North Korean Nuclear Brinkmanship and its Global Impact

North Korea, stunned the world community yet again, defying its perceived threat perceptions, sending jitters across the region by conducting an underground nuclear test. Thereafter this was followed, reportedly, by the test-firing a series of short range missiles—unmindful of international pressure—a move that could invite fresh sanctions and punitive actions against it. Nations across the world condemned the test. China, Pyongyang’s closest supporter, called it a “flagrant and brazen†violation of international opinion and said it “firmly opposes†North Korea’s conduct. However, those who are aware of the stewardship of the North Korean leader say that Comrade Kim Jong-Il is courageous, ambitious, and does everything in a big way. He has a strong daring character which enables him to carry out any difficult task and take it to its completion with his own efforts, once he starts it. For some Korea watchers, he is the best sailor who can steer within the fewest points of the wind, and exact a motive power out of the greatest obstacles irrespective of the world’s populist moves. The KCN agency said North Korea successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25, 2009 as a part of the measures to reinforce its nuclear deterrent for self-defence, territorial imperatives, integrity and sovereignty of the country.

Background of Nuclear Weapons

THE insight into North Korea’s esoteric nuclear programmme dates back to the late 1970s. By 1994, the United States believed that North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with increasing amounts of plutonium. Faced with diplomatic pressure and the threat of American military air strikes against its reactor, North Korea agreed to dismantle its plutonium programme as part of the Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors would be complete

Nonetheless, with the abandonment of its plutonium programme, North Korea secretly began a programme to build a bomb based on enriched uranium. In October 2002, North Korea publicly admitted to running a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced that it had performed its first-ever nuclear weapon test. And finally, North Korea sent shock waves across the world by conducting its second nuclear test on May 25, 2009.

Reason Behind the Test

THE race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong—but that is the way to bet it, Damon Runyon seems to say. Yet, there are different schools of thought and interpretations on the motivations behind Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons programme. Those who believe North Korea is a revisionist state that is dissatisfied with its place in the current international structure argue that Pyongyang’s nuclear aspirations are motivated by the need to create a serious external threat. This school of thought has ample evidence to support its claims: North Korea’s initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a Constitution that states that the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and the Korean Workers’ Party bylaws calling for a “completion of the revolution in the south†.

On the other hand, some analysts believe North Korea is a state satisfied with the status quo and that it seeks peaceful coexistence with South Korea and the international community. Proponents of this school of thought often argue that Pyongyang’s nuclear motivations are defensive in nature and designed to deter external threats to North Korea. Evidence to support this argument includes the 1972 North-South Joint Communiqué; the 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea (the so-called “Basic Agreement†); the 1991 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula; the 2000 summit meeting between the leaders of North and South Korea; the Agreed Framework with the United States; and reunification proposals that would recognise “two systems†for the North and South.

Regardless of North Korean motivations, Pyongyang’s record of exporting ballistic missiles and missile production technology have raised concerns that North Korea may also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or even complete nuclear weapons to state or non-state actors.

Global Impact

NORTH KOREA being defiant in the face of international condemnation of its latest nuclear test, the United States called the test a matter of grave concern for all countries. “North Korea is directly and recklessly challenging the international community,†President Obama said in a statement. “North Korea’s behaviour increases tensions and undermines stability in north-east Asia.†The UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, said he was “deeply disturbed†by the test. “I’m closely following the situation in the region as well as consultations in the United Nations Security Council.†Later, the UN Security Council unanimously condemned North Korea for testing a nuclear device in violation of its resolutions against Pyongyang. Council members acted swiftly in response to North’s nuclear test. More so, the UN Security Council discussed its response to the latest escalation in the crisis. In a separate move, US ambassador Susan Rice said: “We are now resolved to work on a new resolution, a strong resolution and strong contents.†India is equally vocal in taking head-on North Korea for its uncalled nuclear test.

Others apart, China, North Korea’s key ally, said it was “resolutely opposed†to the test, urging its neighbour to avoid actions that would sharpen tensions and return to the six-party arms-for-disarmament talks. Japan, which considers itself high on the North’s potential hit list, said it would seek a new resolution condemning the test. Russian defence experts estimated the explosion’s yield at between 10 and 20 kilotons, many times more than the one kiloton measured in its first nuclear test in 2006 and about as powerful as the bombs the US used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. One kiloton is equal to the force produced by 1000 tons of TNT.

Gordon Brown described the test as “erroneous, misguided and a danger to the world†. The British Prime Minister added: “This act will undermine prospects for peace on the Korean peninsula and will do nothing for North Korea’s security.†South Korea and Japan condemned the test, North Korea’s second since it exploded its first nuclear device in October 2006 in defiance of international opinion. That test prompted the UN Security Council to pass a resolution banning Pyongyang from activities related to its ballistic missile programme. The South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, convened a session of the country’s Security Council after seismologists reported earthquakes in the Kilju region, the site of the North’s first nuclear test.

In Tokyo, Japan’s chief Cabinet Secretary, Takeo Kawamura, said the test was “a clear violation of the UN Security Council resolution and cannot be tolerated†.North Korea had warned of a second nuclear test after the UN condemned its test-launch of a ballistic missile on April 5 and agreed to tighten sanctions put in place in 2006. Pyongyang insisted it had put a peaceful communications satellite in orbit, but experts said the technology and methods were identical to those used to launch a long-range Taepodong-2 missile.

North Korea NPT and the World

EAST ASIAN columnists underline, a de facto nuclear North Korea increases pressures and prospects for other East Asian states to acquire nuclear weapons as well. The test is all set to create a tangible impact on the NPT cutting across world frontiers. Growing North Korean nuclear weapons resources could also directly fuel proliferation ambitions elsewhere in the world. And North Korean success in avoiding meaningful repercussions for either its NPT noncompliance or its subsequent NPT withdrawal would set a negative example (if not a precedent) for other nations and erode future arms control compliance.

These consequences, taken together, suggest that North Korea’s nuclear weapons acquisition poses a far greater threat to the NPT than the legal and symbolic precedents that might be set by making exceptions for Pyongyang in order to reverse that acquisition. However unseemly those precedents might be, the priority is to find a way to a peaceful nonproliferation solution in Korea.

North Korea’s nuclear activities would pose such problems to global peace and security whether it had signed the NPT or not. If the world community allows complications from the fact that North Korea did sign the NPT to interfere with solving the basic problems of North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, it would be cutting off its nose to spite its face.

This conclusion does not appear exceptionally willy-nilly. The concern over setting legal and symbolic precedents that could weaken prospects for future NPT compliance is real. Any unique treatment of North Korea should stem from a shared global goal of curbing nuclear proliferation. If this goal is kept paramount, and because the North Korean case has always been exceptional, detrimental precedent-setting can be mitigated. The NPT has successfully prevented proliferation around the world and provides the strongest legal mechanism to compel disarmament by its signatories, the five nuclear weapon powers. However, it is under pressure today for not achieving enough on both counts. The stakes on keeping the NPT viable, if not vibrant, are very high.

In certain ways, the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula offers opportunities for enhancing global nonproliferation and disarmament efforts, as well as challenges. Some of those opportunities can be realised even without a near-term or complete cessation of North Korea’s nuclear weapon ambitions. These opportunities should be the focus of all those concerned about the long-term survival and vitality of the NPT. Sometimes, it is the exception that makes the rule.

Analysis

TOP American analysts believe North Korea’a test is moving closer to possessing the ability to mount a nuclear warhead on long-range missiles that are capable, in theory, of reaching Hawaii and Alaska. A second nuclear test is by no means simply a propaganda ploy. Most experts believe that the 2006 test was flawed, producing an explosive yield well below even what the North’s scientists had predicted. The scientific and military imperatives for a second test have been strong for over two years, and the potential data, experience and other advantages of further testing would be tremendous. Yet some analysts believe the North Korean leader, Kim Jong-Il, hopes to use the test to shore up support from the military amid mounting speculation that he is about to name one of his three sons as his successor. Another fall-out could be that after the North Korean test, the propelling motivation for aggressively aspiring states like Iran and others could move on unhindered to acquire nuclear weapons.

Solutions

A careful analysis of the crisis in the North Korean Peninsula is crucial as efforts continue to permanently dismantle the nuclear roller-coaster. There appears to be a consensus among UN Security Council members on the need for a UN resolution in response to the latest North Korean nuclear test, instead of the relatively toothless President’s statement that greeted the April 5 missile launch. Furthermore, those nations who tend to block efforts to punish the North for its violations have reacted with unusual ferocity. However, the UN may choose a compromise resolution along with punitive actions as the move appears so.

• Under the compromise resolution, the sanctions will mostly be aimed at the North Korean leadership and its nuclear and ballistic missile programme.

• It will ban travel by North Korean Government officials involved in military programmes and ban trade in luxury goods and high end financial activity of the country’s leaders.

• But it will largely spare the North Korean people and in fact include a cut out for humanitarian relief.

• All the 192 member states of the UN are required to comply with the provisions of the sanctions resolution.

• Any unfavourable declaration is bound to displease China that sees Japan as a re-emerging regional rival which, strategists say, has been constrained by Beijing’s skilful use of maverick North Korea, the same way it has used Pakistan to constrain India.

• The United States, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan engaged North Korea in negotiations a year ago aimed at convincing Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons programme in exchange for economic and diplomatic rewards.

• But North Korea walked away from the six-party talks two months later, after Washington slapped sanctions on a Macau-based bank it said was involved in money-laundering and counter-feiting on behalf of Pyongyang.

Conclusion

IN the final analysis, geo-strategic experts and defence analysts regard the military option unattractive; diplomacy—backed by economic and political pressures and inducements—has been the preferred instrument to restrain and dismantle North Korea’s capabilities. At the same time, diplomacy requires military backing. According to the Obama Administration, a strong US security alliance with South Korea and Japan, and efforts to enhance allied military capabilities—including the redeployment of US forces in South Korea, continuing modernisation of South Korean forces and development of the theatre missile defences—will weaken North Korea’s ability to employ threats and intimidation as a diplomatic instrument. The possibility of a pre—emptive strike against North Korean strategic military assets is also a diplomatic instrument. To the extent that North Korea views such an attack as a credible danger—whatever the likelihood of such a move—Pyongyang will be more inclined to avoid escalation and make compromises for a diplomatic solution. Similarly, the threat of a military blockade to enforce economic sanctions and political isolation can make a diplomatic solution more attractive as an alternative.

Since the stakes are so high, and other options are less attractive, diplomatic efforts are likely to continue—despite the attendant frustrations and difficulties. Finally, success in the Six Party Talks could have the additional benefit of laying the foundations for a nascent multilateral security mechanism in East Asia that would help to support peace and security throughout the region. Nevertheless, it is matter of time before the UN proposes resolutions to put the record straight regarding the North Korean nuclear brinkmanship.

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Dr Quaisar Alam belongs to the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.