If a wider war in Middle-East actually starts, will it be bigger than is commonly believed? | Bharat Dogra

Urgency of stepping up peace efforts immediately by the UNO and others

For quite some time, there has been much discussion on the possibilities of a wider war breaking out in the already deeply troubled Middle East region. If this actually happens, this would be tragic beyond words and its costs in terms of the loss of human lives, displacement and mass distress will be intolerably high. Hence at the outset it should be stated that the maximum efforts should be made now to prevent such a war from breaking out. Also, it should be asserted that it is still possible to prevent such a war if no time is lost in stepping up peace efforts in a big and significant way, by the UNO and others.

It should be recognized that the very real possibilities of a wider war certainly exist, and must be faced realistically and reduced as much as possible. As the already horrific violence seen in Gaza (which has claimed around 200,000 human lives in Gaza as a result of direct and indirect deaths caused by Israel’s highly disproportionate response to the horrible October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas) has shown, the indirect deaths caused by famine like conditions, denial of food and clean water, spread of disease, homelessness, lack of essential medical help and medicines can be higher than the deaths caused directly by the violence of the conflict in the form of shootings, bombings etc. This is also revealed in the context of the conflicts in Yemen and Syria. Hence a wider war in the region can lead to catastrophic conditions within a relatively short time and the tensions will spread to other countries as the people displaced on a large scale by war will try to find refuge elsewhere. In addition, a wider regional war in the Middle East can also accentuate potential flash-points including sectarian tensions elsewhere.

Recent discussion of a wider war has been taking place generally in the context of the fact that during the ten months of the Gaza conflict Israel has also been involved in smaller conflicts or exchange of fire with Hezbollah and Lebanon, with Iran, with the Houthi rebels of Yemen, with Syria or with militias based in Syria or Iraq. At the same time there has been some exchange of fire by some Houthi rebels and other militias of this region with US military bases and ships. There are multiple fronts. However, on the positive side, various sides have generally been cautious to maintain these exchanges of fire within certain limits.

Unfortunately on at least two occasions these limits have been crossed, leading to the emergence of bigger crisis situations. The first time was in April 2024 when Israel attacked an Iranian consulate building in Syria, killing about a dozen persons including some senior Iranian commanders. While Syria did not retaliate, Iran retaliated in a measured way, creating the impression of a spectacular response but ensuring that huge damage was not caused to Israeli targets. The USA worked behind the scenes for such de-escalation that Israel’s counter-response was also not a very damaging one. So all the sides cooperated and the April crisis did not blow over into the much-feared major escalation and a wider war.

The second major possibility of a wider war appeared around the end of July 2024 when Israel first assassinated a leading Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr ( as well as others) in Beirut and then allegedly killed the top political head and prominent negotiator of Hamas Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran where he had gone to attend the inauguration ceremony of the newly elected moderate President of Iran Mr. Pezeshkian. The responsibility for the second assassination of a moderate Hamas leader (also called a former Prime Minister) was not officially owned by Israel but internationally has been very widely linked to Israel. The killing of the chief negotiator of Hamas was a huge blow to the ongoing negotiations for ceasefire and peace on the Gaza front.

Both assassinations were regarded as acts of grave provocation on the part of Israel, and both Hezbollah and Iran promised to take suitable retaliatory action. The big question being debated just now at the time of writing is this—when these retaliatory actions come will these lead to a wider regional war, or will it be possible to manage these as in the case of the earlier escalation threat of April 2024?

From the available evidence, it appears that this time the possibility of managing the crisis without this leading to a wider war are less than before (unless the prospects can be improved immediately by effective peace efforts). An attacked leading country like Iran is likely to feel that it cannot afford a second time again to give only a ‘managed’ response to highly provocative attacks without demoralizing its supporters and allies. Hezbollah has even less reason to seek to moderate its response. Above all, it appears that this time the Israeli Prime Minister Mr. Netanyahu, due to a complex of factors related to his self-interests as well as to his perception of this being an opportune time for escalation, is even more inclined to ignite a wider conflict in which the USA feels compelled to join on its side, willing or unwillingly.

Meanwhile, the USA has already sent its military reinforcements to the troubled region or is in the process of doing so. As an ABC report titled ‘US sends more fighter jets and ships to the Middle East ahead of possible Israeli retaliation’ tells us—The Pentagon will send an additional fighter squadron and more warships to the Middle East to help defend Israel should Iran react militarily to this week’s assassination of Hamas’ top leader in Tehran. The US will also maintain an aircraft carrier presence in the Middle East. The deployments follow President Joe Biden’s commitment to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday about ‘new defensive US military deployments’ in the region. Defense Secretary Austin also ordered the deployment of an additional fighting squadron to the Middle East. He also ordered additional ballistic missile defense –capable cruisers and destroyers to the US Eastern Command and US Central Command regions. The Defense Department is also taking steps to increase readiness to deploy additional land-based ballistic missile defense.

In September 2023 already there were 30,000 US troops in the Middle East. These troops are placed in countries like Qatar, Bahrain Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and UAE. There are also 900 US soldiers in Syria and around 2500 in Iraq. After the October 7 attack, thousands more were added to the existing troops in the Middle East, including in warships.

It is likely that the first retaliatory action of Iran and Hezbollah will be at least relatively stronger than in the past, although there may still be some restraint. Again, the chances of the further counter-responses of Israel being at a more intense level are higher now. The capacity, if not the inclination, of the USA to ‘manage’ the situation so as to avoid a wider war is likely to be reduced in a condition of its present-day confusions and a lame duck President.

So while we hope that there will be only a mild, managed response from Iran and Hezbollah, high in rhetoric but low in actual harm it causes, and a similarly mild counter-response from Israel, defusing the crisis as before, what we are more likely is see are harsher responses and counter-responses leading to escalation.

If the harsher responses lead to a war breaking out between Israel and Iran on the one hand and Hezbollah/Lebanon and Israel on the other hand, then this will inevitably bring in others too. Houthi rebels, Militias based in Iraq and Syria and of course Hamas and related groups in Palestine will do whatever they can do additionally to harm Israel.

In Gaza, Israeli aggression may become more unrestrained to achieve quick results including ethnic cleansing so that more people may be killed and others driven across the border. Israeli aggression may also increase in the West Bank region.

However, the biggest new entry, willing or more unlikely unwilling, is likely to that of the USA and close allies like U.K. and Germany. NATO will be divided on the issue with members like Norway opposing more aggression on Palestinians but members like Germany expressing strong support for Israel. UK will go wherever USA goes.

However, it will be most difficult for NATO to manage the response of Turkiye. Senior leaders of Turkiye including President Erdogan have threatened, more or less, that they may even directly confront Israel if it continues to be extremely aggressive towards the Palestinians and Hezbollah. If this becomes a reality then this will create a situation of not just deep divisions within NATO members but also an unprecedented one of one NATO member (Turkiye) confronting other NATO members (USA, possibly also Germany). This is such a high risk for NATO that the situation will possibly be ‘managed’ before it comes to this, but the possibility based on statements already made and the unfolding scenario certainly remains.

Surely, there will be impacts on other countries of the region too and the USA’s tendency to concentrate on ruling elites while ignoring the sentiments and sensitivities of the street, of the common people, may come to haunt it as people in several Arab as well as other countries come out to express their support for the Palestinians in particular but perhaps also for anyone fighting Israel. Jordan and Egypt in particular may experience an upsurge of protests against any alignment with Israel and the USA and to a lesser extent this may be seen in some other countries too.

On the other hand, there may be many anti-war protests in the USA too, combined with protests in support of the Palestinian cause. The impact of all this on the upcoming US elections will be keenly monitored by various parties.

To what extent people across the Red Sea may be affected in the wider Horn of Africa region, in the wider Sahel region, the Muslim population in particular, remains to be seen.

Of course, almost the entire world will be affected in terms of the energy situation, oil and gas supplies, its impact on other needs like food, fertilizers and transport, shipping and trade, imports of various essential goods as well as exports. Some of the poorer and more vulnerable countries, dependent more on energy imports and remittances from workers in the Middle East countries, will be more adversely affected. The already serious humanitarian crisis in several countries and regions, including Yemen, Syria and Gaza of course but also in several African and other countries, will worsen further as the international community will further reduce its attention towards the people facing highly serious food shortages and other deprivations.
The weapons supply and even economic help to Ukraine may decline as important suppliers like the USA and Germany turn more towards the Middle East.

Can Russia come to the assistance of Iran and its allies which will be the weaker side in this wider war? At present Russia has its hands fully engaged on the Ukraine front. However, the fact remains that it has a presence as well as an important stake in the region, and has played an important role in saving the Assad regime in Syria from the possibility of an invasion by the USA or a collapse caused in other ways. Hence Russia may provide limited but important high-tech help. This may or may not lead to a possibility of a direct confrontation with the USA, in addition to this threat already existing on the Ukraine front. China, as a leading industrial and economic power, is also in a position, apart from having an inclination and a motive, to play an important supportive role towards Iran but is most unlikely to have a direct involvement in any wider Middle Eastern war.

A wider regional war will also increase the race for nuclear weapons. Iran will accelerate its efforts to get nuclear weapons. If Iran has nuclear weapons, then Saudi Arabia will try to get these too, whether from Pakistan or elsewhere.

Israel already has a considerable number of nuclear weapons and it remains a highly contentious issue whether it will use these in a wider regional war. The possibilities of use will certainly increase if Israel is losing or facing an existential crisis.

Keeping in view all these factors the chances of intolerably high levels of distress caused by a wider regional war are very high and therefore all possible efforts are needed by the UNO, by the international community, by the peace movements and by anyone who can contribute to peace, to prevent a wider war and to stop it at a very early stage if this breaks out. Anyone who is thinking in narrow terms of benefiting from such a war is delusional as such big wars ultimately bring ruin and distress to everyone, particularly in times of such highly destructive weapons.

At the same time, we must also recognize that as long as the original crisis created by the ongoing Gaza conflict remains, the risks of escalation will also continue. So there should be much enhanced efforts for a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, including releasing all hostages and prisoners of both sides, or at the very least, stopping the mistreatment of all prisoners.

Secondly, while there is time available of perhaps just a few days, the UNO must send special de-escalation envoys, respected persons known for their deep knowledge of the region as well as their commitment to peace, to Israel, Lebanon and Iran, with teams to help them, and possibly to some other places, to ensure that the maximum de-escalation efforts can be made and a disastrous wider war in the region can be avoided.

Here we may note that the Middle-East region with its deserts and long coastlines is a region that is highly vulnerable in times of climate change. The region faces very serious humanitarian crisis already in Gaza, Yemen, Syria and parts of Iraq. In Gaza due to direct and indirect costs of war about 200,000 people are likely to have died in just ten months. For Yemen, a UNDP report estimated that 377,000 people had perished directly and indirectly due to conflict by 2021 and that if the conflict continues through 2030, the number of people dying due to conflict directly and indirectly is likely to rise to 1.3 million. In Syria, UNICEF estimates that about 7.5 million children need humanitarian assistance. Nearly 7.5 Million people here have been displaced while an overwhelming majority of the people have to live in poverty. Hence there is great urgency of the nations of this region, on their own and in joint efforts, to devote their resources increasingly to humanitarian assistance, to meeting the essential needs of all people and to environmental protection. The actions pushing the region towards wider war will take the region towards the opposite direction. The refugees from the war and the humanitarian crisis that will be aggravated as a result of this war will spread to many parts of the world, particularly Europe, increasing tensions in many countries. Hence an agenda of peace needs to be implemented as early as possible for the entire region with the UN playing an important role in this.

(Author: Bharat Dogra is Honorary Convener, Campaign to Save Earth Now. His recent books include Planet in Peril, A Day in 2071, Man over Machine, Protecting Earth for Children and Earth without Borders)