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Mainstream, VOL L, No 29, July 7, 2012

GP and Ethnic Question in Sri Lanka

Tuesday 10 July 2012

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by NEELAN TIRUCHELVAN

Many Sri Lankans were distressed and saddened to read of the death of G. Parthasarathi on August 1, 1995 at the end of a distinguished career in law, diplomacy and education. GP was a consummate diplomat who immediately commanded respect for his erudition, his intellectual sophistication, his understanding of international relations and domestic politics and his inexhaustible patience, compassion and good sense. This article will focus only on one aspect of his extraordinary career, his role as a political intermediary in the resolution of Sri Lanka’s national question. G. Parthasarathi’s efforts resulted in Annexure ‘C’, the controversial document which has provided the conceptual building blocks for all subsequent efforts at ethnic reconciliation including the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord and the political proposals unveiled by President Chandrika Kumaratunga on August 3, 1995.

Three Criteria

In August 1983 the Sri Lankan President accepted Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s offer of good offices to facilitate a political solution. This was a watershed in Indo-Sri Lankan relations and the search for a special envoy to Sri Lanka to undertake the delicate and complex mediatory efforts was intensified. There were three criteria that had been articulated within the higher reaches of the government for this position which was highly prized within the political and bureaucratic establishment. First, the negotiator must be a skilled diplomat who was sensitive to the geo-politics of the region. Secondly, he must be a lawyer capable of coping with the Byzantine complexities of Sri Lanka’s Constitu-tion, and the riddles in carving out an autono-mous region within a unitary state. Thirdly, he had to understand the domestic politics of India and be capable of commanding the confidence of political opinion within Tamil Nadu, which had expressed solidarity with the Tamils of Sri Lanka in their predicament. G. Parthasarathi clearly met all of these criteria given his legal training and distinguished diplomatic career spanning several decades.

G. Parthasarathi had other advantages. He enjoyed total access to and the complete confidence of the then Prime Minister of India, and was frequently consulted on sensitive issues of both foreign and domestic policy. He was thus able to symbolise the authority and concern of the Government of India at the highest levels. A lesser known fact was that G. Parthasarathi knew Sri Lanka and had forged personal friendship and linkages which had grown over the years with the middle class Western educated elite in Colombo. He had led a cricket team from the Presidency College in Madras, and played against such stalwarts as F.C. de Saram, the Oxford Blue who dominated Sri Lankan cricket in the post-War years.
His Oxbridge associates included Raju Cooma-raswamy, the international civil servant, and Pieter Keuneman, President of the Sri Lanka Communist Party (a contemporary of Mohan Kumaramangalam, both of whom were Presidents of the Cambridge Union). He had also known the political power broker, Esmond Wickremasinghe, who had controlled Lake House for many years, and was a close adviser to the political leadership within the United National Party.

Parthasarathi soon grasped the complexities and the many pitfalls in the tasks ahead. The traumatic events of July 1983 had so deeply polarised the two communities that the prospects of ethnic reconciliation seemed dismal. Each community’s perceptions of the problem had become so deeply embedded in their respective psyches that there was little common ground on which he could work. He had to familiarise himself with history, contemporary political events and developments, and with the personalities and attitudes of the key actors on the Sinhala and Tamil sides. Above all, if perceptions were to be altered, he had to work on the consciousness of the two communities and their leaderships.

Humility and Good Humour

GP’s first few visits were directed towards familiarising himself with the key political actors on the Sinhala side. He briefed himself on the background of the senior and more influential Cabinet Ministers, and Opposition leaders. He then met them individually and listened patiently to their perceptions, fears, anxieties and obsessions. He consulted with the widest cross-section of Sinhala opinion, including Gamini Iriyagolla, the President of the Buddhist Theosophical Society, and the Venerable Walpola Rahula, the scholar-monk who was the Secretary-General of the Supreme Council of the Maha Sangha. Although some of their views were emotionally charged, they were invariably deferential to the stoic elder statesman. He brushed aside small discourtesies with his characteristic humility and good humour. A youthful leader had insisted that GP call on him, and confirm strictly to the norms of protocol. GP cheerfully complied, but could his measure of the man have gone up in the process? He realised that the vanities and personality quirks of the key actors were as important as their substantive beliefs.

He moved more easily with the old Left such as the Trotskyite leaders—Dr Colvin R. de Silva and Bernard Soyza, and his old friend Pieter Keuneman. He had immediate empathy for their secular outlook, and their instinctive response to the aspitations of national minorities.

Focal Point

He soon became the focal point of the anguish and hopes of the Tamil side. He was generous with his time: he met innumerable delegations of expatriate groups and he met personally with leaders of the different militant organisations. He advised them, admonished them and constantly pushed them to explore and recognise the limits of their political options. Struggle and negotiate was his response to those who obstinately adopted fundamentalist positions on even the process of negotiation. His task was a difficult one. While he frequently counselled restraint, he was distressed by the escalating violence and the incalculable suffering of the ordinary people. He was moved by the sense of deprivation and passion which underscored the sacrifice of the youth. He often had little more than sympathy to offer to those who complained of the excesses of the state, the gross and persistent violations of human rights. Denied legal or political redress, the Tamil mood soon turned to despair.

Inevitably, GP developed a special relationship with the TULF leadership. He engaged them intellectually, while remaining emotionally detached. He questioned the conceptual under-prinnings of their political demands. Concepts such as ‘self-determination’ and ‘traditional homelands’ were probed in depth so that they could clarify and refine their own thoughts. He pointed to the contradictions between an approach which emphasised autonomous regions for national minorities (as contained in the Ceylon Workers Congress proposals before the All-Parties Conference in 1984) and that which sought federal or quasi-federal forms of devolution within a democratic polity. Each arrangement presupposed distinct constitutional models which were not easily recconciliable. He drew on his immense political and diplomatic experience to draw comparisons with the negotiations on Kashmir, Mizoram and the Vietnamese liberation struggle. He counselled that the Tamil negotiating position should be guided by internally consistent principles, and not on the expediency of the moment.

GP’s substantive contribution was in negotiating the set of proposals for devoution of power to Regional Councils, more popularly known as Annexure ‘C’. He completed this exercise within a span of four months from August to December 1983, over several meetings in Colombo and New Delhi with President Jayewardene. He brought to bear all the skills of a consummate negotiator in mediating between the Tamil political leadership and the Jayewardene Government. He asked the TULF to formulate a scheme of devolution which would fall short of the ultimate demand of a separate state, while being consistent with their aspirations for equal treatment and the sharing of power.

Reformulated Draft

The initial draft envisaged a Union of States, an overtly federal arrangement with the major areas of socio-economic development, education and cultural policy and land settlement and law and order being devolved to the States. GP reasoned that the substance of the Tamil demands would need to be woven into a scheme without the emotive content or the terminology which could trigger Sinhala resistance. The scheme was reformulated and presented as one which would acknowledge the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The ‘Union of States’ was altered to a ‘Union of Regions’. Besides the sharing of power between the Centre and the Regions, provision was made to ensure that Tamils enjoyed an adequate, if not proportionate, share in the recruitment to the armed forces, the police and the public service. GP felt that the Tamils would need to share power at the Centre if they were to join the mainstream of national development.

Jayewardene readily conceded many of the elements of the scheme, but the unit of devolution remained intractable. The government was wedded to the notion that the district should be the basic unit of devolution, and even a proposal to permit districts within a province to combine into larger units was considered too radical a concession to Tamil demands.

GP began to feel that he was reaching the limits of his own persuasive powers. A new negotiating strategy was called for. He decided to make a direct appeal to Jayewardene, and arranged to see him at the President’s House late in the evening on or about August 6, 1983, in the company of S. Thondaman and one other. The case for a larger unit was dispassionately presented.

It would result in an augmentation of power and resources. Tamils would need to be offered a package of proposals which seem a reasonable alternative to their basic demand.

Jayewardene seemed tired and exhausted. He listened to the presentations without comment. He seemed listless, and it was not clear whether he had absorbed any of the points made. As the meeting ended and the delegation descended down the wrought iron staircase at the President’s House, GP observed reassuringly:
I am 73, Mr Thondaman is 70, but the old man upstairs is in his eighties. Age must take its inevitable toll.

Jayewardene, however, remained enigmatic. He had in fact followed the arguments advanced, and agreed next morning to the creation of Provincial Councils.
Later during Jayewardene’s visit to New Delhi in December 1983, GP mobilised the support of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to present the case for a single linguistic region. GP’s devotion to detail was such that he even endeavoured to ensure that the meeting had the right ambience to facilitate a full and frank discussion of the contentious issues. Jayewardene demurred. He could anot not erode his base of support. He, however, agreed to a compromise. Annexure ‘C’ would confine Regional Councils to Provincial limits. The Tamil leadership would, however, be free to advance the case for merger before the All-Party Conference. Jayewardene reviewed the proposals at the Ashoka Hotel and asked GP: “Where do I sign?”. And GP responded that this was not an agreement and no signatures were required.
It was anticipated that Annexure ‘C’ would form the basis of the All-Party Conference, summoned in January 1983, and that the Conference would provide the opportunity to forge a consensus around the proposals.

On the contrary, the Conference proved to be disastrous, and its participants rejected Annexure ‘C’, and refused even to focus on its contents. Amidst mounting criticism from Sinhala organisations, Buddhist groups and some Opposition parties, even the government distanced itself from Annexure ‘C’, and denied any responsibility for its contents. Every dilatory tactic was used to avoid serious discussion of substance, and meetings were adjourned at the slightest pretext. The Conference dragged on endlessly amidst escalating violence and the continuing excesses of the security forces. The Tamil groups became exasperated, but GP counselled caution and encouraged them to remain with the Conference. Finally, in December 1984, the government presented proposals in a highly attenuated form for a limited scheme of power-sharing which fell far short of Tamil expectations. The All-Party Conference was wound up on December 21, 1984.

In early 1985 there were new diplomatic initiatives with New Delhi actively pursuing a policy of improving its bilateral relations with its neighbours. These policy initiatives coincided with attempts to question GP’s role in the negotiating process. Two factors contributed towards this trend. First, the Tamil political leadership had become increasingly dependent on GP for guidance and advice on its political strategies. Their frequent consultations with GP were widely publicised in the Indian and Sri Lankan press, and began to alter progressively Sinhala perceptions of his role. Secondly, GP soon became vulnerable to bureaucratic and political intrigue in New Delhi and it was whispered in Colombo that a consistent campaign to discredit his role would prove effective.

Costly Absence

GP was deeply pained by these intrigues, and his role was progressively eclipsed. He remained, however, the institutional memory within South Block of Sri Lanka and its ethnic question. His absence proved costly in terms of the quality of attention that was devoted to the complexities of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict. The decision-making process within New Delhi and the process of negotiations suffered a setback with tragic consequences for Sri Lanka.

(Mainstream, August 12, 1995)

A distinguished scholar and public figure of Sri Lanka, Neelan Tiruchelvan was a Member of the Sri Lankan Parliament. He fell a victim to the LTTE’s terrorism in Colombo.

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