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Mainstream, Vol 62 No 33, August 17, 2024

Algorithm of July Rebellion in Bangladesh: Not Armageddon but A Protracted Struggle Unfolds | Gouri Sankar Nag

Saturday 17 August 2024

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Just prior to monsoon in 2024, Bangladesh found itself on the brink of a significant crisis as widespread protests erupted in June, primarily driven by students pouring out in umpteen numbers in opposition to the government’s quota system for public sector jobs. This system traditionally favoured the descendants of those who fought in the country’s liberation war in 1970-71. Although the movement began with the agenda of Gen Z of Bangladeshi society viewing such job reservation policy as an outdated relic that perpetuated inequality and discrimination, their litany of discontent soon became the momentous tide against the alleged misgovernance of the Awami League regime led by Sheikh Hasina. This time the mood of the students’ movement was distinctly radical as they vented out their disaffection through a language that transcended historical grievances. They positioned themselves explicitly as children of the new millennium, with focus on contemporary issues rather than past divisions such as those of 1947 or 1971. Their protests reflected their tremendous awareness of political dynamics in Bangladesh and their sacrifice in front of excessive police action used by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s administration. They could perceive that the elected government has turned into a “dictator in disguise†.

The situation escalated dramatically in June and July when the Awami League government committed several fatal political follies. First, it underestimated the potential strength of the movement and hastily resorted to state’s coercive mechanism to quell the unrest. This move produced a boomerang effect in that it intensified student’s anger and mobilization, leading to increased visibility in public spaces through rallies and marches. The fervour of those protests was palpable and lack of negotiation with the student leaders created a trap in terms of posing a serious challenge to a government that was already under scrutiny for grave allegations of electoral malpractices in last general election (i.e. 12th parliamentary election in Bangladesh) in January 2024. The students’ reinvigorated activism not only highlighted their dissatisfaction with certain existing policies but soon underscored a broader demand for accountability and democratic governance in Bangladesh, thereby accelerating the pressure on the government. In the past we also observed how these micro-movements rapidly spread with electrifying tempo when they were typically organized at the grassroots level, involving student unions and associations across various educational institutions. Besides, student movements in Bangladesh frequently intersect with other social and political forces that often deviate from preordained course but the lens it creates is a reality check with an urge for course correction. For instance, they often align with labour unions, feminist groups, and human rights organizations. This time too we have seen that Amnesty International has strongly condemned the killing of student Abu Sayed during the protest at Dhaka University and other campuses across the country. [1] Yet the government was lulled in the belief that perhaps it could hold on to power with trigger-happy posture.

The recent movement in Bangladesh has showcased several significant features that underscore its depth and complexity. First, one of the most notable aspects is the substantial support it has garnered from overseas Bangladeshi Diasporas, who have rallied behind the cause, amplifying its reach and impact. This international backing, in contrast to very conservative kind of restraint on the part of the great powers of world politics, has been crucial in providing emotional fillip, resources and visibility to the movement, allowing it to transcend geographical boundaries.

Second, the involvement of some veteran intellectuals has lent credibility and gravitas to the protests, as their authoritative voices resonate with both historical significance and contemporary relevance. For example in course of the ongoing nationwide movement demanding quota reform, a veteran author of Bangladesh namely Muhamed Zafar Iqbal said in a written note which he confirmed later to tbs news that he would never want to go to Dhaka University again lest he had to encounter the new Razakars. His fulminating reaction that “And as long as I live, I do not want to see the face of any razakar. We only have one life, why should I have to see razakars again in this life?†was immediately shared on facebook and drew the notice of the youth in their fight against the regime.

Third, the advent of social media has further emboldened the youth, offering them a platform to express dissent against the establishment in real-time. This digital landscape has facilitated rapid mobilization and organization among young activists, enabling them to share their grievances widely and connect with like-minded individuals. Here it would not be too much to remember that the 2018 Road Safety protests in Dhaka, also made extensive use of social media to coordinate actions and spread awareness. It was not a bubble that vanished once for all but such moments exhibited that people were seething with unrest, enough to form the nationwide bloc against the corrupt oligarchy albeit these developments could not be coherently shaped and spearhead due to divergent strategies and ideologies. Nevertheless the lesson it generated was a new algorithm of protest, tapestry of which is interwoven but deeply connected to people’s basic needs and their bhagidari (i.e. share) in the system.

Fourth, compounding these dynamics was Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s politically biased remarks on July 14, where she compared the student protesters with Razakars (i.e. traitors and collaborators with the Pakistani regime during the Liberation War) [2]. Such comments not only alienated a significant portion of the student body but also served to ignite further outrage among those who felt badly insulted and humiliated by their leader’s disparaging tone. This misstep indicated a profound disconnect between the government and its constituents, suggesting that tensions would scale up escalating beyond manageable levels. The students’ response was swift and fierce; they perceived Hasina’s comments as an affront to their dignity. Consequently, this incident added fuel to an already volatile situation, leading to an outpouring of protests that reflected a broader popular discontent with governmental policies and actions.

To comprehend the nature of the movement in Bangladesh, we need to examine two critical aspects too: the historical legacy of the language movement in favour of the recognition of Bengali and the recent political twist in the country. The language movement, which emerged in the early 1950s, was a pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s history that underscored the importance of linguistic and cultural identity. This movement arose as a response to attempts by the then Pakistani government to impose Urdu as the sole national language, which marginalized Bengali speakers. The protests culminated in tragic events on February 21, 1952, when police opened fire on demonstrators. As written by a young researcher namely Hasan Hamid, “21 February is also observed in Bangladesh as ‘Shaheed Dibosh’ (i.e. Martyr’s Day). The names of the five most famous Language Movement’s martyrs are much heard of: Salam, Barkat, Rafiq, Jabbar and Shafiur.†[3] This episode left indelible marks on the national consciousness and laid the groundwork for future struggles for autonomy and rights, ultimately contributing to Bangladesh’s quest for independence from Pakistan in 1971.

There is no gainsaying the fact that Bangladesh stands as South Asia’s youngest democracy, having gained independence after a historic struggle characterized by emotional fervour and nationalist sentiment. However, despite its initial promise, the progressive potential of nationalism has faced significant challenges over the decades. Following independence, Bangladesh was subjected to a series of military coups and economic and climate induced disruptions that caused to diminish safety nets and betrayed the aspirations of people. Each episode of military rule prompted mass protests; however, these efforts often fell short without a conclusive consolidation of egalitarian democratic transformation. It was only when a larger coalition of progressive forces got united that a transient flicker of hope of meaningful political transformation was visible. This ongoing struggle reflects both the resilience of Bangladeshi nationalism and its complex relationship with democracy. It seems to unravel a protracted battle because the current situation in Bangladesh will take time to get back its rhythm with hope of substantial improvement, not mere satisfaction out of patch-work.

This time, unlike the 2013 Shahbagh Movement, a new narrative has emerged, shaped by the changed realities of contemporary society and the aspirations of the new generation that demanded change. The government was compelled to recognize that threats of crackdown and repression were neither effective nor appropriate response to the demonstrations led by this new generation. Each tragic loss of a student only served to galvanize the movement further, igniting a renewed vigour among protesters who were determined to voice their demands for justice and reform. Herein lies optimism that students have not been co-opted by the system and their readiness and opposition to status quo not only symbolises their tremendous mental strength but also echoes the immortal tune-“we shall overcome some day†i.e. the conviction in the dream of a new progressive and egalitarian order sidetracking the minor aberration and scepticism, leading to a narrative of anarchist violence and unstable governance. Amidst the fluid situation we need to demystify these perceptions to keep alive hope that there would be some sustained engagement by the students instead of hitherto fluctuation marked by periods of dormancy followed by sudden resurgence in response to specific incidents or issues. Similarly, we would expect that student movements in Bangladesh must adhere to a tradition of non-violent protest, drawing on the principles of civil disobedience and peaceful demonstration.

(Author: Professor Gouri Sankar Nag, Department of Political Science, Sidho-Kanho-Birsha University, West Bengal, India)


[2Accessed the news “Amidst Bangladesh’s quota reform movement, why the term ‘Razakar’ has provoked unprecedented fury†from https://indianexpress.com/article/india/bangladesh-quota-reform-movement-why-the-term-razakar-has-provoked-fury-9465108/ on 4/8/2024.

[3Accessed the Comment “Remembering the martyrs of the ‘Bengali Language Movement†by Hasan Hamid from https://www.sadf.eu/remembering-the-martyrs-of-the-bengali-language-movement/ on 4/8/2024.

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