Interlinking Rivers: The story from scratch | S.G.Vombatkere

The interlinking of rivers (ILR) is ill-conceived, ruinously expensive, technically questionable, ecologically devastating, and socially disruptive. Here’s why ILR needs to be scrapped, and integrated water resource management of river basins should be adopted instead

Flood and Drought

The distribution of water resources in the country is highly uneven over space and time. Over 80-90% of runoff in rivers occurs in four months of the year, and there are regions of harmful abundance and acute scarcity. [1]

Central governments since the 1950s, have sought solutions to solve or mitigate the serious social and economic ill-effects of rivers in flood, and also of drought-prone regions. Technocrats deliberated on how to handle the annually recurring disasters of flood and drought, which exist simultaneously in widely separated river basins. They classified areas subject to flood as ‘water-surplus’, and areas subject to drought or water shortage as ‘water-deficit’.

The core concept

In August 1980, the Ministry of Irrigation formulated a plan titled “National Perspectives for Water Development”. The plan included establishing a National Water Development Agency (NWDA) as a Government of India Society under MoWR in 1982, to study basin-wise surpluses and deficits, and explore the possibilities for storages and links for transfers of water.

MoWR’s NWDA technocrats thus initiated the design for interlinking rivers (ILR) to implement the deceptively attractive idea of simultaneously mitigating flood and drought, by canal-based mass-transport of water from water-surplus areas of the Brahmaputra and Ganga basins to the water-deficit areas in Peninsular India.

NWDA’s core concept was: Interlinking rivers transfers excess water from the regions which receive a lot of rainfall to the areas that are drought-prone. This way, ILR can control both floods and droughts.

Perversion of planning

Linking distant rivers by canals on a grand scale is not a new idea. As far back as 1858, Army engineer Captain Arthur Cotton, came up with ambitious proposals to connect all major rivers of India with interlinking canals.

In 1972, Dr.K.L.Rao proposed a “Ganga-Cauvery link canal”, and in 1977 airlines Capt Dastur proposed a “National Garland Canal” scheme. Government considered both as techno-economically not feasible.

Thus, NWDA’s ILR concept remained dormant, until President of India, Dr.A.P.J.Abdul Kalam, stated in his 2002 pre-Independence Day Address to the Nation, that interlinking of rivers (ILR) was inescapable to solve India’s flood and drought problems. Taking a cue from this, in September 2002 Advocate Ranjit Kumar (amicus curiae in another matter) filed an application [2] praying that the Supreme Court should direct government to take up this project. CJI Justice B.N.Kirpal accordingly issued Notices to the States and the Centre. The matter came up for hearing on the day before Justice Kirpal was to retire. At the hearing, in the absence of response from all states but one, Justice Kirpal presumed that states have no objection to ILR, and passed an order to government to take up and complete the ILR project in the shortest possible time.

With uncharacteristic and unseemly haste, and by-passing all planning procedures and checks for major projects, PM Vajpayee’s NDA-1 government kick-started the ILR project. It constituted a Task Force for ILR on 13 December 2002, revealing NWDA’s plan for 30 high-capacity river-linking canals – 14 Himalayan and 16 Peninsular – with a total length of 14,900-km, costing Rs.5.6-lakh-crores. [Reference “MAP: Thirty river-linking canals (Source: NWDA)”]

Thus ILR, a national mega-project affecting Centre-State and inter-State relations, with enormous social, environmental, economic, financial and political implications, materialized in just 122-days (14 August to 13 December 2002). Initiated by the Head of State, this happened without application of mind by the Judiciary, without consideration of alternatives by the Executive, and without discussion in Parliament. These egregious omissions by India’s constitutional pillars, for a national project of enormous physical, geographic and financial magnitude, were followed by MoWR’s and ILR TF’s calculated official opacity. [3]

The combination of executive hubris, judicial haste, and legislative apathy, made a mockery of established planning processes and of the checks and balances of constitutional governance [4]. It is a precise, unrivalled example of how a national project should not be planned.

Before demonstrating how this travesty of planning was set into motion over the next two decades by successive governments, we may note that ILR has conceptual shortcomings [5] and technical, operating, social, environmental, legal, economic, security and political vulnerabilities. There is no evidence to indicate that the viability of the ILR system-as-a-whole was part of the planning. A critical examination of the claim of ILR solving flood and drought, is below [Note 1].

MAP: Thirty river-linking canals (Source: NWDA)

ILR Task Force

Sensing business opportunity, CII and FICCI enthusiastically supported ILR, and NDA-1 government set the completion target date as 31 December 2016. The calculations for cost estimate and target date were never made public. Under a dynamic Chairman, the ILR TF went into over-drive, going to great lengths and expense to popularise the concept of ILR among the public, with ready help from CII and FICCI to organise seminars and selective public meetings.

When questioned on the planning processes, Chairman Prabhu sometimes stated that ILR was “a concept”, and at other times described it as “a project”, displaying confusion or evasion. NWDA claimed that ILR will provide water to irrigate 35-million hectares of farmland and supply 34-GW of hydroelectricity, but did not substantiate its claims with data and calculations. NWDA’s FAQs accessed on 21.12.2024, include the statement: “The program is to complete [sic] by 2016 as desired by Supreme Court will be kept in view” [Emphases supplied], when the completion target of 31 December 2016 was set in 2002. The fact of the website not being updated for 22-years, is clear from the outdated statements in the FAQs, [6] and speaks for the lackadaisical planning of a national project.

Scientists, engineers, social scientists, grassroots and civil society activists, raised objections and cogent arguments against ILR, but government’s intransparency and unaccountability resulted in stone-wallng, ignoring, or side-stepping, including directing objectors to the information-deficit ILR TF website <https://riverlinks.nic.in/taskforce.asp> . The basic opposition to ILR was, that the mega-project was ill-conceived, and a case of reverse planning logic. It was without consideration of all alternatives to solve the problem of water availability, it was decided a priori that ILR was a solution, and government proceeded to address the modalities of ILR implementation.

ILR TF closed down

Eventually, on-the-ground country-wide resistance from thousands of people who would be affected by various components of the ILR project, combined with the strong arguments and objections against ILR, resulted in ILR TF being closed down on 29 December 2004. According to the new UPA-1 government, it had “completed its role”. ILR TF’s website (https://riverlinks.nic.in/taskforce.asp) vanished. However, UPA-1 kept the ILR proposal alive by creating a Special Cell in MoWR, to coordinate the planning and work, and prepare DPRs under guidance of two senior NWDA technocrats.

Judiciary’s continued interest

On 25 November 2008, the Supreme Court asked Government why not even one of the 30 links planned, was underway. Government informed the Court that the consensus between States had not yet been worked out and in cases where it was done, the signatures of the State governments had not been obtained. “The Pioneer” (November 26, 2008) reported that the Bench directed the Centre to file a detailed status report by January 2009, indicating the proposed dates for completion of the Feasibility Reports of the river links.

“The Indian Express” (December 2, 2009) reported that UPA-2 government’s MoWR minister P.K.Bansal, told the Lok Sabha that interlinking Himalayan with Peninsular rivers (re-estimated at Rs.4.44 lakh crores by National Council of Applied Economic Research) was unaffordable, but that Himalayan and Peninsular rivers would be linked separately. Significantly, UPA-2’s own MoEF minister Jairam Ramesh, declared the ILR project would be a “human, ecological and economic disaster for the country”, though smaller inter-basin transfers could continue.

In October 2011, questioning whether the ILR project would require land acquisition, the Supreme Court said that it might not favour the project if it meant a huge financial burden on Government. “My concern is only on what is the financial liability of the project. We want to make it clear that we would not pass order on it if it causes huge financial burden”, observed a three-judge Bench, headed by CJI Justice S.H.Kapadia. The Bench also directed amicus curiae Advocate Ranjit Kumar to file a report on the financial viability of the project in a month’s time, and scheduled the next hearing for January 2012.

Clearly, apart from the political compulsions of not endorsing a proposal made by the predecessor NDA-1 government, there was considerable confusion in the UPA-2 government on the financial, economic and environmental viability of ILR project. As clearly, one notices the Supreme Court’s unusual interest to promote the ILR project over the years, and the continued abject neglect by Parliament.

Judicial over-reach

Thereafter, the Supreme Court’s judgment of 27 February 2012 disposed off two writ petitions opposing ILR, dating back to 2002. It directed Government to implement the ILR project by setting up a special committee whose decisions would take precedence over all administrative bodies created under the orders of the Supreme Court. It directed the union cabinet to take all final and appropriate decisions, and laid down a “preferable” time limit of 30 days for decision-making, and granted “liberty to the learned amicus curiae to file contempt petition in the Supreme Court, in the event of default or non-compliance of the directions contained in its order”.

This was a clear case of judicial over-reach into the arena of the Executive. However, the UPA-2 government, perhaps aware of the possibilities implicit in the huge expenditures which the ILR project entailed, overcame its accustomed opposition to judicial encroachment, and raised no objections.

Governments change but ILR lives on

With the BJP-led NDA-2 government coming to power in May 2014, MoWR minister Uma Bharti vigorously revived NDA-1’s ILR proposal, particularly the Ken-Betwa link. Thus, the ILR project, at humongous social, environmental/ecological and financial/economic cost continued to be promoted without proper application of the judicial mind and without consideration of alternatives. The hand of the politician-bureaucrat-corporate nexus in furthering its agenda was plain as daylight.

The time-line of ILR starting in 2002, demonstrates how different members of the Apex Judiciary, and different parties and politicians of the Executive, and successive unquestioning Parliaments, have by-passed established planning practices in promoting and pressing a ruinously expensive national mega-project of doubtful utility, that involves huge population displacement. With NWDA’s unsubstantiated assurances of irrigation or power-generation advantages, these authorities were only concerned with time and cost issues, and failed to consider the social costs of land required and families impacted by ILR, or the environmental and ecological costs.

Water sharing disputes

There are several on-going inter-State and inter-basin water-sharing disputes, which remain unresolved despite Supreme Court interventions. Since the ILR project concerns inter-State and inter-basin mass-transport of water, it is necessary to briefly address water disputes.

Water disputes can be between countries (international), between states (inter-State) and within states (intra-State). These are due to disagreements concerning different perspectives on water. Disagreement can be on one or more of the following:

* Validity of hydrological data; * Construction or operation of river projects; * Control over water availability and utilization; * Immediate, seasonal and anticipated water needs; * Treaties or awards by tribunals or courts; * Ratio of water sharing especially in times of water scarcity; * Riparian rights; * Political compulsions; etc.

In the inter-State context, the decades-long Cauvery water dispute principally between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, is a typical example of states sharing water of the same river, involving all the above reasons for dispute. Another typical example is the decades-long inter-basin (Sutlej and Yamuna) water sharing, SYL canal dispute of Punjab and Haryana, with Punjab enacting a law not to share its water with Haryana, and the Supreme Court striking down that law as “unconstitutional”. In both these and other cases, there has been public violence and social unrest.

In the international context, India’s water disputes with Pakistan and with Bangladesh, also involve the above disagreements. Nepal and lower riparian Bangladesh have objected to the ILR project. India’s dispute with China on Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo) water remains indeterminate, especially now with China planning the world’s largest dam, [7] affecting India’s lower riparian rights.

The reality of water demand

Many more examples can be quoted, but the foregoing examples adequately illustrate that every State wants water, no State agrees that it has “surplus” water, and particularly in times of scarcity does not agree to share water. This is because every State government is bound to look after the needs of its own population. Thus, in the past, Central government orders have been challenged by States, with increasing animosity between neighbouring states, while judicial decisions on water disputes have nearly precipitated constitutional crises. Changing water from a State subject to a Concurrent or Central subject by constitutional amendment – as suggested by some worthies – cannot solve on-the-ground thirst and demand for water, regardless of orders of the Supreme Court or the Central or State governments.

In present times, as increasing water scarcity becomes cause for conflict at all levels of society, it passes understanding how, over the years, successive Central governments, spurred by a succession of learned Supreme Court judges, are unable to comprehend that pursuing the ILR project will only create fresh conflicts, or intensify existing conflicts, between people on-the-ground and between governments, in Courts of law or on the streets. This can only weaken the Centre and lower or destroy the pedestal of respect on which the Judiciary stands in bringing genuine justice to the people.

Environmental impacts

The cumulative environmental impacts of the component projects of the ILR mega-project are a serious concern. Growing environmental degradation caused by uncontrolled extraction of natural resources due to the economic-growth policy, combined with galloping climate change, increases stress on water resources. India, with 16% of global population (and increasing) but only 4% of global fresh water (and reducing), will be very seriously water-stressed in coming years.

To understand the environmental and connected issues [8]involved in the ILR project, it is instructive to consider the Rs.44,600-crores Ken-Betwa Link Project (KBLP) [9] between Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh. The Ministry of Environment, Forest & Climate Change (MoEF&CC) was pressured to obtain clearance from National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) after MoWR minister Uma Bharti declared in June 2016, that delay in clearance to KBLP was a “national crime”, and threatened to go on a hunger strike. Accordingly, allowing environmental and climate change concerns to become victim to political pressure, NBWL gave its clearance to KBLP in September 2016. However, in 2019, a Central Empowered Committee appointed by the Supreme Court reportedly said NBWL’s clearance had no merit [10] and appeared economically infeasible, but political compulsions triumphed.

In 2007, Deepali Rastogi, Panna District Collector for over 30-months, [11] boldly stated: “To say that the Ken Basin is a “water surplus” basin is not only totally erroneous, it holds disastrous implications for the residents of Panna district and other districts of the Ken river basin”. Due to government’s political pressure, MoWR has refused to reveal Ken-Betwa hydrological data to non-Government members of its own Expert Committee. [12]

KBLP is merely one example, to demonstrate how governments’ motivation for project execution bulldozes real-time environmental and economic concerns, and how policies value short-term and limited economic gains over long-term survival issues.

Social impacts of dams and canals

In the foregoing, the property and livelihood loss and social disruption due to mass displacement of populations, has not been discussed. This is an on-going, burning problem all over the country, epitomised by the 40-years-long people’s peaceful resistance in the Narmada Valley. It is apt to mention that since 1950, at least 60-million people have already been displaced, many twice over, due to dam-canal construction. Besides the suffering of the project-affected families, there is social unrest as they move to new places, where they are not welcome among people who are themselves already economically stressed. These issues are not addressed at all by the ILR projects.

Governments violate laws

Adivasis form the bulk of populations impacted by dam-canal projects. Their protests are not only about loss of land and habitat, way of life and social disruption, but also about governments violating the following extant laws. [The purpose of enactment of each violated law is mentioned in quotes: PESA 1996 (for “rights over community resources”), EPA 1984 (for “protection and improvement of human environment” & “prevention of hazards to living beings, plants and property”), FRA 2006 (for “righting historical injustice”; “scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers are integral to the very survival of forest ecosystems”; “remedy insecurity of rights”) and LARR 2013 (for “a humane, participative, informed and transparent process for land acquisition for industrialisation”)].

People’s on-going resistance to the Arunachal’s Upper Siang multi-purpose mega-dam project is only the most recent example [13].

The way forward

In January 2002, in the context of water conservation and availability, PM A.B.Vajpayee wisely recommended: “Catch every raindrop where it falls”. However, President Kalam’s promotion of ILR on 14 August 2002, resulted in his no-conflict, low-cost, practical idea of watershed management, being summarily pushed aside, in favour of NWDA’s ILR scheme, perhaps because ILR involved huge expenditure and opportunity to the politician-bureaucrat-corporate nexus. PM Vajpayee never questioned it.

The interlinking of rivers is an ill-conceived, ruinously expensive, technically questionable, ecologically devastating and socially disruptive national mega project. [14] Notwithstanding, planning and execution of individual links is proceeding, with Union Budget allocations.

Government of India needs to scrap the ILR project, and also scrap large-scale civil engineering water management projects. It should rather look to intra-basin watershed management.

Central and State governments need to enforce water conservation by a combination of appropriate, region-specific, tried and tested methods of integrated water resource management (IWRM), and review agricultural and industrial water-use policy which can mitigate the effects of increased water-stress due to climate change. Failure to do this, will inevitably result in unmanageable social unrest, and environmental and economic disaster.

(Author: S.G.Vombatkere holds a Civil Engineering (Structural dynamics) PhD from I.I.T., Madras)

Notes:

1. Inter-basin transfer of water is an outstandingly large, complex program, best studied using computer simulation models and system analysis.[Ref.1] There is no evidence that NWDA conducted such studies, for its proposal of a system of high-capacity canals linking river basins based upon the “exchange principle”, each (donor) river basin donating water to a (recipient) river basin in exchange of water received from another river basin. A high-capacity link canal 100-m wide 10-m deep flowing at 2-m/sec (maximum flow velocity permissible to prevent cavitation damage) in ideal conditions, can carry a theoretical maximum of 2,000-cumecs. [Cumec=cubic meters per second]

2. Water off-take of 2,000-cumecs from Ganga (Link-10) for transfer to Subarnarekha river basin during the 4-months monsoon, when (water-surplus) Ganga’s average flood flow is 55,000-cumecs, is paltry relief for Ganga’s flood, that too only downstream of the off-take point, with no relief upstream. Further, in the 8-months non-monsoon period, when Ganga’s lean period average flow is 5,280-cumecs, a 2,000-cumecs off-take will be opposed by people and local governments. A link canal which is almost useless in relieving flood during 4-months, and quite useless during 8-months, is a system design failure and a collosal economic burden.
3. Examination of the ILR system [Reference “MAP: Thirty river-linking canals (Source: NWDA)”] shows:

* Ganga water (from the off-take Link-10 canal headworks near Bhagalpur in Bihar) reaches only Godavari, by means of Link-10: Ganga–Subarnarekha; Link-11: Subarnarekha–Mahanadi; and Link-15: Mahanadi–Godavari is not a canal link but a 2,000-cumecs pumped lift requiring large dedicated power supply. Ganga is a “donor” basin, and the others are “recipient” and “donor” basins according to the exchange principle.
* Link-19 & Link-20 supply upper Krishna water to upper Pennar, and Link-16 & Link-17 supply upper Godavari water to lower Pennar. Krishna is a “donor” basin, and the others are “recipient” and “donor” basins, according to the exchange principle.
* Link-22 supplies Pennar water to Cauvery. Pennar is a “recipient” and “donor” basin, according to the exchange principle.
* In Peninsular India, areas of Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Telengana and Karnataka, which are at elevations of 300-m to over 1,000-m above MSL, are water-deficit regions. Thus, Ganga water originating at Bhagalpur (42-m above MSL), and flowing by gravity to Mahanadi (Link-11) and by pumped lift to lower Godavari (Link-15), cannot supply water to the water-deficit regions of Peninsular India.

4. This examination of the ILR system, shows that NWDA’s concept of simultaneously mitigating flood and drought, by canal-based mass-transport of water from water-surplus areas of the Brahmaputra and Ganga basins to the water-deficit areas in Peninsular India, cannot function.

5. The ILR system is unworkable for systemic technical-cum-operational reasons [15].