Winners and losers in Syria | M K Bhadrakumar

December 8, 2024

Iran and Russia are the two big losers in the ouster of Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad on Sunday by the Sunni Islamist groups affiliated to al-Qaeda. Assad fled in the nick of time after giving orders that there be a peaceful handover of power. The likelihood is that he is in Russia. At any rate, a rollback of the Islamist takeover in Syria is out of the question.

The Arab oligarchies of the Gulf region are full of trepidation over the surge of a variant of political Islam that may potentially pose an existential challenge. Unsurprisingly, they have gravitated toward Iran, whom they see as a factor of regional stability, reciprocating Tehran’s call on regional states to circle their wagons to ward off the challenge of “Takfiri” groups (codename for al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the Iranian narrative.)

Israel and Turkey are the biggest winners, having established links with the al-Qaeda groups. Both are all well-set to project power into Syria and carve out their respective spheres of influence in Syrian territory. Turkey has demanded that Syria belongs to Syrian people alone — a thinly covered call for vacation of foreign military presence (Russian, American and Iranian.)

Equally, the Biden Administration can derive satisfaction that Russian military presence will not henceforth remain unchecked and an untenable situation of dramatic loss of influence surrounds Moscow’s military bases in the western Syrian province of Latakia.

There is no question that the lame duck administration in Washington will draw vicarious pleasure that the incoming presidency of Donald Trump will have to grapple with prolonged instability and uncertainties in the West Asia, an oil-rich region that is crucial to the “America First”axis of the new administration’s foreign policies.

To be sure, lurking beneath the surface of the big picture, there are several sub-plots, some of whom at least are of contrarian disposition. First of all, the renewed calls [1] that are heard jointly from the Astana group (Moscow, Tehran and Ankara) and the regional capitals for intra-Syrian dialogue leading to a negotiated settlement have a ring of unreality insofar as the current international climate virtually rules out any such prospects in a foreseeable future. The US is pleased with the regime change in Damascus and will follow up with efforts seeking the closure of the Russian bases in Syria.

Second, Turkey has special interests in Syria in relation to the Kurdish problem. The weakening of the Syrian state, especially the security apparatus in Damascus, provides Turkey for the first time a free run in the northern border provinces where Kurdish separatist groups are operating. Suffice to say, Turkish occupation of Syrian territory may assume a permanent character and even a quasi-annexation of the regions is within the realms of possibility. Make no mistake, the Treaty Lausanne (1923) which Turkey regards as a national humiliation has expired and the hour of reckoning has come for reclaiming the Ottoman glory.

In all probability, therefore, what is at stake is the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country and the disintegration of Syria as a state. It has been reported that Israeli tanks have crossed the border into southern Syria [2]. According to Israeli media, Tel Aviv has direct contacts with the Islamist groups operating in southern Syria [3]. It is no secret that these groups were mentored by the Israeli army for over a decade.

Thus, at best, a truncated Syria, a rump state, is to be expected with large scale outside interference, and in a worst case scenario, Turkish revanchism and Israeli aggression taken together — plus the American occupation of eastern Syria and a weak central authority in Damascus — the country in its present shape, founded in 1946, may altogether vanish from the map of West Asia.

In fact, the Gulf states and Egypt have reason to worry about an Arab Spring 2.0 — oligarchies being overthrown and replaced by the militant Islamist groups. Their comfort level with Tehran has perceptibly deepened. But, of course, the US will counter this regional trend which would otherwise isolate Israel in the region.

Russia is pragmatic and a foreign ministry statement [4] on Sunday strongly hinted that Moscow has a plan B to shore up its military presence in Syria. Interestingly, the statement pointed out that Moscow is in touch will all Syrian opposition groups. The statement scrupulously avoided using the word “terrorist”, which Russian officials had been freely using to characterise the Syrian groups who have taken over Damascus.

The Russian embassy in Damascus is not in any danger. It is entirely conceivable that the Russian intelligence which is traditionally very active in Syria — for obvious reasons — had already begun sensitising Moscow on a power transition in Damascus being in the cards and kept contacts with the opposition Islamist groups, the strident public rhetoric notwithstanding.

In comparison, Iran suffers a serious setback from which it is difficult to recover any time soon, as the ascendancy of the Sunni groups will lead to a new power calculus in Syria, which is viscerally hostile towards Tehran. The evacuation of diplomats [5] followed by the storming of the Iranian embassy [6] in Damascus speaks for itself. Indeed, Israel will spare no effort to ensure that Iranian influence is vanquished from Syria.

The heart of the matter is that Iran’s regional influence significantly diminishes as the resistance groups (which are largely Shi’ite) become rudderless and disillusioned. This not only works to the advantage of Israel but also triggers a shift in the balance of forces regionally.

The amazing part is that Iran failed to anticipate the turn of events. The advisor to the Supreme leader Ali Larijani actually visited [7] Damascus and met with Assad to reiterate Tehran’s full backing to stop the Islamist forces that were already nearing the city gates.