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Mainstream, Vol 63 No 1, January 4, 2025

Review of Intondi’s, Saving the World from Nuclear War | Eric Ross

Saturday 4 January 2025

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BOOK REVIEW

Saving the World from Nuclear War: The June 12, 1982, Disarmament Rally and Beyond
by Vincent J. Intondi

Johns Hopkins University Press
Johns Hopkins Nuclear History and Contemporary Affairs Series
2023. 152 pp.
(paper), ISBN 978-1-4214-4640-0

Reviewed by Eric Ross (University of Massachusetts Amherst)

In Saving the World from Nuclear War, Vincent J. Intondi offers a concise yet comprehensive examination of the context and legacy of the June 12, 1982, Nuclear Disarmament Rally. Against the backdrop of a period of heightened nuclear anxiety in the United States and around the world, Intondi argues that “a new movement emerged, led primarily by women and younger activists, who viewed eliminating racism, patriarchy, and nuclear weapons as part of the same fight to create a more just and equal world” (p. 5). By challenging prevailing assumptions about the antinuclear movement, the book refutes the notion that nuclear weapons were peripheral to the broader peace and social justice movements. In doing so, Intondi provides a crucial correction to the common characterization of the disarmament campaign as ineffective, performative, and dominated by the concerns of primarily white, middle-class, single-issue activists.

In part 1, Intondi traces the resurgence of the antinuclear movement to the late 1970s, marking the end of a contradictory decade in nuclear policy. Intondi underscores the paradox of this period, noting that although international arms control efforts created an impression that “the chances of nuclear war were diminishing … the development of nuclear weapons actually increased in the 1970s” (p. 14). Recognizing this reality, a coalition of concerned global citizens began awakening to the unsettling reality that humanity found itself on a perilous path toward nuclear annihilation. However, the danger inherent in these developments did not resonate with a widespread audience until the rise of Ronald Reagan.

Amid mounting geopolitical crises, Reagan assumed the presidency at a time, as Intondi notes, when “the Cold War seemed to be heating up” (p. 17). On the campaign trail, Reagan presented himself as a staunch anticommunist hawk. He rejected rapprochement, disparaged diplomacy, and branded arms control agreements as appeasement. Once in the White House, he did little to rein in his rhetoric. He continued to assert that nuclear war was not only survivable but winnable, even at the cost of tens of millions of American lives. In preparation to “win” a nuclear war, Intondi explains, Reagan pursued the “largest military spending increase in peacetime history,” ballooning the defense budget from $130 billion in 1979 to close to $300 billion in 1985 (p. 21).

This buildup did little to instill any sense of security. Instead, Intondi argues, it merely “scared the American public into thinking we were going to have a nuclear war, and it angered Americans about where money was being spent” (p. 22). In response to this militaristic madness, millions mobilized, as tens of thousands flocked to join the ranks of antinuclear groups, democratizing the debate around nuclear weapons. The emergent coalition was diverse, intersectional, and backed by the weight of public opinion. Intondi highlights the significant shift from previous generations when nuclear policy was “dominated by all white males, academic jargon, an alphabet soup, and complicated game theory strategies” (p. 27).

Part 2 details the preparations undertaken by leaders of the reinvigorated antinuclear movement for the June 12 rally in New York, scheduled to coincide with the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament. With as many as one million attendees, ranging from rock stars to atomic bomb survivors, the event would go on to be, as Intondi describes it, “the largest peace rally ever to take place on United States soil” (p. 87). The organizers were committed to the rally reflecting the newfound diversity of the movement. Yet, as Intondi highlights, “with many voices came many opinions,” and despite relative unanimity in the nuclear arena, broader consensus-building proved challenging (p. 39).

Intondi details how many left-leaning and minority-led groups vigorously opposed their exclusion from leadership, as they were determined to prevent their continued political marginalization within the peace movement. They hinged their participation on securing genuine representation, rejecting compromise of their principles in the face of conservative and corporate pressures to moderate their views for the sake of supposed unity. Beyond securing leadership roles, they emphasized the need to show solidarity, tying resistance to nuclear weapons to a broader critique of empire. They aimed for the rally to also serve as a platform to denounce US interventionism from Central America to Southern Lebanon. As Intondi illustrates, a recognition emerged on the left that “nuclear disarmament was inextricably linked to race and colonialism” (p. 59). This position largely prevailed. African Americans, for example, constituted more than 50 percent of event leadership. This was of particularly relevance as increases in military spending and corresponding tax cuts to fund it disproportionately impacted black communities.

While the rally amassed unprecedented numbers, Intondi begins part 3 asking whether it achieved its aims. Some contemporary observers argued it had no discernible impact. Intondi relays their blunt assessment, amounting to a belief that “the peace groups could have just stayed home” (p. 94). However, Intondi contends that this perspective was overly cynical. Reagan never publicly acknowledged that the rally altered policy. Nevertheless, the protest, a reflection of widespread antinuclear sentiment, compelled him to confront the reality that his hardline positions were largely unpopular and untenable. By 1985, Reagan agreed to previously unthinkable arms control negotiations. In 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev foreswore nuclear war. These developments suggest that the impact extended far beyond that day.

Saving the World from Nuclear War is an impressive and important work. In just over a hundred pages, Intondi skillfully surveys the history of the antinuclear movement through the lens of the 1982 rally. He also does so in a highly accessible manner, which is essential given the unfortunate relevance of nuclear weapons today. The book contributes greatly not only to our understanding of the rally but also to the broader historiography. It advances Lawrence Wittner’s intervention, among others, emphasizing that the movement had a substantial impact on shaping policy. Intondi ultimately demonstrates how a diverse global coalition came to understand that there is no justice on a planet destroyed, united in their opposition to this grim potential, and, at least for the moment, made nuclear war not only unimaginable but politically unthinkable.

[This work from H-Net is reproduced under a Creative Commons License]

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