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Mainstream, VOL XLIX No 33, August 6, 2011

Rethinking Beggary Laws in India

Wednesday 10 August 2011

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by SUDEEP BASU

The felt need is to move away from the ‘custodialisation’ framework of anti-beggary laws to one that stresses on ‘vocationalisation’ or skill
building exercises for beggars.

For several decades beggars fending for themselves on the streets of Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata have been at the mercy of anti-beggary laws meant to create aesthetically appealing and ‘livable’ cities. In August 2010 the media reported a high incidence of death of the inmates in a beggars’ colony in Magadi Road, Bangalore. The news shocked the public conscience and provoked unprecedented reactions among the citizenry. This incident brought to light the existence and misuse of anti-beggary legislations that have been enacted by several States. The tragic event suggests, in a rather disconcerting but compelling way, that it is through death alone that the figure of the beggar could be resurrected. How do we then begin to account for anti-beggary laws that criminalise begging? What future do so such laws hold?

This incident is also not just symptomatic of the oppressive manner in which anti-beggary laws operate in general but specifically raises the thorny issue of ‘custodialisation’ or custodial justice. The problem of custodial deaths is intimately related to the administration of custodial justice which has led to a rather awkward handling of the issue of beggary in India. With custodialisation, the lives of beggars continue to remain under perpetual threat and that threat itself becomes a means of social control by the state. The fact of there being a law on beggary in the first place leads to a situation where the state arrogates upon itself unlimited powers to decide the fate of beggars. Beggars become easy targets and being homeless makes it easier for the state to prey on them and take necessary action in the name of public order. We have a scenario where, as Kalpana Kannabiran states elsewhere, “no longer are rights ‘funda-mental’, instead ‘restrictions’ have become so”, and in the case of beggars this is accentuated.

There exist multiple challenges to the effective administration of justice, particularly custodial justice especially due to lack of comprehensive data on the inmates present in ‘certified institutions’ like a beggars’ home and lack of proper guidelines/procedure in the process of enquiry by the authorities. The arrest and detention process is similar to the process of ‘dumping’, which is indicative of the state’s failure to rehabilitate members of different communities who have differing needs such as the mentally ill, eunuchs, drug dependents, invalids and lepers. One of the shortcomings in the court process is that the minimum detention period of fourteen days results in loss of jobs. Even those who were not beggars to begin with, end up having to resort to begging to meet their needs. On seeing beggars ‘beg’, judges serving in these courts often fail to act neutrally. These courts do not provide the most basic rights such as right to a phone call and that to an attorney.

ANTI-BEGGARY LAWS give power to agents to pick beggars up at will; to arrest them and subject them to long periods of detention without a proper process resulting in denial of liberty, which is clearly outside the constitutional mandate. It remains only a way of managing poverty through coercive means. The judgment in the Ram Lakhan case is an interesting departure, since it focuses on guidelines to be followed by the presiding Magistrate before detaining someone. Basically it urges judges not to rely on appearances alone. It also directs attention to certain issues which need to be considered while evolving an appropriate legal policy with regard to beggar rehabilitation. First, the causal factors or circumstances in which beggary happens need to be treated with greater sensitivity by the legislation and law enforcement authorities. Second, detention in a certified institution should not be considered the sole available option in sentencing. Here one must recognise the class element in anti-beggary laws, since the law appears to discriminate on the basis of ‘participation’ in institutions. Those outside these institutions seem to be committing a wrong in the eyes of the law. Thus those trades which are not formalised are not deemed legitimate as per the definition in the Act which is a clear violation of Article 19(1)(g). A curious paradox is that while the First Law Commission regarded Section 109 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) 1973, that stigmatised men who had no means of representation as draconian, it remains in the form of anti-beggary laws which criminalise ostensible poverty.

The object of anti-beggary laws points at penalising; it hampers attempts by beggars to find alternative means of livelihood which are restrictive for the poor and the disadvantaged. While the law fails to provide formal security systems, it attacks the informal structures which are essential in the absence of the former. A shift of emphases in the existing framework of anti-beggary laws is called for. The care/custodiali-sation framework which reflects the disem-powering aspect of the law ought to give way to a more welfare-oriented/rehabilitative policy framework that stresses on ‘vocationalisation’ or skill-building exercises which enables. While making employment benefits guaranteed under different welfare programmes accessible to beggars, the attempt in the long run should also be to overcome the insensitivity syndrome that runs through the entire operation of anti-beggary laws through planned civil society interventions at all levels.

Dr Sudeep Basu is an Assistant Professor at the Gujarat Institute of Development Research, Ahmedabad.

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