Mainstream Weekly

Home > Archives (2006 on) > 2009 > July 2009 > ‘Colour’ Revolution Fizzles in Iran

Mainstream, Vol XLVII, No 30, July 11, 2009

‘Colour’ Revolution Fizzles in Iran

Saturday 11 July 2009, by M K Bhadrakumar


Israelis are realists par excellence. This is why it is always gainful to buttonhole an Israeli counterpart over a single-malt on the diplomatic circuit. He will invariably weave into the tapestry of the plain tale a nylon thread until then obscure to the naked eye.

Thus, the first warning that the adventurous project to mount a “Twitter revolution” in Iran was doomed to fail had to come from the Israelis. It meshes well with the indications that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s capacity to command the seemingly explosive political situation was never really been in doubt, no matter the hype in the Western media that Tehran was on the ‘knife’s edge”.

If any doubt lingers, that also is dispelled by the fury in the state-controlled Saudi Arabian media’s unprecedented, vicious personal attack on both Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad—of a kind alien to the culture of ta’arof (politesse) or even taqiyah (dissimulation) in that part of the world. Riyadh’s fond hopes of witnessing the Iranian regime debilitated by a protracted crisis have been dashed. Its principal interlocutor, former Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, has vanished from the chessboard. Riyadh seems bracing for Tehran’s wrath.

Israel’s Faultless Prognosis

In an extraordinary media leak at the weekend, just as Khamenei’s historic speech at the Friday prayer meeting in Tehran ended, Meir Dagan, head of Israel’s Mossad, let it be known that a win by Iranian Opposition candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi in the presidential election on June 12 would have spelled “big problems” for Israel.

Israelis have a way of saying things. It was a subtle acknowledgement of political realities in Tehran. Speaking to the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee of the Knesset (parliament) on June 16, Israel’s spymaster could foresee that the protests in Iran would run out of steam. According to Ha’aretz newspaper, Dagan said: “Election fraud in Iran is no different than what happens in liberal states during elections. The struggle over the election results in Iran is internal and is unconnected to its strategic aspirations, including its nuclear programme.”

He explained: “The world, and we, already know Ahmadinejad. If the reformist candidate Mousavi had won, Israel would have had a more serious problem, because it would need to explain to the world the danger of the Iranian threat, since Mousavi is perceived in the international arena as a moderate element. It is important to remember that he is the one who began Iran’s nuclear programme when he was Prime Minister.”

The assessment is faultless, perfect. By a masterstroke in “back-channel” diplomacy, Israel signalled to Tehran it had nothing to do with any “colour” revolution. It was a timely signal. Indeed, divisions have come to surface that have existed for years within the Iranian regime. But it is very obvious that there is no scope for a “colour” revolution in today’s Iran. Even a trenchant, relentless critic of the regime like veteran author Amir Taheri admits:

The regime’s base has benefited from Ahmadinejad’s largesse, and the rest of Iranian society is not sure anyone could do better. Ahmadinejad’s principal weakness is his failure to bring the rich and corrupt mullahs to justice, as he had promised. His supporters say that would be the priority in his second term.... Today, he is the authentic leader of the Khomeinist movement in a way that Mousavi, or [former President Mohammad] Khatami, or any of the other half-way-house Khomeinists could never be.

Mousavi’s Limitations

Nonetheless, Mousavi kindled hopes in the West—notably London, Paris and Berlin—and some “pro-West” Arab capitals. But then, that was because he was a known factor as the Foreign Minister and then Prime Minister during 1981-89. The issue was never that he was a modernist or reformer. To quote Taheri, the well-informed chronicler of the Middle East, Mousavi, when he was in power, “developed a wide network of contacts in the US, Europe and the Arab countries”.

Taheri, who rubs shoulders with the Arab and Western political elites with elan, offers insights into the Mousavi camp. He recalls that the man who led the lengthy Algiers talks, which resulted in the release of the American hostages in 1981, Behzad Nabvi, is still assisting Mousavi. So is Abbas Kangarioo who held secret negotiations with the Ronald Reagan Administration in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra deal. Kangarioo, a key advisor and friend of Mousavi, also has the distinction of having “developed a network of contacts in intelligence and diplomatic circles in Europe and the US”.

Unsurprisingly, Taheri estimates that while Mousavi’s fame might have spread far and wide in the Western intelligence circles, his principal appeal at home is confined to the urban middle classes who wish the “Khomeinist revolution would just fade away... People like Mousavi and former Presidents Mohammad Khatami and Hashemi Rafsanjani have long ceased to be regarded as genuine revolutionaries”.

From another direction, Taheri came to virtually the same definitive conclusion as the Israeli intelligence chief reached. Namely, that a weak interlocutor without a “Khomeinist base” like Mousavi could never make concessions that the US, the Europeans and the Arabs demanded, whereas Ahmadinejad can afford a softening of position as it will only seem a clever manoeuvre. Paradoxically, negotiating with Ahmadinejad might prove easier for the West, as he has a genuine constituency.

Looking back at the past four years, the fact remains that Ahmadinejad restored the connectivity of the regime with the radical populist discourse. “Four years ago,” Taheri writes, “the image of the regime was one of a clique of mid-ranking mullahs and their business associates running the country as a private company in their own interest. The regime’s ‘downtrodden’ base saw itself as the victim of a great historic swindle. Under Ahmadinejad, a new generation of revolutionaries has come to the fore, projecting an image of piety and probity, reassuring the ‘downtrodden’ that all is not lost.”

Ahmadinejad’s populism is a double-edged sword. If carried too far, it may undermine the legitimacy of the regime, which included corrupt sections of the clerical establishment. But Ahmadinejad is a clever politician. He has certainly grown while on the job these past four years. Although he self-portrayed with gusto as a locomotive that charges ahead without brakes or reverse gear, he knew where to stop and when to glance over his shoulder. Thus, he hit at many corrupt practices and threatened to bring key figures to justice, but stopped short of landing the big catch. The big question is whether Ahmadinejad will cast his net wide in his second term.

Rafsanjani Outmanoeuvred

However, Khamenei remains the ultimate arbiter. Ahmadinejad publicly acknowledged the locus of power by expressing in a formal letter “his gratitude” to Khamenei for his “helpful remarks” at the on Friday prayers on June 19. That week’s (June 14-19) power-play showed that Khamenei effectively thwarted Rafsanjani’s attempt to rally the clerical establishment in Qom. The turning point was reached on June 18 when the majority of the 86 members of the powerful Assembly of Experts (which Rafsanjani headed) openly rallied behind Khamenei.

The Assembly of Experts is the most powerful organ of the regime, invested with the authority to elect and dismiss the supreme leader and to supervise his functioning. Around 50 members of the Assembly of Experts said in a statement that “enemies of Iran” were masterminding the “unrest and riots” over the presidential vote through its “hired elements”. Rafsanjani conclusively lost the war when the majority of the members of the Assembly of Experts expressed confidence that with the “sagacious directions of the [Supreme] Leader”, the machinations of Iran’s enemies will be defeated.

Armed with this decisive support, Khamenei came to deliver his historic Friday (June 19) prayer speech where he ruled out any rethink about the election result. Rafsanjani failed to show up at the prayer meeting, even as Khamenei made clear his support for Ahmadinejad, stressing how closely their viewpoints coincided.

Significantly, Khamenei referred to Rafsanjani by name even in his absence. The message was loud and clear: Khamenei’s supremacy is unchallengeable. Most ominously, while Khamenei graciously absolved Rafsanjani of any personal corruption, he left open the possibility of legal proceedings being initiated against his family members. Rafsanjani will now need to weigh his options very carefully. He cannot but factor in the Sword of Damocles hanging over his family members who have allegedly amassed huge wealth through corrupt practices.

Also, Khamenei made no effort to specifically contradict the grave charge levelled by Ahmadinejad during the election campaign that Rafsanjani conspired with the Saudi regime to overthrow his government—an allegation that the President couldn’t have made without input from Iranian intelligence, which comes under the supervision of the supreme leader.

On June 20, the Assembly of Experts went a step further by expressing its “strong support” for Khamenei’s speech. It called on the nation to obey Khamenei’s guidelines. Also on June 20, the Iranian armed forces headquarters and the Qom Seminary Teachers Society and several influential voices in the regime publicly rallied behind Khamenei. The so-called reformist clergy aligned with Khatami changed their mind and called off their planned demonstration on June 20.

The hard reality, therefore, is that Khamenei’s awesome powers are in no way under challenge. He can afford to let demonstrations by Mousavi’s middle-class followers continue to let off steam, as he has the authority to command the situation in a holistic way. That is to say, even if protests may continue for a while—which seems improbable as Mousavi finds himself in a tight spot—that does not erode state power.

As Taheri put it,

So-called ‘Iran experts’ did not realise that Mousavi was a balloon that a section of the Iranian middle class inflated to show its anger not only at Ahmadinejad but also at the entire Khomeinist regime. Otherwise, there is nothing in Mousavi’s record... to make him more attractive than Ahmadinejad.

At the end of it all, the international community can only heave a sigh of relief that while this complex and extremely confusing political drama unfolded, George W. Bush was no more in the White House in Washington. United States President Barack Obama could grasp the subtleties of the situation and adopted a well-thought-out, measured policy and broadly stuck to it despite apparent pressure from the conservatives.

His remarks have not even remotely called into question Ahmadinejad’s locus standii, let alone Khamenei’s, to lead the country. Nor has Obama identified himself with Mousavi’s call for a new poll. If anything, he ostentatiously distanced himself from Mousavi. Certainly, not once did Obama threaten to go back on his offer to directly engage Iran in the near future.

Meanwhile, Obama has just done some thoughtful fine-tuning in the line-up of the Iran hands in his Administration, as the countdown begins for the commencement of direct talks. He shifted Dennis Ross to the National Security Council as Special Advisor for the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia instead of appointing him as the special envoy to Iran on the lines of George Mitchell’s portfolio covering the Palestinians and Israel. Tehran will no doubt welcome the shift, given Ross’ hawkish views. Now, it will be the right thing to do if Obama asks Richard Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to hold additional charge of Iran.

Clearly, the Iranians took note that Obama’s statements remained carefully modulated, although Voice of America might have meddled in the turmoil, as Tehran alleges. Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s broadside on June 20 in Tehran singled out Britain, France and Germany, but omitted any reference to the US (or Israel). Among European countries, Tehran trained its guns on Britain.

Mottaki said British forces in Iraq trained saboteurs and infiltrated them into Iran. But even then, it is a measure of Tehran’s self-confidence that he elected to mock, saying it’s time London forgot the adage that the “sun never sets on the British Empire”.

(Courtesy: Asia Times)

ISSN (Mainstream Online) : 2582-7316 | Privacy Policy|
Notice: Mainstream Weekly appears online only.