Home > Archives (2006 on) > 2011 > Using Water Conflicts for US Benefit in Central and South Asia
Mainstream, VOL XLIX, No 21, May 14, 2011
Using Water Conflicts for US Benefit in Central and South Asia
Tuesday 24 May 2011
#socialtagsby HASAN HAMIDULLAH
The US is eager to reclaim its right to mediate between India and Pakistan on disputes between the two neighbouring states of South Asia (and these disputes are not negligible by any reckoning). Despite strong opposition from New Delhi the Obama Administration is trying to invent one pretext after another to reassert that right. The latest one is the water dispute between New Delhi and Islamabad that Washington is seeking to exploit to its advantage.
On February 22, 2011 Democrat Senators led by John F. Kerry presented a report, “Avoiding Water Wars: Water Scarcity and Central Asia’s Growing Importance for Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan†(available via Internet: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov), to the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations. In the midst of several noble appeals and sound suggestions there is in the report a not-so-subtle message: the US should use the water disputes between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and India and Pakistan to promote American national interests in this part of the world.
For example, while the report notes that the Obama Administration “has recognised the critical role water plays in achieving our foreign policy goals and in protecting our national security interests†, it laments that “our efforts still lack strategic clarity, unity of purpose and a long-term vision to support our national security interests†. That is why the report advances four recommendations—providing benchmark data to improve water management; focussing on water demand management; recognising the international dimensions of water issues and delivering holistic solutions; and safeguarding institutions against shocks to water supply and demand—aimed at “encouraging a US foreign policy that strengthens our support in the region†while promoting endeavours to enhance transboundary water cooperation as well as stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Central ASIA is currently hovering on the brink of a water war—a cold or hot conflict over the employment of water, a highly precious resource in that sphere of the globe. The bitter arguments between Tashkent and Dushanbe over the water of Amu Darya and its tributaries have become most intense among several issues fuelling inter-state quarrels.
New Delhi and Islamabad are currently engaged in hard talk over dams in J&K. Both countries would no doubt be grateful to Uncle Sam if he furnishes sane advice. But the Indian side should have no illusions about how the US views its hydro-projects. This is clear from the tenor of the aforementioned report.
The number of dams under construction and their management is a source of significant bilateral tension. Currently, the most controversial dam project is the proposed 330-megawatt dam on the Kishenganga River, a tributary of the Indus. While studies show that no single dam along the waters controlled by the Indus Waters Treaty will affect Pakistan’s access to water, the cumulative effect of these projects could give India the ability to store enough water to limit the supply to Pakistan at crucial moments in the growing season.
As far as the Tajik-Uzbek water dispute is concerned, Uzbekistan’s President Karimov has so far been successful in blocking the ambitious hydro-power projects envisaged by Tajikistan. These projects could gravely affect the water available to the Uzbek people in general and have an adverse impact on the country’s agriculture in particular. Since a similar water dispute has developed between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and Karimov’s Kazakh counterpart Nazarbayev has embarked on talks with Kyrgyz officials on the issue, the Uzbek leader has every right to assert that this is not a matter of his personal friendship or enmity with Tajikistan’s President Rakhmon, but a question of national security and survival; which is why Tashkent can legitimately demand a say for itself in Dushanbe’s water policy. This is precisely what Tashkent has done and after years of acrimonious talks as well as Cold War tactics, Uzbekistan has successfully defended this right in the wake of the Tajik offensive as also during the UN and European Union’s mediating efforts.
But now a new US thesis is bound to undermine all the hard work put in by Karimov in this area. What is the thesis? The US has unequivocally declared that not only Tajikistan but Afghanistan too should be allowed to use the water of Upper Amu (Pyandz) and its tributaries and Afghan representatives should be included in any future talks on Amu Darya and Tajik hydro-power. It is not difficult for Tashkent to figure out who stands behind Kabul in this regard: the entire international community as well as the US.
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MEANWHILE the new US attempts to internation-alise the water issues of Central Asia (in fact, as has been already pointed out, the third ‘recommen-dation for action’ in the aforementioned report underscores the need to ‘recognise international dimensions of water issues and deliver holistic solutions’) are intended not only to enable Washington meddle in the politics of the region, the undeniable truth is that the US is keen on both energy and water to build a new network of American military bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Pentagon and CIA have calculated that the new and larger Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh River in southern Tajikistan would be in a position to ensure export of electricity to the south. (As the report underlines, the Rogun Dam “was first proposed in 1959 and construction began in 1976†but the “project stalled after the collapse of the Soviet Union†; however, “in recent years the Tajik Government restarted the construction process†and “if completed, this dam would likely be the highest in the world and generate power not only for Tajikistan but also to export to Afghanistan and Pakistan†) But the Pentagon and CIA also know that while the project would energise the Tajik economy it would be at the cost of the Uzbek farmers and population as a whole. (The report thus discloses: “In discussions with staff, Uzbek officials argue that because it could take up to 18 years to fill, the Rogun project will severely reduce the amount of water flowing into Uzbekistan.†)
The Obama Administration is well aware of the sharp conflicts that have developed over water in the region. But it seems to be deriving a vicarious pleasure from such conflicts; according to its understanding, the more the quarrel accentuates, the better it is for Washington. Why? Because after promoting its plans like the guarantee of power and water for a new network of US military bases in Afgha-nistan and Pakistan, America can exploit the opportunity of donning the mantle of a mediator between Tashkent and Dushanbe and, in the process, using the mounting temperature in the tense Karimov-Rakhmon relationship, get a chance to back—not just morally but materially too—the Uzbak Opposition, both liberal and Islamic, through the not-so-inconsequential Tajik help and assistance.
It wants a similar scenario to evolve in the Indo-Pak negotiations on water so that America benefits and is able reach its short-term goal: getting a foothold in the talks that, from the US’ long-term perspective, is of enormous significance.