China, India and Tibet—Strategies and Responses

China’s renewed intransigence over the Dalai Lama and Arunachal suggests, on the one hand, a post-Olympics accretion of confidence following the success of her spectacular performance and, on the other, a general nervousness induced by the global financial crisis. Tibet is in any case a seething cauldron of discontent, inviting a massive post-Olympics crackdown at home and abroad, while on the mainland businesses have closed and there is a significant rise in urban unemployment. Indeed, the financial crisis is hitting China faster than predicted. Whereas until now the linear increase in wealth had depoliticised the cities and the middle class, with changed economic conditions the state is worried about its hold especially over cities where potential trouble-makers—intellectuals, students and workers—reside. If ideology was the cementing factor fifty years ago today it is wealth, and any setback could unleash uncomfortable political demands.

Chinese diplomatic behaviour often appears erratic and unfathomable though seemingly successful in pursuit of her national interest (even as a poor country she was defiant, intransigent, even aggressive). With expanding clout in the economic and military cum space fields, her pathology, like that of a neurotic giant, invites emollience rather than challenge. Though the diplomacy of any country largely reflects its power position in the international arena, styles vary. Chinese techniques often derive from their received strategic tradition, particularly from Sun Tzu, and/or from the methodology of totalitarian regimes. She also has received imperial attitudes. Tibetans have surely been familiar with them over the centuries, and India now has clocked up more than fifty year’s experience, apart from British records. But still the public is frequently taken by surprise by China’s sudden twists and turns for which the Indian Government’s gloss fails to inspire credibility, suggesting instead a certain inability of the state to adequately anticipate, comprehend and respond. And yet India does learn, albeit slowly and reluctantly.

Several Western scholars have sought to identify certain peculiarly Chinese methods and negotiating procedures (Indian techniques have evoked no comment other than ‘diffident and reactive’) including Guy Olivier Faure (Negotiation Journal, April 1998) and Richard H. Solomon for Rand. Faure classifies Chinese methods into those of ‘mobile warfare’ for dealing with enemies, and ‘joint quest’ with potential partners. These methods once understood turn out to be fairly constant and predictable, facilitating the making of appropriate responses. Despite official Chinese rhetoric India clearly falls into the enemy category when it comes to territorial border negotiations, though like most states with China India adopts strategies of both engagement and competition.

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Tibet’s position is peculiar—on the one hand from a Chinese perspective it is a domestic concern, that is, a ‘law and order’ problem, yet the sway the unarmed Dalai Lama exercises over the Buddhist populations in Tibet, Mongolia, Japan, and China (where he claims two million followers), gives him great ‘soft power’. Moreover he is acknowledged by Tibetans inside and outside Tibet as their supreme leader; he heads a virtual government-in-exile, and his post-Nobel Peace Prize international personality is only growing. Chinese leaders are quite paranoid about him, and instead of seeking his cooperation to stabilise the situation in Tibet, denounce him as an ‘enemy’ (splittist of the ‘motherland’). Thus China is diplomatically in a state of ‘war’, as defined above, with both India and the exiled Tibetans.

To recapitulate some characteristic ‘warring’ techniques, not all specific to China:

1. Nurturing negative ‘enemy’ images: right from the start Nehru’s moral ‘idealism’ cut no ice with Mao, and Chou-en-lai found him not only weak and gullible but hypocritical, given Chinese interpretations of the Hyderabad, Junagadh and Goa actions. Even more so was the later accession of Sikkim under his daughter’s regime which they have, till today, failed to clearly recognise. Subsequent leaders, including Vajpayee who abandoned previous party positions on Tibet by trying to fit themselves into Nehru’s cast, inevitably remained suspect in Chinese eyes. Similarly the Dalai Lama has of late been the subject of quite vicious vituperation while travellers to Tibet note the visible contempt in which the Chinese hold the ‘subject’ Tibetans. From a communist perspective Tibet’s was a feudal society trapped in the superstitions of religion: this justified the adoption of any means or stratagem to destroy it. As Middle Kingdom chauvinists, they simply wished to annex it. By contrast Nehru entertained golden opinions of Chinese modernisers as Asian brothers, and the Dalai Lama also voiced his appreciation of communism (in its universal materially redemptive goals isomorphic to those of universal Buddhist spirituality) except for the gun.

2. Securing ‘control of ground’: the occupation and takeover of Tibet, Aksai Chin, Ladakh gave China the advantage in structuring negotiations and talks, pushing the other side into the role of supplicant. To be sure, there is nothing specifically Chinese about this, land and property grabbers the world over know that ‘occupation is nine-tenths of the law’.

3. Using or misusing history as justification for contemporary policies, often brazenly embroidered and slanted: an entire mythology concocted by omission, addition, edition and misinterpretation of facts shows that ‘Tibet was always part of China’, and a selective interpretation of history derecognises the MacMahon Line as an imperialist boundary, while claiming as legitimate all land acquisitions of the Qing empire which occurred roughly during the time period of western colonialism. Although China uses ancient history to justify present borders the reverse does not hold: that Tibet ruled over a good portion of China in her pre-Buddhistic days does not apparently balance out the equation—rather history is revised.

4. Misleading the other through false concessions or misleading hints, trading upon the other’s ignorance or desperation. Such was the map showing India and Sikkim in similar colours without official endorsement leading to premature MEA jubilation. The sudden issuance of a visa to Kiren Rijiju, an Arunachal MP, for visiting China during the Olympics might have been interpreted as a positive tactical move, but one hears that it was a clerical error and the concerned embassy officer was subsequently withdrawn. Thus it was not a deliberately misleading ploy. However, a real remark thrown out by Chinese negotiators on the Tibetan delegation’s penultimate visit as to what kind of autonomy they desired within the limits of the Chinese Constitution was seized on by them as a possibly genuine query only to have at the last November round of talks, their carefully considered response summarily dismissed as ‘splittism’.

5. Identifying and cultivating a sympathetic individual on the other side results in a declared friendship, which implicitly places on the ‘friend’ obligations such as influencing negotiations in China’s favour, or creating a favourable atmosphere for talks. Kissinger and Brzezinski are examples from the US: in India several individuals willing to be persuaded of Chinese good intentions included K.M. Pannikkar, the first Indian ambassador to China, and many more apart from the openly avowed pro-China Communist Parties, newsmen and even non-ideologically compatible political parties. Similarly the Chinese cultivated the last Panchen Lama seeking to play him against the Dalai, but ultimately could not win his fealty. Amongst Tibetan exiles the Chinese have been most comfortable with Shanghai-educated Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s brother, through whom they initially invited Tibetan delegations to visit their homeland and later resumed negotiations in 2002. However, even he has been obliged to expose their current denials of a promise made to him that they would negotiate anything with the Tibetans short of independence.

6. Blowing hot and cold are of course common tactics. The enemy can be frightened by strong bluster, overawed by displays of strength, or gently dealt with as occasion demands. Chou-en-lai flattered Nehru when he was afraid the Dalai Lama may not return to Tibet in 1956, but slapped him in the face by the military invasion of 1962. Deng held Rajiv Gandhi’s hand for several (countable) minutes to win concessions over Tibet without giving any concrete returns. Most recently at the Beijing Asia-Europe Summit the Chinese went out of their way to give India’s Prime Minister, whom they had not invited to the Olympics, special attention as an acknowledged economist, hoping for a useful Asian dimension on the financial crisis. (However, they were rewarded only with IMF theology.) In their public pronouncements over the past fifty years the Dalai Lama was first treated with respect as a religious leader, his ‘clique’ condemned as splittist, but now he himself is savaged in both his political and religious roles.

7. Although the Chinese often insist on a ‘principled’ negotiating posture, they feel free to themselves drop these principles as and when required. They loudly demand ‘sincerity’ from the Dalai Lama, apparently unaware of their own unscrupulousness. Indeed China easily reneges on commitments: she bulldozed the Tibetan delegation in 1951 into signing the 17-pt Agreement which while giving Beijing central authority over Tibet guaranteed autonomy to the TAR, preservation of the existing political system and of the established status, functions and the powers of the Dalai and Panchen Lamas, preservation of Tibetan monasteries and their income. They have consistently violated the clauses of that agreement, but any reminder is branded as ‘splittism’. However, the Indian Government is not only frequently asked to solemnly repeat its recognition of China’s sovereignty over Tibet, but is frequently reminded of her commitment not to allow political activity by the exiled Tibetans on her soil, as recently with the recent Tibetan gathering in Dharamsala.

8. The Chinese generally prefer to negotiate on their own territory for obvious reasons as they have insisted with the Tibetans who would have preferred Switzerland or other neutral territory. With India they have alternate meetings in India and China. But they like to fire preliminary broadsides before negotiations, either foreclosing options for the other side by making exaggerated claims through the media as with Arunachal, or making deniable diplomatic pronouncements to create an ambience favourable to themselves. Before the recent November talks with Tibetan envoys China attacked the Dalai Lama for expressing reservations about his Middle Path diplomacy (to which they have never subscribed); after the talks they declared from the housetops that they will not consider autonomy for Tibet in any form. Unable to prevent the Dharamsala conclave from meeting, they then offered to continue the talks!

9. Defining the terms of the discussion: the Kashmir and Tibetan cases are wide apart in terms of history both ancient and modern with markedly different constitutional status—Kashmir enjoys far more autonomy and economic rights than Tibet with no fear of demographic invasions and appropriation of local jobs and property. Yet China has, since the militant uprisings over the last two decades, slyly equated the two. Within terms of this false equation which India has not challenged, she has lost ground to China while totally accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Despite Chinese demands the Dalai Lama on grounds of upholding his monk’s vow of not uttering falsehoods, has refused to accept the thesis that Tibet (and Taiwan) were always part of China. This to the discomfort of the Chinese, keeps the issue open for debate.

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As has been wryly remarked, India clings to the negotiating table with her finger-tips, while the Chinese breathe down on her with arms and elbows spread across its surface.

Indian blunders have been attributed to a compromising culture, a generic desire to muddle through, and the problems of being answerable to a public in an open regime. Not having an implacable posture of her own, India seems to accept the Chinese paradigm of law and history and argue within it, by which she gives away the game before she starts. Militarily and economically she is some decades behind China and her democracy allows a free play of opinion which the Chinese can fully exploit. However, from time to time India has replied in kind to Chinese provocations. For example, the Indian Army was properly equipped and outfitted after the1962 debacle and in 1987 recovered its morale by delivering a decisive blow to the Chinese at Sumdorong Chu which the Indian Government for some reason failed to adequately advertise, in contrast to, say, public awareness of the bloody nose China received in 1979 when invading Vietnam to ‘teach her a lesson’. However, given India’s growing presence in the international arena with her advances in the economic, scientific and technological fields and her perseverance with democracy (albeit now almost at the lowest common denominator), she may hopefully feel encouraged to more strongly defend her national interest. She certainly ignored China’s request to disallow the November Tibetan meet, and even Sonia Gandhi expressed some disapproval of the Vienna betrayal, though not enough to stay away from the Olympics.

Over several decades Tibetans negotiated within the non-violent middle path paradigm which accepts Chinese sovereignty while asking for genuine autonomy in political and religious affairs. Despite constant rebuffs they strove hard to give the obdurate Chinese the benefit of the doubt. Although constant stonewalling has driven them to review their position, the Dalai Lama’s cautious pragmatism still prevails over the younger Tibetans’ demand for a more radical negotiating posture. Minimally the recent Dharamsala Tibetan conclave recommended rejection of further talks with the Chinese until they adopt a more conciliatory posture, failing which they would be free to explore non-violent avenues for self-determination or independence. In the absence of a time limit this hardly signifies a major escalation especially keeping in mind China’s patient wait for his demise. The Dalai Lama has, in the meantime, once again urged India to adopt a more confident posture towards China, as indeed Tibet’s situation, present and future, is symbiotically tied with India’s.