Mainstream Weekly

2008 Russian Elections and the Future Scenario

Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra — 2008-04-14T16:19:50Z

The Russian presidential elections in March 2008 and their results did not come as a surprise to Russia watchers. Expectedly Dmitry Anatolevich Medvedev, the candidate backed by President Vladimir Putin, won an overwhelming majority, that is, more than seventy per cent of votes amidst charges of irregularities and state patronage. Besides the high drama of rejection of some high profile candidates such as former Prime Minister, Kasyanov, the boycott of elections by some international monitors despite the Putin administration's assurance of fairness have added much colour to the recent elections. The world leaders and media remained cautious in exercising their opinions over the election results, for instance while US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice looked forward to work with the Kremlin under Medvedev, she did not pronounce any judgement on the results or electoral campaigns. The succession of Medvedev to the highest office of Russia on May 7, 2008 and the political aftermath too have been subject to wide speculations. This article analyses all these issues related to the recent presidential elections, and then focuses on the future course of action the new President would likely take.

IT was till December 2007 that speculations were rife about who will be the next Russian President after Vladimir Putin, who declared his unwillingness to amend the Constitution and contest for a third term. Though the names of the First Deputy Prime Ministers Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov, and other low profile leaders such as Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov were doing the rounds for succession, it was still difficult to predict the name Putin would choose. On December 10, 2007 Putin ended all speculation by announcing the name of Medvedev as his preferred successor at a meeting of the United Russia Party, the patron party of the Russian President. Besides United Russia, four other parties—Fair Russia, Agrarian Party, Civilian Power, Russian Ecological Party ‘The Greens'—supported the candidature of Medvedev. On December 17, 2007 Medvedev was officially declared as their candidate in the 2008 presidential election. On December 20, 2007 Medvedev formally registered his candidacy with the Central Election Commission which after one day, on December 21, 2007, accepted the candidacy as valid.

Besides Medvedev, four other candidates registered with the Central Electoral Commission to contest the elections. The most popular among these four candidates was the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Gennady Zyuganov. Zyuganov is a veteran of the Communist Party in Russia. His popularity was at its peak when he almost gave a second run to then Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, in 1996. He remained the official Communist candidate in later presidential elections in 2000 and 2004, but lost to Putin. Another candidate, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party, also the Deputy Speaker of the Duma, is known for his eccentric way of dealing with things. Reportedly he physically hurt his opponent in a TV discussion programme during the election campaign. Regarding India he often advocates strong relations with the South Asian country and calls for Russia's strategic inroad to the Indian Ocean. Though he contested all the presidential elections, he never secured more than eight per cent of votes. Andrei Bogdanov, the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, was the youngest of all candidates at the age of thirtyseven, but without a mass base. Boris Nemtsov of the Union of Right Forces withdrew his candidature on December 26, 2007 and supported the candidature of Mikhail Kasyanov of the People's Democratic Union.

One of the most controversial aspects of the electoral process was the disqualification of the candidature of the former Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, on controversial grounds. His candidature was rejected on the ground that many of signatures of support (for successful registration of candidature one should have the support of two million citizens) were forged and owing to this shortcoming he was declared disqualified. Kasyanov appealed against the decision of the Electoral Commission to the Supreme Court, which rejected the appeal on February 6, 2008. This issue of rejection raised dissenting voices in various quarters accusing the government body of partiality. Some of the other candidates whose candidatures were rejected included Vladimir Bukovsky, Nikolai Kuryanovich and Oleg Shenin. Bukovsky was a Soviet-era dissident. His candidature was rejected on the ground that he was not living in Russia for the last ten years, a requirement for candidature. Kuryanovich's ultra-Right ideas and open admiration of Hitler led to the rejection of his candidature.

The opinion polls before the election were divided on the percentage of votes the contesting candidates would secure, though all the polls agreed with the forgone conclusion that the Kremlin-backed candidate, Medvedev, was going to win the election. According to an opinion poll published in BBC News on January 20, 2008, about 82 per cent of people said they would vote for Medvedev, followed by Zyuganov, whose poll rating was between six and 15 per cent. Other candidates secured less than six per cent of votes. This poll showed the huge popularity of the candidate supported by President Putin. It appears that it was the popularity of Putin which fetched Medvedev such a huge percentage of votes in opinion polls, which later actualised in practice. It can be mentioned here that the election posters during the campaign portrayed Putin and Medvedev standing side-by-side with the slogan ‘together we will win'. Another opinion poll by the Levada Centre in Moscow, in September 2007 after Putin announced his intention to head the United Russia party in the parliamentary elections, showed a lead for Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev (then prospective candidates for presidency), with 34 per cent and 30 per cent of the votes respectively.

The elections took place on March 2, 2008 amidst complaints by international organisations and media of unfair means adopted by the Kremlin to garner more support for Medvedev. One of the major setbacks to the elections in the context of impartiality was the refusal of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in its capacity as an international election standards watchdog, to monitor the elections because of undue restrictions put by the government. Russia later agreed to increase the number of OSCE observers and extend the time-frame for their visit, but the OSCE refused the offer as it did not meet its requirements. It insisted to send at least 50 observers on February 15, 2008, five days before the date proposed by Moscow, in order to effectively monitor the election campaign, which Moscow refused to accept. The February 28, 2008 issue of The Economist reported, quoting figures from SCAN, a media database owned by Interfax, that Medvedev was mentioned over six times more often than his three rivals in 1000 different news sources. The Russian newspaper, Novaya Gazeta, reported forged election protocols and cases in which independent observers were not allowed to monitor the election process. Reportedly, in an incident in Biysk city in the Altai Krai region of Southern Siberia three out of nine members of the local Electoral Commission refused to sign the protocols citing widespread irregularities.

The Russian civil society organisation, Golos (a Russian name, literally meaning ‘voice'), after covering 40 Russian regions during elections, observed that the elections were largely free and fair but with irregularities. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) observer mission stated: “The election is a major factor in the further democratisation of public life in the Russian Federation, and recognises it as free, open and transparent.” A similar view was expressed by the observers of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as they hailed the elections as free, fair and in line with international standards. The observers from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe stated the elections ware a “reflection of the will of an electorate whose democratic potential was, unfortunately, not tapped”.

As per the data provided by the Central Electoral Commission, 69.6 per cent of Russia's 109 million registered voters took part in the poll. The elections took place with 300 international observers and 96,000 polling stations. On the expected lines Medvedev was declared elected by the Electoral Commission. The total break-up of number of votes and percentage of votes secured by candidates was as following: out of total 73,731,116 votes cast, 1,015,533 votes proved to be invalid due to one or other reasons. Medvedev secured 52,530,712 votes, amounting to 70.28 per cent of votes cast. His closest rival Zyuganov secured 13,243,550 votes, amounting to 17.72 per cent of votes. Zhirinovsky secured the third position with 6,988,510 votes and 9.35 per cent. Andrei Bogdanov secured only a marginal 968,344 votes, amounting to 1.30 per cent of votes. The election results officially made the path clear for Medvedev to be crowned the third President of Russia.

Many in the Western media portrayed the presidential election as nothing but farce, criticising it as ‘mockery' marking the country's ‘retreat from democracy'. Some analysts expressed the opinion that the overwhelming majority for Medvedev was a mandate for Putin's policies. Some others expressed the opinion that it was the fear of likely Western interference as in the neighbouring countries which motivated the voters to favour the official candidate. President Putin hailed the election of Medvedev and observed that it would help in ‘maintaining the course we (himself and Medvedev) have chosen together and been implementing together'. Medvedev without any reservation stated that his term would be a ‘direct continuation' of Putin's policies. He dismissed predictions of his role as a puppet under Putin, who would likely serve as the Prime Minister under his presidency.

The international reaction to the election of Medvedev was rather restrained. On the eve of his election as the President, a White House spokesman from Washington stated in a formal tone that ‘the United States looks forward to working with him.' The unofficial US response appeared critical and harsh. Hillary Clinton of the Democratic Party observed that the elections marked ‘a milestone in the country's retreat from democracy'. The European Union (EU) Commission President, Jose Manuel Barroso, expressed the hope that under the leadership of Medvedev Russia and the EU would ‘consolidate and develop their strategic partnership, based not only on common interests but also on respect for values'. However, the leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats in the European Parliament, Graham Watson, commented that Russian citizens had been deprived of free and fair elections which would likely further strengthen authoritarianism in Russia. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) too expressed disappointment at the conduct of the elections. Calling the elections unfair and unjust, its leader, Andreas Gross, criticised the Russian Government for depriving the people the opportunity to ‘fully exploit its democratic potential'.

IT is difficult to predict in the current scenario the exact course Russian politics would take after Medvedev assumes charge of the highest office. In the coming months, both Medvedev and his mentor Putin would like to work together for ‘direct continuation' of the policies initiated by Putin eight years ago. But in the new scheme of things it is Medvedev (for the background and political growth of Medvedev see author's article in March 1, 2008 issue of this journal), relatively inexperienced in matters of foreign policy, who would remain at the helm of affairs and Putin would work under him in the capacity of the Prime Minister. The inexperience of Medvedev may push him to rely on Putin for guidance. Unless Putin has any subtle plans and ambitions, he has to work with Medvedev to contain the powerful Kremlin clan, called siloviki, who hold important positions and have primarily a security background. Medvedev has tough challenges ahead as the disgruntled regions of Russia, such as Chechnya and Dagestan, have caused much tension due to separatism and the extremism factor. The disturbances in the ‘near abroad' due to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO's) expansion plans and politics of oil and energy too have caused much concern in Kremlin.

In the emerging scenario, the new Russian leader has to define Russia's goals in both domestic and foreign policy. He has to tackle the oligarchs and contain corruption. In matters of foreign policy he has to adopt a middle path which can avoid the pro-Western romanticism of the Yeltsin era and the aggressive posturing of Putin. No doubt it would remain a daunting challenge for Medvedev to work with the West in a cooperative framework especially when both are entangled in a bitter power politics in the world, especially in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Medvedev may like to develop closer relations with China and India to counter US influence in the post-Soviet space and foster the framework of the multipolar world structure. However, it may prove difficult for Medvedev to ignore the West with which it has trade and economic relations.

Medvedev can also play the European card by driving home the point that Russia is a European country and its interests are best served by aligning with Europe and resisting the hegemonic ambitions of the US. The moving closer of Ukraine to the NATO has already generated much bitterness between the US and Russia. Countries like Georgia and Azerbaijan have also declared their intention to join the NATO. In this evolving scenario it may be difficult for Medvedev to smooth sail Russia's foreign policy. It appears plausible in this context that Medvedev may continue the assertive foreign policy initiated by his immediate predecessor, but this assertion may not result in any military measures towards its neighbours or elsewhere. Russia too would likely play its oil and energy diplomacy to secure and strengthen its national interests.

Medvedev has declared that one of his priorities would be to make Russia the world's biggest financial centre, adding that Russia would actively acquire shares in foreign companies. As one commentator observed, Russia under Medvedev could aspire to play ‘the role of a global regulator of the contemporary system of international relations' as ‘this is the mission worthy of Russia in the global policy of the 21st century'. Hence, it may not be surprising that Medvedev would focus more on strengthening the Russian economy, and leave foreign policy matters to Putin. This economic ambition would also remain a difficult task to achieve as Russia is still not at par with the developed countries in terms of infrastructure, services and diversification of economy. It is the energy resources that catapulted Russian economy due to ‘petro-dollars'. But for a sustainable and developed economy Russia has to adopt vigorous economic reforms to diversify the economy and at the same time making it investor friendly.

Indo-Russian relations under the new dispensation in the Kremlin would likely remain unchanged. Though recent months have not been very satisfactory for bilateral relations as the controversies surrounding the aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov, and Russia's dismay at the growing Indo-US cooperation indicate, it would be farfetched to predict drastic changes in Russian foreign policy towards India. So far, Medvedev has not pronounced anything which can be seen against India's interests. Some commentators have observed that the young leader with no security background may ignore India and seek for strategic partners elsewhere in Europe, Japan or China. The reverse speculation may as well be true that Medvedev may pursue a forward policy to strengthen relations with the rising Asian power with which his country enjoys traditional ‘seamless relationship'. As the Strategic Partnership document signed between the two countries in 2000 shows, both the countries share the vision to develop a terror-free, democratic and multipolar world order. Medvedev's policy towards India, hence, would depend on his appreciation of these emerging imperatives and the role to be played by India and Russia together in the realisation of the strategic vision.

Dr Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra belongs to the Research Faculty at the Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai.

Putin Persona and Forthcoming Elections in Russia

Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra — 2008-03-01T18:19:00Z

The forthcoming presidential elections in Russia in March 2008 have naturally cought the world's attention. Scholars on Russia agree that Putin is going to shape the emerging political scenario, but there is divergence of views about the exact course his political career would take after March. There have been debates and discussions not about the result of the forthcoming elections which appears to be inevitable but rather on the future of Putin. Speculations range from whether he would retain his all-powerful position in another capacity, or would let Russia usher in genuine democracy, or would install a puppet in the Kremlin and so on. However, on analysis one thing appears certain: at least for the coming decade Putin would influence Russian politics. His role in choosing the presidential candidate or his participation in December 2007 Duma elections shows that Putin is not going to adopt a life of retirement. The Russian people have retained their confidence in Putin, who is perceived macho and strong, ready to deliver.

The Putin Persona

THE Putin phenomenon has intrigued analysts throughout the world. A decade back, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was almost a non-entity in political circles of the world. Now, after a decade he is a person of world stature. The Time magazine, in its annual issue of 2007, chose President Putin as the Person of the Year for bringing Russia to the ‘Table of World Powers'. He is compared with Russian figures like Lenin, the founder of the Bolshevik and socialist age in Russia. Like Lenin, Putin harped on the Russian past to emphasise its greatness. He called the Soviet collapse in 1991 the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century. Incidentally Putin was 47 when he became President as was Lenin when he led the October Revolution of 1917. He is also compared with Peter the Great who adopted ways to develop relations with other powers. His assertive foreign policy found a decisive utterance in the Munich conference on Security Policy in February 2007 where he criticised the American attempt to subjugate the whole world.

Putin found himself lucky in the scheme of things when he came to power. The economy registered a boom in the late 1990s due to rise in energy prices. Besides the rise in oil price, incidents like the handling of the Chechen issue and the Russian embarrassment at the failure of Western promises provided Putin the ground to shape Russian foreign policy in the changing world order. The Russian economy has grown almost sevenfold to almost $ 1.4 trillion in the past eight years of Putin's rule. As per estimates, the country has the world's third largest currency reserves and it has enough oil revenue funds to boost investment from about $ 160 billion in 2006 to almost $ 440 billion by 2010. Putin, with his characteristic sporting spirit (with black belt in karate to his credit), started assertive diplomacy among nations of the world. Within a few years in office, Putin suddenly emerged in the world centre-stage. While the Western critics called him a dictator, a promoter of ‘managed democracy' and ‘authoritarian', his popularity at home rose drastically. His policies struck a chord between divergent factions amidst the fragile scenario within the Russian public, and he was rated one of the highly venerable leaders after Lenin.

Russian society itself provided President Putin adequate ground and locus to emerge as a strong leader. The Russian psychology (shaped by imperial history and leadership) proved fertile soil for the rise of such leadership. Russia was never a democracy in the Western sense of the term; there is almost no separation of powers among the different braches of government. People believe in a strong national leader, whether he is Lenin or Stalin or Putin. The rule and domination of the authority at the top have led to the evolution of a culture of dependency on a particular locus of power. Hence, Putin's rise in the popular psyche is explained not only by the economic development of the region but also by the Russian psychology itself. Besides, his actions have evoked in popular memory the actions of a strong leader a la Lenin who can deliver. Putin's action in Chechnya was the first such step. According to a survey, Putin's popularity rate was about at 50 per cent before the second Chechen war in 1999. His rating after the war suddenly crossed the 60 per cent mark. The Russian people appear to be more status-centric, not much geared towards change. In this scheme of things, the leader emerges supreme; his actions are at times seen without scrutiny.

However, Putin's actions, despite strong criticisms, cannot be said to be mere components of a hyperbole or pure manipulations or just a gimmick. Putin raised Russia from a Western-totting entity to an assertive, independent and rising global power. Putin's enigma is not only connected with his capacity to meet the challenges from the West, NATO or EU, or the increasing influence of Kremlin-insiders called ‘Siloviki', but it also linked to his success in raising Russia's stakes in international politics. Though oil and energy made an important contribution to Russia's post-Cold War emergence, it was undoubtedly Putin who played a dynamic role whether at the summit talks with the Western powers including the US, or reinventing ties with India and China, or adopting independent positions on interna-tional issues such as Iraq, Iran, Palestine and Kosovo, or taking a strong stand in the neighbourhood in the framework of the CSTO, CIS or such organisations, or in bringing stability in Russia's regions such as Chechnya. If there is something called the Putin phenomenon emerging, there is no doubt that the Russian psychology has aided the process; but at the same time it is the personality of Putin which has strengthened such a perception.

Forthcoming Elections

IN view of his colossal rise in the Russian political scene it is but only to be expected that the forthcoming presidential elections on March 2, 2008 would revolve around the personality of Putin. It is almost a foregone conclusion that Putin's hand-picked candidate, his long term aide, Dmitry Medvedev, would emerge as his successor. Putin chose to end the long speculation about his successor by announcing Medvedev as the candidate backed by him. Hence, there was no surprise the Medvedev, whose popular rating was merely at 30-35 per cent according to a Levada centre poll in 2007, suddenly found catapulted to 60 per cent after the nomination. Medvedev's candidature is supported by the following political parties: United Russia (the party promoted by Putin, and which secured 70 per cent of seats in the December Duma elections), Fair Russia, Agrarian Party and Civilian Power. He registered his candidature for the post of President on December 21.

The nomination of the other candidates may add veneer to Russian democracy but without much substance. Till the end of December, besides Medvedev, four other candidates registered successfully their bids in the Central Electoral Commission. They included Andrey Bogdanov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladimir Zhirinovsky and Gennady Zyuganov. A brief profile of these candidates can be attempted here. Andrey Bogdanov is the leader of the Democratic Party of Russia. Mikhail Kasyanov is a former Prime Minister and current leader of the Popular Democratic Union. Vladimir Zhirinovsky is the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. He ran for presidency in 1991, 1996 and 2000. Gennady Zyuganov is the leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. He ran for presidency in 1996 and 2000, but not in 2004. Probably, he is the most popular and respected Opposition leader in Russia. Other high profile and outspoken leaders such as Garry Kasparov, the former World Chess champion and United Civil Front leader could not register their candidacy on some flimsy grounds.

The dilemma before Putin appears to be two fold. First, how to retain control over policy-making without violating the constitutional norms. It can be mentioned that the current Russian Constitution does not allow the presidential office-bearer to remain in office for more than two consecutive terms. Second, how to retain the image of Russia as a democratic and vibrant society. Incidents such as the murder of Anna Politovskaya, a human rights activist and journalist working on Chechnya in 2006, has made enough dents on Putin's claims on the last count. It is alleged that the journalist was killed with official complicity as her reports were highlighting Russian excesses in Chechnya. However, it is difficult to predict the future course of actions Putin or his aides would likely to take to ensure his overall control. There are speculations in this context which can be listed as the following. First, Medvedev would be appointed interim President so that Putin can be again selected for third term without violating the Constitution. Second, as already proposed by Medvedev, Putin can lead the Duma in the capacity of Prime Minister with more powers. Third, there is a possibility that Putin may be declared by parliament the ‘national leader' for life. By exercising the last option be is likely to adversely affect image by exposing himself as a power hungry politician.

Tasks Ahead for the New President

DMITRY Medvedev belongs to the post-Soviet generation. Starting his political career after studying Law from St Petersburg University, he joined politics at the young age of 25 in the Mayoral office of the same city. He worked under the guidance of Putin who was them a Deputy Mayor before becoming the Mayor in St Petersburg. Hence, when Putin boasts that he knows Medvedev for the last 17 years and the latter would likely lead Russia on the path he has laid, it makes sense. Medvedev sees Putin as a father figure and mentor. Medvedev's meteoric rise in Russian politics could not have been possible without the blessings of Putin. It was Putin who called Medvedev from St Petersburg to Moscow and appointed him in important positions. He worked in various capacities such as coordinator of federal programmes in the areas of health, education, housing and agriculture. At the age of 37, he was elevated to the position of Chairman of the Board of Russia's natural gas monopoly, Gazprom. He became a Deputy Prime Minister in 2005 at the age of 40.

The advantage of Medvedev is he is young, dynamic and has experience in politics and administration from a younger age. At the age of 42 he is poised to be the youngest leader Russia has ever had in its modern history. He bears no baggage of the KGB. However, the tasks ahead which he has to deal with are varied. First, unlike Putin, Medvedev is less experienced in handling international issues. Though he has occupied many important offices including that of the largest state-owned Gazprom, he does not have any direct experience in foreign policy. In the increasingly tense and competitive world Medvedev least initially may find it difficult to handle the issues. However, his liberal image in the Kremlin and outside may prove an asset for him to deal with the Western world. His observation at the World Economic Forum in Davos last year that ‘no undemocratic state has ever become truly prosperous for one simple reason: freedom is better than non-freedom,' might have appeared soothing for leaders of the West. However, Medvedev is unlikely to toe the line of the West as Yeltsin did.

Second, the stability of Russia must be another concern. Maintaining stability in Russia's Caucasian region such as Chechnya, Dagestan and Ingushetia, which have recently witnessed widespread violence, will be a formidable task for the new President. Third, developing and strengthening relations with emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, etc. would be equally challenging. Fourthly, Russia's ‘near abroad' policy needs to be constantly reinvigorated as the region is still volatile due to ethnic disputes such as in the Nagorno-Karabakh, or Abkhazia or South Ossetia, religious fundamentalism, and because of the region's geo-strategic importance. Fourth, Medvedev will have to assert his authority and establish control over the ‘Siloviki', a powerful clan in the Kremlin who hold important positions and who usually have security force background.

Dr Mahapatra belongs to the Research Faculty at the Centre for Central Eurasian Studies, University of Mumbai.