider Indo-Pacific region.

Fourthly, citizens in Bangladesh have repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to struggle for democratic renewal and accountable governance. Various regimes at different times have deviated from the fundamental principles of the state but citizen’s movements have persisted in demanding restoration of these principles. For example, when the military ruler Ziaur Rahman deleted secularism from the constitution and rehabilitated Islamists in politics – including some who were alleged to have collaborated with Pakistan in the 1971 genocide against Bengalis – it was the civil society groups who led the struggle for the restoration of secularism in the constitution, and prohibition of the political use of religion. After decades of civil society movements, secularism was finally restored in the constitution in 2011 and the trials of the quisling of Pakistan started in 2013. But in recent years the flawed elections, repression of political opposition and government measures to control the media and civil society have raised concerns about the democratic future of Bangladesh [5].

Fifthly, Bangladesh’s major challenge however remains in the arena of politics and governance. The challenge before both the government and the people of Bangladesh is the need to enhance the state of governance to a level which is consistent with the needs of the nation’s drivers of growth and the extensive opportunities opening up for the country in the global economy. 3 The first task will be to move towards a regime of accountability in governance through the return to a system of free, fair and inclusive elections which minimises the influence of money and muscle power so that people of modest means can freely participate in the political process. It would be expected that a more representative political process would allow for a more inclusive development process which democratises economic opportunity and narrows social disparities.

Sixthly, India has always been very active in tackling militancy in South Asia. But we cannot club the issue of refugees with militancy. If we do so it would be unfortunate to be guided by a narrow state-sponsored agenda of xenophobia. Culturally the people of Bangladesh, Myanmar and India are so close that we cannot encourage stringent security implications over and above humanity. Hence while the citizenship issue is undoubtedly important, we cannot jump on the bandwagon that refugees like Rohingyas are anti-national which would not only be an anathema to humanity but would indirectly provoke citizens to oppress the refugees. If such things happen, it would have sure repercussions on India-Bangladesh relations because right-wing groups in India always tend to exaggerate the bogey of “illegal Bangladeshis” while keeping mum on Tibetans in Delhi or Tamil Sri Lankan Refugees in Bangalore. This is not only a double-standard game but it also sets the precedence to shape similar responses in Bangladesh where Rohingyas are routinely under attack by Bangladeshi authorities. This is but the reality of reprehensible state aggression. Instead, the benign attitude should be to frame a more humane refugee policy unless the process of the humanitarian situation in northern Rakhine is adequate to permit the Rohingya refugees to safely return. Since Bangladesh and India have friendly and beneficial relations, it is in both nations’ best interests to address the Rohingya refugee situation by dialogue and working through international organizations.

Democracy means more than just free elections. Bangladesh needs to address the challenge of democratising the democratic process to ensure that representative institutions are no longer exposed to elite capture and are rescued from the influence of money and muscle power. Parliament needs to regain its rightful place as the source of constructive debate to address the problems of the country rather than serve as an arena for confrontational politics. Citizens’ trust in the rule of law needs to be established so that they can believe that one law for all prevails without partisan application of law enforcement. The prospects for meeting such challenges depend to a large extent on the political commitment of the leadership to reconnect with the foundational goals of building a democratic, secular and just society in Bangladesh. But in the final analysis, it is the people themselves who as real protagonists of the “telic movement” cannot either be complacent with election or cease the sense of efficacy to stand up against the populist challenge.

The defining feature of state-society relations in Bangladesh has been that these tend to be predominantly structured by the political order and somewhat less by the economic order and marginally by the social order like ideology, ethnicity, regionalism etc. Such portrayal of the relations between political and business elites, perhaps, reflects the dominant trends but counter dynamics are also emerging. For various contingent reasons, certain business sectors have accumulated collective political power to deal with the political elites on their own terms to secure benefits. Also, these sectors currently possess not only veto power (capacity to prevent policy or regulatory reforms deemed threatening to their collective interests) but agenda-setting power (i.e. power to shape future configurations of economic and regulatory policies) as well. Yet as politics is dialectical and moreover it is a realm of poiesis, likewise there is the horizon of possibility in which alternatives are axiomatic.

(Authors: Dr. Gouri Sankar Nag, Professor, Dept of Political Science, SKB University, Purulia; Dr. Arpan Bhattacharya, Assistant Professor, Dept of Political Science, Ramananda College, Bishnupur, Bankura)