Indian Economic Reform as an Example of Disaster Capitalism

Most people who survive a disaster want the opposite of a clean slate. They want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. But disaster capitalism’s ‘reconstruction’ begins with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what is left of the public sphere and then quickly moving to replace them with corporate-designed economic and political structures before the victims of the disaster are able to regroup and stake their claim to what was originally theirs.

Introduction

MILTON FRIEDMAN, Nobel Laureate in Economics and propagator of the free market economic stabilisation theory, passed away in 2006, but his ideas have immortalised him. His shock therapy approach to development economics combined with his free market approach to policy reform is a deadly combination for many developing nations. Yet, this combination has been increasingly cropping up in developing countries’ economies over the past 50 plus years. With a ‘seize-and-reform’ methodology, Friedman, along with groups of people seeking economic dominance in the world market, brought a new meaning to the word developmentalism.

There are many examples of the implemen-tation of shock therapy throughout recent history. Surprisingly, many developing countries have been heavily influenced to implement free market practices into their economies by the use of shock therapy. Whether the government was violently overthrown, like in Chile, or whether economic policy had been influenced by ‘reform-based lending’ by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) like in India, shock therapy has been implemented very consistently in the developing countries’ economies.

Although Chile’s economy was converted through violent overthrow, India’s case of Friedmanite economic reform is much more subtle. The World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Trade Organisation (WTO) have seized control of India’s economy by making it dependent on loans. These policy-based loans are structured so that, in order to receive a loan, India must make reforms to its economy and re-write some of its laws. Most of these reforms are said to be ‘capacity-building’ reforms so that the Indian economy can become self-sustaining. But information reveals that India is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign superpowers such as the USA, and is experiencing the ill effects of such reform-based loans. However, India is also experiencing high growth in gross domestic product (GDP). If this benefit is compared with the drastic social losses, there is a net loss under the dispensation of these international institutions.

By comparing the case of economic reforms of Chile and India, this paper illustrates how Friedman’s shock doctrine school of thought is present in India’s economy. Although different countries have experienced different initial disasters or crises, India’s economic reforms show evidence of Milton Friedman’s liberal stabilisation policy just as much as Chile’s. So long as powerful international financial organisations such as the WB, IMF and WTO subscribe to Friedman’s perspectives on developmentalism, the developing world will remain trapped in their vicious cycle. Rather, if one takes a look at history, protectionism may prove more effective in seeking sustained development.

The framework of the free market and liberalisation theory propagated by Friedman was set in the beginnings of his development economics in Chile. [Klein, Naomi; 2007] The same shift toward liberalisation in India’s economy by subtle manipulation in national policy through reform-based lending by the WB and IMF is evident. The social ramifications of these policy reforms is also discussed as India is economically colonised. Mostly, it detracts from India’s current substantive freedoms and goes against creating more.

Milton Friedman Still Lives

NOVEMBER 16, 2006—Dr Milton Friedman, who contributed to the ruin of developmental economics and propagated a theory linked to the economic, social and political problems of many developing countries across the globe, ceased to breathe.

As a young man, Friedman had a love of mathematical systems.1 He became interested in economics and began to apply mathematical rigour and a ‘scientific’ approach to economics research in Rutgers University where he taught. Under the influence of Arthur Burns and Homer Jones, who introduced him to ‘rigorous mathematical economic theory’, he pursued studies in Chicago University, which became his intellectual home, and eventually taught rigid mathematical economics based on free trade policies there. This was expanded to proving that his ‘closed loop’ circuit of liberalisation worked, not just in mathematics, but in the real world. Acclaimed as an original thinker, he propagated his ideas and dreams to his students. His theory was not only heard by students, but through his many friends in high places, by the entire development economics community and large multinational corporations (MNCs).

By the free market spirit of his theory, the economy was perceived to be a self-regulating force similar to an ecosystem. When the market was liberated from the ‘misguided policy-makers of the world’, it would strike a perfect balance between supply and demand. Humans’ own self-interest would create ‘maximum benefit for all’. The system was a ‘closed loop’. Where the market was experiencing failure, it was deemed that the market was not ‘free enough’.2

“Friedman’s mission… rested on a dream of reaching back to the state of ‘natural’ health, when all was in balance before human interferences created distorting patterns… de-patterning societies, of returning them to a state of pure capitalism, cleansed of all interruptions—govern-ment regulations, trade barriers and entrenched interests…†3

The message of Friedman thus became one of ‘purification’. This was influenced by the neo-liberal theory of Friedrich Hayek, who believed that government involvement would lead to ‘the road to serfdom’. Friedman believed in a similar idea of governance. However, along with a number of his colleagues, his theory of liberalisation became one of ‘shock’ where the only way for a state to become ‘pure’ and free from distortions, was to induce painful ‘shock therapy’. He recommended ‘shock therapy’ to politicians of countries in distress, as economic policy.4

Milton Friedman’s ‘Shock Therapy’

The painful shocks were prescribed in a series of steps:

• Step 1: The removal of all regulations and rules that disallow the accumulation of profits.

• Step 2: The privatisation of all state-owned assets that could be owned and operated by corporations for profit.

• Step 3: A dramatic reduction in funding of social programmes.

Within these three steps, there are plenty of specifics. Corporations were supposed to be free to sell anywhere in the world. This meant abolishing subsidies and tariffs. The price of labour would be solely determined by the market and subsequently there would not be a minimum wage limit. Related to this was the rule where there would be no protection of local industries. His policy discouraged taxes but, when unavoidable, they were to be low. The state was mandated to privatise health care, education, the postal system, retirement pensions, and national parks.5 As perceived by proponents of the shock doctrine, ‘true purity’ can only be achieved through a shock that ‘wipes the canvas clean’. Massive disasters—such as natural disasters, civil conflicts, military coups and economic crises—were perceived as an opportunity, as a fresh beginning with hope of a fully free economy. Friedman writes:

“Only a crisis actual or perceived produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternative to existing policies, to make them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.†6

Essentially, ideas were being created to replace existing policies so that when a crisis occured, the economy could be eventually stabilised with a free market. However, what Friedman neglected to state was that sometimes crises were induced by large international actors to achieve a clean slate in order to establish a ‘free market’ economy. This was not only in the best interest of Friedman and his associates, but in the best interest of corporations and large hegemonic actors seeking dominance in the world’s capitalist economy.

Friedman in the War Against Developmentalism

Friedman’s vision coincided precisely with the business interests of large MNCs, “which by nature hunger for vast new unregulated markets†.7 But his theory also coincided with the strategic interests of the USA. Friedman and his colleagues did not always wait for crises to occur to swoop in and ‘save the economy’ with their free market economic policy. Rather, crisis was induced in some cases to ensure that dominance in the global economy remained in the hands of the USA through large US-based MNCs. Chile’s economic reform over the past five decades serves as an example of the steps that were used to ensure this global dominance.

In the 1970s, Chile, moving toward a Leftist political structure, threatened nationalisation of US copper mines and the ITT companies, of which the USA owned 80 per cent. This meant that the USA would lose control of most assets (including national resources) in Chile, and this would impact the US economy.

The US Government, under the leadership of two men, Theodore W. Shultz (Chairman of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago), and Albion Patterson (Director of the US Cooperation Administration in Chile), came up with a plan to swing Chile’s economy in favour of the USA.8 Under the shadow of Patterson’s statement: “The United States must take stock of its economic programmes abroad… we want [the poor countries] to work out their economic salvation by relating themselves to us and using our way of achieving economic development†, the USA came up with a plan to change the economic ideology of Chile, first in a peaceful way and, if push came to shove, in a more violent way.9 The first way was to educate Chilean economists in free market economics by offering grants for studying at the Chicago School of Economics. The University had designed a programme for Chilean students called the ‘Chile Workshop’ where they integrated the ‘problems’ of Chile’s economy into most classes. Students were re-educated to disdain the strong social safety net, and the protections of national industry, its trade barriers, and its control on prices.10 These students were then sent home to educate Chile’s university population. Though many of them became professors, very few of them achieved any political power, and the USA’s effort to peacefully change Chile’s economic ideology proved futile.11

But the USA did not give up. When Richard Nixon became the President, his imaginative approach to foreign policy changed the dynamic of the Chile situation. Meanwhile, Salvador Allende, a radical socialist, was elected in 1970 to lead Chile’s government. Nixon’s immediate reaction was to order the CIA Director, Richard Helms, to “make the economy scream†.12 The aim was to deter Allende from nationalising their assets by boycotting Chilean copper. When boycotting did not work, the US Government encouraged disdain of Allende in military groups to bring about his removal. The Chilean Catholic School, which had the exchange programme with the Chicago School of Economics, became what the CIA called a ‘coup climate’.13 The coup proceeded in two ways: (1) the military plotted to exterminate Allende; and (2) the economists worked to erase his economic ideas.14

General Augusto Pinochet led the military coup which eventually placed him in power. He was a free market theory supporter and had Friedman as his economic advisor. It was no surprise that immediately after he was in power, Chile experienced a series of shocks. The military coup itself was the first shock; economic shock therapy was the second; and Ewen Cameron’s shock, drug and sensory deprivation (psychological and physical shock or torture of dissenters) was the third. This forced Chile to become a free market oriented economy.

To this day, Chile’s economy still has the essence of Friedman’s ideology. Although not all of their national resources are privatised, the country has very little tariffs, price regulation, and largely favours the USA in trade practices with many trade agreements. In 2004, Chile signed a “Free Trade Agreement†with the USA which entailed 12 years of completely duty-free bilateral trade. Chile’s total exports to the USA in 2006 totalled $ 9.3 billion; the USA clearly still has its manipulative clamps on Chile’s economy even though their copper mines are owned and operated at the national level. Chile moved toward liberalisation of their economy because of Friedman’s influence on the economy with both ideology and his physical input. He was the mastermind of Chile’s economic reforms over the past 30 years.15

These triple shocks, namely, military, economic (formulated by Friedman), and psychological (formulated by Ewen Cameron) have been used in the manipulations of the US Government world-wide. These extreme examples of manipulation have been seen in many countries such as Brazil and Indonesia and, in a different manner, in Russia. Friedman’s economic policy has been adopted by large international institutions such as the IMF, WB and WTO to manipulate the economy in favour of the USA.

Neo-liberalism Alive and Well

Although Milton Friedman died in 2006, his ideology has been assimilated into mainstream development economics as a way to thicken the wallets of people seeking dominance in the world market.

“The ideology is a shape-shifter, forever changing its name and switching identities. Friedman called himself a ‘liberal’, hippies tended to identify as ‘conservatives’, ‘classical economists’, ‘free marketers’ and later, as believers in ‘Reaga-nomics’ or ‘laissez-faire’. In most of the world, their orthodoxy is known as ‘neo-liberalism’, but it is often called ‘free trade’ or simply ‘globalisation’.†16

These shape-shifting forms of free market theory have immortalised Friedman and his theory and have been applied worldwide to the economies of numerous developing countries. Thus Milton Friedman’s spirit lives on through those whom he has trained at the Chicago School of Economics. Many of them are in very influential roles and are “even more Friedmanite than Friedman himself†.17 Examples of Friedman’s theory used for manipulation may be seen in many countries. Among them, India has moved toward liberalisation and globalisation largely because of the reform-based lending by IMF and WB.

India’s Economic Reforms: The Shift toward Liberalization

LIBERALIZATION can mean a variety of things, but in the Indian context, the word liberalisation means “reducing government regulation of economic activity and the space for state intervention, except in the all-important matter of guaranteeing private property rights†.18 After achieving independence, India was left with a fairly liberal economy. It had far fewer controls than some of the most ‘free market’ economies.19 It was the popular belief, based on historical evidence, that Keynesian theory was the most successful for achieving social and economic development. This was what India had focused on after freedom from British rule in 1947 until 1991, when it made a historic step toward liberalisation and globalisation of the economy. It can easily be seen as a symptom of manipulation by the World Bank and subsequently, the corporations of the world.

India’s Economic Crisis: 1991

In the 1980s, India was experiencing steady growth in its economy until a series of crises occurred in 1991. From 1985, India started having a balance of payments problem, and by 1990 it had escalated into an economic crisis. India, being closely tied to the Soviet Union as a significant trading partner, experienced a severe jarring of its economy when the Soviet Union collapsed. By the end of 1990, India was in a very poor economic position, and was close to default.20

The Gulf War erupted in January 1992. This precipitated a huge upswing in imports and a massive downswing in exports,21 causing a huge fiscal deficit and creating further trade problems. The gross fiscal deficit of the government rose from nine per cent of the GDP in 1980 to 53 per cent in 1991.22 India was at the point where it would barely finance more than a few weeks of imports. India was thus constrained to airlift 67 tonnes of reserve gold to the IMF in exchange for a loan.23

India had to act quickly, and P.V. Narasimha Rao’s government quickly implemented several economic reforms that led toward the liberalisation of India’s economy. The economy began to grow once again. This of course is not to say that it was equitable or sustainable growth.

Liberalisation of India’s Economy

The WB-IMF prescribed reforms led to liberalisation of the Indian economy, and that was instead of shifting more toward protectionism, which was the historically proven way to achieve sustained and equitable growth. Shipping gold in order to receive a loan was a blow to economic self-respect and India was desperate to gain back a position of respect in the global economy. And liberalisation was perceived as the way to do it. There was a package of reforms in the liberalisation of the Indian economy, with three distinct components:

• First Component—Fiscal stabilisation so that the economy’s growing fiscal deficit could be minimised and controlled to encourage more spending on social and economic infrastructure.

• Second Component—The competitive pressures were to be increased with internal liberalisation of the economy. This left an open door for enterprises to freely make production and investment decisions with market conditions and without much government intervention.

• Third Component—Integrating with the global economy was emphasised by removing most controls on foreign trade and exchange rates, lowering tariffs, substantially relaxing regulations regarding external capital flows, and a proactive policy for attracting foreign direct investment.

This package was supposed to release powerful growth impulses and lift the economy out of poverty,24 and these changes were implemented in July 1991 as the New Economic Policy. There were a number of structural reforms that came along with the macroeconomic reforms. Structural reforms were broadly in the areas of industrial licensing and regulation, foreign trade and investment and the financial sector.25 All tariffs from India’s economy were eliminated. It was said that it was essential in order to avoid a high-cost economy, which discourages foreign investment. In this context, Uma Kapila said: “We must take action when and if it becomes apparent that the flow of foreign investment is excessive and it is undermining the domestic economy.†26

Trade Policy reforms were also implemented. Along with the abolition of tariffs, the WTO agreement showed that India had made a major commitment to liberalise trade practices.27 In all industries, a Disinvestment Commission followed by the Department of Disinvestment encouraged all national-owned resources be sold to private corporations.

But additionally there were more reforms; exchange rate reforms, where the rupee was devalued twice in July 1991 leading to a 20 per cent devaluation of currency; capital market reforms and financial sector reforms. However, all of these reforms were not beneficial to the public at large, and India’s shift toward liberalisation turned out to be questionable for India as a whole. It was clear that the people of India were not making the choices for policy reform, and that there was a higher power making the economic decisions for them.

A Higher Power?

After the 1991 economic crisis, the WB-IMF-WTO implemented several changes in favour of privatisation.

“The Bank staff has rewritten India’s trade policy, fiscal policies, labour laws, health care regulations, environmental regulations, procurement rules and foreign exchange laws. The Bank is playing this legislative role primarily by imposing conditions on its loans. Unlike the terms imposed by a commercial bank, however, many of the conditions imposed by the Bank have nothing to do with loan repayments.†28

These institutions are the drivers of foreign economic policy, and under their influence, the following laws were amended after 1991 to implement structural adjustments in India:

• Inland Waterways Authority of India Act, 1985,
• Inland Vessel Act,

• Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973,

• The Companies Act, 1956,

• Industrial Finance Corporation Act,

• Monopolies Restricted Trade Practices Act,

• Industrial Disputes Act,

• Indian Iron and Steel Company Act, 1972,

• IISCO Act, 1976,

• Indian Electricity Act,

• The Electricity (Supply Act), 1948,

• Iron and Steel Companies and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1978,

• Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926,

• Bank Companies Act, 1970,

• Indian Telegraph Act, 1985,

• Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act,

• Silk Industrial Companies Act, 1985,

• Employees Provident Fund Act,

• Merchant Shipping Act,

• ONGC Act 1959,

• Maternity Benefits Act, 1961,

• Air Corporation Act, 1953.29

These reforms may not mean much as a list, but as a collective unit, the WB-IMF-WTO have, through reform-based lending, changed India’s economic policy from an internally based economy to an externally based one.30 In the short-term, these institutions may have been seen as benefactors because India was lifted out of a serious crisis with the loan and showed increasing economic growth. But over a longer period of time they were exposed as using their financial power to prise open exploitative pathways into the Indian economy for MNCs, with the negative fallout of structural adjustment.

Concerns Regarding Social and Political Implications of Reform

ALTHOUGH India experienced short-term industrial free market growth in GDP, there were social and political ramifications of the liberalisation of its economy. These are:

• Disbanding protection for small industry increases the chances of efficient industry from the West dominating the Indian market and forcing Indian-owned industries to close. This increases the likelihood of exploitation in industry, decreases India’s autonomy in the market, and increases unemployment. This further loosens the accountability of MNCs.

• Less expenditures on pro-poor programmes result from the lessening of social expenditures by the government. This is part of the liberalisation process according to Friedman. Many aspects of health-care and education were also privatised well, relinquishing the control of these important social sectors to private firms rather than being controlled by the Indian people. This has widened the vast canyon between the rich and the poor in India.

• Incentives to expand enterprise and professional skills increase inequalities because industry only aims to increase profit, which is mostly achieved by exploiting wage labour, which in turn widens the gulf between the rich and poor.

• Open doors for foreign capital and agreeing to the jurisdiction of international organisations decreases the autonomy of India because their agreements involve removal of tariffs making India’s economy dependent on the West, rather than encouraging self-sufficiency. This in turn gives India less control over its economy, and loosens the accountability of MNCs.

• Decreasing concern for sustainability and the environment is caused by the increased focus on consumerism and industry rather on operating on earlier sustainable living practices that used to be part of India.31

The WB-IMF-WTO have flexed their monetary muscles and used the weapon of conditionality to satisfy the growing consumerism in the West, primarily in the USA, while the people of India are starting to feel the social effects of these economic reforms. It is evident that India’s economy is the another example of Friedman’s disaster capitalism toward free market ideology that is still unfolding.
Conclusion

MILTON FRIEDMAN’S liberal stabilisation theory, disaster capitalism, and shock doctrine are still widely used in the international community to manipulate the developing countries’ economic policies for corporate benefit. Although there are a wide range of methods used to implement Friedman’s ideology, they can be lumped together into the same general category. They can all be safely deemed as methods that harm the developing countries in the long run. Although they may produce short term quantitative benefits, Friedman’s liberal stabilisation policy is simply a way of justifying a fancy manoeuvre for large MNCs to pry open the economies of these countries and exploit them for resources and labour. Whether or not the countries that are being exploited have experienced violence in the colonisation of their economy, in the long run their social and political losses are straight across the board. By comparing the case of economic reforms of Chile and India, this paper illustrates how Friedman’s shock doctrine school of thought is alive and well in India’s economy. Although they have experienced different initial disasters or crises, India’s economic reforms are a part of Friedman’s liberal stabilisation policy just as much as Chile’s.

As long as powerful international organisations such as the WB, IMF and WTO subscribe to Friedman’s perspectives on developmentalism, the developing world will remain trapped in their vicious cycle. However, if one takes a look at history, protectionism may prove more effective in seeking sustained development.

REFERENCES

1. Central Intelligence Agency. Notes on Meeting with President of Chile, September 7, 1970, www.gwu.edu/~nsarshiv. (accessed July 7, 2010)

2. CIA, “Secret Cable from Headquarters [Blueprint for Fomenting a Coup Climate]†, In the Pinochet File: A Declassified Dosier on Atrocity and Accountability by Peter Kornbluh, New York: New Press, 2003, pp. 49-56.

3. Clements, Kenneth W., “Larry Sjaastad: The Last Chicagoan†, Journal of International Money and Finance 24 (2005), pp. 110-13.

4. Friedman, Milton, Capital and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

5. Ghosh, Arunabha, “India’s Pathway through Financial Crisis†, Global Economic Governance Programme, 2010.

6. Hayek, Friedrich August, The Road to Serfdom, New York: Routledge, 2005.
7. International Monetary Fund, What Caused the 1991 Currency Crisis in India. (accessed July 7, 2010)

8. Kapila, Uma, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009.

9. Klein, Naomi, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007.

10. Nobelprize.org: The Official Website of the Nobel Prize, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1976/friedman.html (accessed July 7, 2010)

11. “The Rising Risk of Recession†, Time, December 1969.

12. The World Bank in India, http://www.ieo.org/world-c12-p1.html (accessed July 7, 2010)

13. Valdes, Juan Gabriel, “Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile†in The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism by Naomi Klein, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 68.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Milton Friedman –Autobiography, Nobelprize.org: The Official Website of the Nobel Prize, http://nobelprize.org/nobel¬_prizes/economics/laureates/1976/friedman.html (accessed: July 7, 2010)

2. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, pp. 58-59.

3. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 57.

4. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 57.

5. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, pp. 65.

6. See Naomi Klein, “Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (1862, repr. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. ix†The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 7.

7. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 65.

8. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 68.

9. See Naomi Klein, “Juan Gabriel Valdes, Pinochet’s Economists: The Chicago School in Chile (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 110-13†, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 68.

10. See Naomi Klein, “Kenneth W. Clements, ‘Larry Sjaastad: The Last Chicagoan’, Journal of International Money and Finance 24 (2005), pp. 110-13†, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 70.

11. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 70-71.

12. See Naomi Klein, “Central Intelligence Agency, Notes on Meeting with President on Chile, September 7, 1970, declassified, www.gwu.edu/~nsarshiv.”, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 72.

13. See Naomi Klein, “CIA, Secret Cable Headquarters [Blueprint for Fomenting a Coup Climate], September 27, 1970†, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 73.

14. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 82.

15. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, pp. 7-8.

16. See Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 17.

17. See Naomi Klein, “The Rising Risk of Recession, Time magazine, December
19, 1969†, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Toronto: Random House, 2007, p. 17.

18. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009, p. 94.

19. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009, p. 95.

20. Arunabha Ghosh, India’s Pathway through Financial Crisis, Global Economic Governance Programme, July 7, 2010.

21. ‘India shining, India scraping’, The Telegraph, July 7, 2010.

22. What Caused the 1991 Currency Crisis in India, International Monetary Fund, archived from the original on 2009-05-08, July 7, 2010.

23. ‘I think a stimulus package is necessary, yes. Bailouts, no.’, The Telegraph, July 7, 2010.

24. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009,
pp. 98-99.

25. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009, p. 100.

26. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009, p. 100.

27. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009, p. 101.

28. The Bank and Good “Governance†, The World Bank in India, http://www.ieo.org/world-c12-p1.html (accessed: July 7, 2010)

29. The Bank and Good “Governance†, The World Bank in India, http://www.ieo.org/world-c12-p1.html (accessed: July 7, 2010)

30. The Bank and Good “Governance†, The World Bank in India, http://www.ieo.org/world-c12-p1.html (accessed: July 7, 2010)

31. See Uma Kapila, Indian Economy: Performance and Policies, New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2009,
p. 111.

Abigail Dawn McGillivary grew up in Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada. She is currently studying for the Bachelor of Arts at the University of Mount Allison at Sackville, New Brunswick, with a major in International Relations and a minor in French. Her interests include economics, history, geography, languages and political science, but she is focussing more on international policy and law and development studies. She attended a course on Science, Technology and Sustainable Development for academic credit at the Vivekananda Institute of Indian Studies, Mysore, as part of the University of Mount Allison Study Abroad Programme on Indian Culture and Civilisation, in 2010. She can be contacted at:

admcgillivary@mta.ca