Navigating the Irony of Exceptionalism and Status Dilemma in the India-US-China Strategic Triangle | Musssaib Rasool Mir, Santosh Kumar

Abstract

A complex interaction of exceptionalism and status dilemma characterizes the international relations of three crucial countries India-US-China. While China aims to restructure the global order around its economic supremacy and civilizational narrative, the United States claims global leadership through its liberal democratic model. As a growing state, India manages its ties with both powers while pursuing its goals of strategic autonomy and international recognition. This is however fraught with ironies: India’s democratic values contrast China’s authoritarian system and vice versa, yet the common desire for prestige is consistent with each-others comparable nationalistic tendencies. Despite advocating for a rules-based international system based on its imaginary moral superiority of the erstwhile Pax Americana, the US only positively interacts with partners that align with its strategic objectives, contradicting the exceptionalism and status guarantees of India as well as China at the international level. There is a common yet ironical interplay of these two factors with no state ready to accept others exceptional character and bestow the status they look for, upon each other. This article explores this intrinsic status dilemma and exceptionalism- the conviction that distinct national missions exist- of the strategic triangle formed by India, US and China in the international system and its impact on their relationships.

The context

The contemporary international system is laden with and up for crisis and instability arising from the confrontational trilateral relationship of different strategic triangles like Russia, China and US; Iran, Russia, China; etc. Similarly, the strategic triangle formed by three very important players of the international system, India, US and China play a very important role in shaping the working of international system. The idea of civilizational exceptionalism and status dilemma pervade the strategic triangle and are important factors in shaping the attitude of the three players in carving both the present and future world order in the system. The core belief system of civilizational exceptionalism and status dilemma, of the three strategic actors India, US, China on the world stage motivates them to forge their relationship within the triangular dynamics and with other actors as well. All three states see themselves in terms of distinct civilizational entities, a precursor to Universalist ethics, and holding a central position among the galaxy of nation-states.

This notion is connected with a civilization state loosely defined as "rooting politics in general on civilizational essences"…run by occult ideologies, "narcissism, psychotic egotism, and the idea of chosen people form the three angles"1 of Civilization states. The neo-imperialist notion is that the clash of civilizations has links to civilization states. In Taiwan, where Beijing is now executing its interpretation of the civilization state after performing it in Tibet and Hong Kong, Putin discovered that the true nature of the civilization state in Ukraine, where the sovereignty and self-determination of Ukraine are turned down in favor of the bogus notion of something termed as deeper fraternal unity between Russians and Ukrainians, by creating an authoritarian state in the name of culture, this state evokes what the French scholar Bernard-Henri Levi dubbed ‘Eurasian morbidity’. The unequal treatment and suppression of minorities along the civilizational lines can be equated with the discrimination of the black and indigenous populations in America and Western Europe. Thereby a civilization state’s innate infamous tendencies are anti-modern and anti-humanist. The triad states of the strategic triangle imagine themselves as exceptional in a civilizational sense; henceforth, it would not be incorrect to call it a ‘civilizational triangle’ as well, on certain common identifiable grounds as below the paper will discuss the exchange of exceptionalism of the U.S., China, and India. Therefore, both the present world order and the new world order would be hostage to such a (toxic) line of thinking where the ’far right neo-imperial clash of civilizations perspective’ shapes the rulers’ mindset and the corresponding strategic policies of the triangle.

Dilemma of Exceptionalism in the India-US-China Strategic Triangle

The U.S. leadership believes there is a generalized sense of unease and worry about the upkeep of a global system that supports an American identity built around the idea of American exceptionalism. The famous slogan of now the President elect Donald Trump for the second term, no doubt is MAGA (Make America Great Again) which with much fanfare has been popularized not only in USA but around the world as well. These presumptions are based on and support U.S. assertions of world dominance. For Washington, Beijing is a fundamental fountainhead of both physical and "ontological insecurity"2 seen as a disruptive force that casts doubt on U.S. beliefs about the universality of its institutions and ideals. A widely expressed notion is that the United States intends to capitalize on India as a counterbalance3. However, American policymakers need to explain India’s importance in terms of economic or defensive objectives. The U.S. government’s official statistics highlight the differences between China and India, including the country’s democratic ideals, close ties between its people, and cultural reach. India’s rise has yet to lead to the exaggerated global rhetoric that has followed China’s ascent. This is true even though the arguments used to support the idea that China’s ascent threatens the international system also hold for India. It is claimed that China poses a danger since it is motivated by nationalist sentiment, sees itself as the center of world culture, longs to redeem the mistreatment of the past, and aspires to usurp American dominance as the most powerful nation in Asia by carrying out modernization, upgrading its military and the proliferation of its naval presence4.

On the other side, the discussion of India’s growth continues to weaken India’s postcolonial identity, even when U.S. moves have the impact of validating India’s view of itself as a significant accountable state. The postcolonial identity is based on ideas of India’s civilizational uniqueness, which distinguishes India from the west and places a premium on strategic independence, self-reliance, and a unique normative view of the international system. India’s ascendancy as a significant political and economic force has led to a change in its approach to international affairs from an ethical "idealism" to an interest-based "realism" in reaction to the threat posed by the Chinese rise to a US-dominated global order and its presumption of the versatility of U.S. beliefs and systems5 founded on the notion of American uniqueness. Even though relations between India and the U.S. have improved, these connections are nevertheless impeded by their divergent worldviews and self-perceptions. However, analyzing whether the shift in Indian foreign policy is justified, is outside the purview of this essay, and has occurred from having an idealistic moral vision of the world order to an interest-based realistic vision. The fact that both India and the U.S. have identities supported by the notion that they have extraordinary traits because of their history and character has long been a major area of friction in bilateral relations.

As Priya Chacko defines American and Indian exceptionalism as the idea that American institutions, alongside its values, are global and, therefore, the USA ought to assume worldwide leadership; India’s civilizational uniqueness promotes the notion that the nation is credited a "non-coercive, prudent, exemplar-style approach to ethical leadership"6 followed by a just road to progress. Although the concurrent development of exceptionalist character reinforced the special bond between the U.S. and the U.K., the ongoing conflict between U.S. and Indian exceptionalism makes it unlikely that the declining U.S. will be successful in forging an immediate fresh, unique partnership with India, at least given the circumstances. For Narlikar, India’s long-lasting advocacy of anti-hegemonic alliances and commitment to hardline bargaining tactics in international forums is mainly attributable to a political climate that the country developed as a result of its imperialist encounters, its postcolonial skepticism of Cold War Western, and primarily American, foreign strategies, and its self-image as a civilizational state that merits reverence7. In other words, this Indian consciousness of the magnitude and the size "of its developmental tasks and its uniqueness as a civilizational state"8, the leaders of India would then be moved to pursue independent strategic policies with much to teach the world about the Kantian ideal of "respect for persons"—but from an Eastern tradition.

The one factor that can unite them and forge their strong relationship against the authoritarian Chinese civilizational state is that both countries have a record of being the oldest and largest democratic states. India and the U.S. are multiethnic democracies "committed to the rule of law and freedom of speech and religion"9. Making democracy a basic idea to build a framework against an all-mighty authoritarian state like China can be a reasonable basis for such an interest-based partnership. Although national interests always overshadow ideological similarities, it seems more viable to forge a working relationship, if not a strategic partnership, between U.S. and India, than between China and the other two states.

A fact largely disregarded is that the U.S. was/is more interested in chasing China than investing its resources in India and, per se, making India a strategic partner. U.S. strategic thinking has always seen India as a country that can keep the two states under check and balance the regional order. Independent analysis about India has been relegated in favour of historically looking at India vis-a-vis Pakistan, now China. The Indian state, to maintain a democratic, rules-based international order, particularly after Modi came to power in 2014, has tried to forge relationships with the U.S. and other states, an "euphemism for preventing China from usurping the American position in global affairs"10. On the other hand, the potential for China and India to forge a strategic and effective partnership seems very low due to low levels of mutual trust and confidence.

India and China are working to formalize their relationship in strategic coalitions like BRICS and SCO because they have a shared interest in reshaping global organizations and a stable environment through higher national economic growth that can be pursued together. But when China and India discuss preserving an open international order, they try to do so from a "different prism, different identities, and interests than the West," however, no non-Western power aims to overthrow the system altogether11. The incompatibility of differing world views and civilizational exceptionalism makes achieving a peaceful world order, a precarious enterprise. As Kanti Bajpai argues, the "Indian strategic community confronts a world in which China has risen to the position of being the most powerful nation without Indian assistance or even a close relationship with New Delhi"12. Xi Jinping wants to use the largest military in history to create a world order centered on China. In support of state dominance, pooled affluence, an innovative approach to win-win cooperation, twin distribution, and retaliation for the century of embarrassment, he has abandoned economic liberalization, an unbalanced material culture, and widespread injustice13. Xi Jinping is writing his own Great Leap Forward under the pretense of transforming China into a powerful, democratic, civilized, peaceful, and contemporary communist society by 2049. He is externalizing through military assertiveness like Mao did, especially against Taiwan and India. The dangers presented by Jinping’s "over-concentrated power are not confined within china’s borders but extend to the world beyond"14. But it is not only about the role of new leadership and the lack of clarity over the Line of Actual Control (LAC); both nations view their political systems as more certain routes to security and prosperity and consider themselves as beacons for Asia. If this theory is right, the India-China conflict goes much deeper than a geographical disagreement, and it can only be resolved if one side comes to share the other’s ideology or if one ideology is supported by the decisions made by other Asian states15.

The Status Dilemma in the trilateral relationship

Another aspect of trilateral partnerships connected with the so-called (imaginary) civilizational uniqueness is the mutual adaptation or denial of status. A state may acknowledge the status of one actor while denying it to a third party. Strategic triangles cause a status dilemma for states by accepting status differentiation. According to William Wohlforth, a state encounters a status dilemma when it believes that another state is attempting to undermine its standing and then acts in a way that could jeopardize the other state’s efforts to do the same16. When the authorities at the higher echelons of a state feel that the status it currently enjoys falls short of the position it deserves, conflict is likely to result, as is shown by empirical studies17. Facilitating prestige to a growing power reduces the influence of recognized authority and raises the price and challenges of giving status to additional triangle members. As a result, states will be hesitant to accept the status aspirations of other triangle actors, especially if they are prospective enemies. Recognition of this status which is political in nature while operating at the international level, defines the relationship and the connection between China, India, and the U.S.

India and the U.S. had a tense relationship due to Washington’s decision to punish India for its nuclear tests while simultaneously elevating China as a strategic ally in 1972. Throughout the history of these three states, the status dilemma has shaped the course of events between them. T.V. Paul and E. Underwood contend that a shift in policy has occurred, with China refusing to raise India’s standing while the United States is gradually doing so18. China does not like the prospect of India’s standing improving due to the promotion of India as a strategic partner and the enlargement of U.S. objectives in the Indo-Pacific. PRC is aiming to maintain the Indo-Pak competition to maintain India’s status as a regional power at par with Pakistan, while India, through its Look East and Act East programs, aspires to go outside the peripheral area and have significant power. The United States and East Asian nations are crucial for raising India’s standing since their support immediately lowers China’s promotion to become the sole Asian force of key importance and thwarts its status aspirations. The U.S. itself has been unhappy and frustrated with the fall in its status throughout the globe as China, India, and other players have swollen in ranks. A deliberate attempt at not giving the devil its due has been the official policy of China, Russia, and other states which see the U.S. as the bastion of all problems and the source of evil. This feeling of unease is influenced by external material variables and the ontological ambiguity connected to power shifts within the strategic triangle. Hence the subtlety of the status dilemma and identity crisis that it generates among the triad generates a new behavior of ontological insecurity among them and negatively impacts the international system. Therefore, understanding the strategic triangles in general and the working of India, US, and China through the perspectives of exceptionalism and status dilemma can provide important insights to policymakers while framing their respective foreign policies. This can add a new dimension to understanding the motivation and behaviour of different states behind their foreign policy choices. Exceptionalism and the status dilemma intertwine in triangular or multilateral relationships, such as the India-US-China dynamic. Each state’s pursuit of exceptionalism (e.g., US global leadership, China’s civilizational resurgence, India’s strategic autonomy) fuels competition and mistrust, intensifying the status dilemma and shaping their strategic interactions.

(Authors: Musssaib Rasool Mir is a senior research fellow at the School of International Studies, SCAS, Central University of Punjab, India, 151401. His area of research is Strategic Triangular dynamics of India, US and China, particularly analyzing the role of China factor in Indo-US relations from 2012-2022. Can be reached at musaibmirkmr[at]gmail.com ; Dr. Santosh Kumar, is an Assistant Professor at the SCAS, School of International Studies, Central University of Punjab, Bathinda, India. His MPhil dissertation titled “Japan-European Union Relations: Political and Economic Dimension, 1993-2007” and PhD Thesis Titled “Japan-Federal Republic of Germany Relations: A Study of Political and Economic Dimensions, 1990-2008” was obtained from the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi. Author email id: santosh.kumar[at]cupb.edu.in )

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